Cover photo. Replica of the twelfth-century Polonnaruwa-era sitting statue carved into a granite rock face at the Gala Vihara (Rock Monastery) in Polonnaruwa, Sri Lanka. The replica was hand-crafted under the close supervision of Burmese architect Tampawaddy U Win Maung in 2011, and is currently on exhibit in the Shwedegon Pagoda at the Sitagu Buddha Vihara in Austin, TX USA.

Rethinking Satipatthana

from investigating Dhamma

to dwelling in jhana

Bhikkhu Cintita

© 2026

Copyright 2026, Bhikkhu Cintita (John Dinsmore)

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Publication Data.

Bhikkhu Cintita (John Dinsmore, Ph.D.), 1949 -

Rethinking Satipatthana  / Bhikkhu Cintita.

With glossary.

1.Buddhism – Meditation. 2. Buddhism – Satipatthana.

© 2026

ISBN #: 978-1-105-67175-3

Contents

Preface

Satipaṭṭhāna is an essential advanced practice in early Buddhism for one intent on awakening. It is clearly described in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and in the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta, in the Ānāpāṇasati Sutta, in the various discourses of the Satipaṭṭhāna-saṁyutta, and in many shorter discourses in the Pali canon. These sources have parallels in the Chinese canon. It is commonly acknow-ledged as the early source of modern vipassanā or insight meditation, and of modern “mindfulness” practice. The Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta is today possibly the most widely studied and discussed discourse in the Pali canon. Satipaṭṭhāna is most commonly awkwardly translated as ‘foundations of mindfulness,’ but I will leave it untranslated, or use the phrase ‘Dhamma investigation,’ which is its function.

Unfortunately, there is much we do not understand about the message of these early satipaṭṭhāna texts, or rather, there is astonishingly little in these early texts that we interpret consistently or convincingly. Satipaṭṭhāna confused me for a long time, and I’m certainly not alone. My detailed investigation of this topic began as a result of my dissatisfaction with the interpretation of clauses such as …

… he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, or he abides body-contemplating in the body externally, or he abides body-contemplating in the body both internally and externally.

… as having to do with contemplating one’s own body then contemplating someone else’s body. I was not convinced. It also alarmed me that no one seemed able to explain why body, feelings, mind, dhammas should be singled out as as the four categories of satipaṭṭhāna practice (the four “foundations”). Although the Sutta is clearly a practice tutorial for investigating many specific Dhamma teachings, I wondered why there was so little Dhamma in the ways the modern derivatives of satipaṭṭhāna are taught.

Moreover, many teachers of satipaṭṭhāna and vipassanā insist that these contemplative practices are incompatible with the silence of samādhi and jhāna, even while the early satipaṭṭhāna discourses (albeit not so clearly in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta itself) consistently and clearly describe the close integration of the jhānas into satipaṭṭhāna practice.¹ At least one early text even describes satipaṭṭhāna itself as “a samādhi,” and samādhi is elsewhere claimed to develop “knowledge and vision of how things are.” This inconsistency also concerned me.

It seemed to me that part of the confusion about what the satipaṭṭhāna texts say comes from a history of re-interpretation of key concepts. It has now been abundantly documented, and is becoming widely acknowledged, for instance, that the meaning and role of samādhi and jhāna found in the commentaries, particularly in the seminal Visuddhimagga, contrast markedly with what is found in the early texts. Much of the confusion around satipaṭṭhāna seems to have resulted from attempting to reconcile multiple contrasting historical frameworks that, in principle, don’t cohere.

I will propose here an interpretation  (unique in a few respects) of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta that indicates that it is well-composed, coherent, consistent and systematic, down to the finest details. It will explain the seeming incompatibility between between the analysis required in satipaṭṭhāna and the silence of samādhi. Moreover it will give us a valuable perspective of the broader roles of the three faculties of right effort, right recollection and right samādhi within the eightfold path.

The methodology of this study

Recent progress in dating Buddhist texts has encouraged prioritizing the scholarly study of “Early Buddhist Texts” (EBT), the earliest stratum of Buddhist scriptures. This approach allows us, in principle, to avoid becoming entangled in the inter-sectarian inconsistencies that later developed historically by focusing on the Dhamma as the Buddha taught it, as far as we can determine. What generally count as EBT are roughly the bulk of discourses of the Buddha and early disciples found in the first four Nikāyas, parts of the fifth Nikāya, and parts of the Vinaya, as found in the Pali canon, as well as in in parallel traditions preserved in other languages, primarily in Chinese.² The EBT paradigm chooses to let these texts speak for themselves, and this is what I will attempt to allow here.

Since the Buddha and his disciples did not have the advantage of the Visuddhi-magga or other later resources at their disposal, the authority of these later texts in interpreting the early texts is contestable. However, the early texts seem clearly to have been articulated in the context of the early Upaniṣads or other related, but no longer existent, pre-Buddhist teachings, and in a certain cultural, intellectual, and physical milieu. These form a source of relevant clues, particularly in the etymology of early Buddhist terminology, for accurately interpreting early Buddhist texts.

In addition to assuming the EBT perspective, I also employ criteria of functionality, coherence, field testing, and cognitive viability in rethinking satipaṭṭhāna.

Underlying functionality is my own—and others’—conviction that the Dhamma serves almost entirely as a support for practice, and that practice is the source of benefits in terms of soteriological and practical goals. Even the most philosophically sophisticated and astute points of Dhamma are parts of the scaffold that upholds practice. Accordingly, we can ask of any Dhammic teaching, “How do we put this into practice?” or “Why would the Buddha teach this? Where is the benefit?” Functionality offers a strong constraint on what can be considered a viable interpretation of the early texts.

I also view the early texts as remarkably coherent, systematic, and well-spoken. This point is easily obscured: First, the early Dhamma was spoken in many very short discourses; that they share terminology and conceptual frameworks with other short discourses has to be worked out. Second, the early Buddhist discourses themselves are often demonstrably unreliable victims of ancient editing. Our task in recognizing the underlying coherence is therefore like piecing together a jigsaw puzzle in which some pieces are missing, and in which other pieces have been mixed in from other jigsaw puzzles. At some point we nevertheless recognize, “By George, it’s the Golden Gate Bridge!” A particular interpretation of the whole has shone forth that we cannot easily disregard, and once this has happened it becomes the basis of interpreting the remaining unplaced pieces, or of rejecting some of these altogether as intruders from other people's jigsaw puzzles. Although such conclusions are still debatable, the convergence of evidence from many sources leave little doubt about their viability. And what shines forth is repeatedly, it seems to me, a coherent, functional system of teachings. Since the Buddha was a very systematic and practical thinker, coherence offers strong requirement for a viable interpretation.

Field testing occurs through the actual practice of a particular candidate interpretation of Dhamma. The Buddha made abundantly clear that the Dhamma is to be “verified by the wise” and instructs us to “come and see,” and so we do. The purpose of satipaṭṭhāna, in particular, is to support such experiential verification of Dhamma. It follows that the Buddhist adept, accomplished in practice, will be in an especially good position to evaluate viable interpretations in terms of practice experience, in fact, in a far better position to witness this shining through than the mere scholar. The adept is like the jigsaw enthusiast who has actually been on the Golden Gate Bridge, who is already familiar with its features and the contours of the landscape and sea-scape around it. Field testing is an essential, ultimate constraint on interpretations, that might otherwise easily result solely from scholastic cleverness.

Finally, cognitive viability asks that our interpretation makes sense in terms of what is independently known about how the human mind works. When we practice samādhi, when we gain insight into non-self and impermanence, when we gain independence from crippling attachments, or when the most pro-gressed among us attain awakening, it must be within the capabilities of human cognition. As an erstwhile cognitive scientist, I bring a useful degree of erudition to the table in this regard, alongside great admiration for the world’s first great cognitive scientist: the Buddha.

My experience has been that the constraint of cognitive viability, in fact, expands as well as limits the scope of possible interpretations. The reason is that we tend to underestimate the capabilities of human cognition. I have found that a cognitive perspective seems to have been particularly productive for understanding what is going on in satipaṭṭhāna practice. For instance, Dhamma practice is about acquiring and applying skills: effectively it teaches us to become “a virtuoso of virtue” and “a wizard of wisdom.” Modern research tells us that skill acquisition or training is largely a matter of internalization of previously explicit conceptual know-how, so that it becomes spontaneous, effortless, intuitive, quick and quiet. A virtuoso pianist does not think, but lets the music simply arise through her, as if in a trance. This helps us understand the how the silence of the jhānas helps, rather than hinders, acquiring the wisdom of the Buddha.

How to read this book

The six chapters in this book qualify as independent essays on the same broad theme. They can be read selectively, and in any order. However, they are integrated in that any topic raised in a cursory manner in one is often treated from a different perspective or with more detail in another, so that the reader can easily explore any such topic more fully as it is encountered. I’ve provided appropriate references by chapter and section number, for instance, “See 5.4.2.”  The glossary at the end of the book also provides such references.

Sutta references follow common standards, such that “AN 5.26 iii 21,” for instance, refers to Sutta 26 in the “Fives” chapter of the Aṅguttara Nikāya, and specifically to a passage that appears on page 21 of volume three of the Pali Text Society’s (PTS) edition of this Nikāya. The text of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta found as an appendix includes the PTS numeration within MN 10.

I’ve introduced a novel notation to abbreviate pericopes, which I think will make them easier to sort out. A pericope is a series of almost identical passages among which alternative words or phrases fill certain slots in a common matrix. Highly redundant, they are generally abbreviated by translators, often in confusing ways. The following is the first instance in a pericope series in the notation advanced here:

One remembers to abandon wrong ◖view◗ and to enter and remain in right ◖view◗: This is one's right recollection. (MN 117 iii 72-76)

The filled slots in the common matrix are marked as “◖…◗.” We simply note these slots are alternatively filled with ◖attitude◗, ◖speech◗, ◖action◗ and
◖livelihood◗ to reproduce the complete series of five clauses.

Overview of the chapters

The chapters of Rethinking satipaṭṭhāna are as follows:

1. A back-roads tour of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. The Sutta is a practice tutorial consisting of a series of exercises between a short introduction and a short conclusion. This chapter is a brief but comprehensive overview of the intricacies of the Sutta.

2. Satipaṭṭhāna faculties. The phrase “ardent, discerning, and recollective, having put away covetousness and grief for the world,” which occurs at the beginning of the Sutta, is intended to ensure full full skillful engagement, potentially in any practice task, even outside of Buddhist practice. I argue that right recollection (sammā sati) is simply the satipaṭṭhāna faculties required in the practice of many Dhamma teachings.

3. The miracle of samādhi. Samādhi is a natural faculty through which the cognitive and affective functions of the mind are progressively narrowed such that practice relies almost exclusively on internalized, effortless, implicit, or intuitive application of skills in the performance of a task. Its fruits are clarity, insight, knowledge and vision of things as they are, which lead ultimately to liberation.

4. Sati no longer means ‘mindfulness.’ The word ‘mindfulness’ has come to designate something in popular usage that was not intended when the early scholar Rhys Davids aptly adopted it in 1881 to translate the Pali sati in the context of sampajaññā. This translation has outlived its usefulness in serious scholarship.

5. Major themes of satipaṭṭhāna investigation. Satipaṭṭhāna practice investigates, verifies and internalizes specific Dhamma teachings in terms of direct experience. This chapter provides a brief account of the various teachings referred to in the twenty-one exercises of Sutta, the conceptual understandings of which are necessary for successful satipaṭṭhāna practice.

6. The jhānas: Dhamma made easy. The account offered in these chapters of right recollection, of right samādhi and particularly of the role of the jhānas in Buddhist practice is shown to cohere with, and also significantly to be explained by, modern research within the cognitive sciences, particularly in skill acquisition, positive psychology, and neuropsychology.

A companion volume. Satipaṭṭhāna Rethought: a meditation manual based on earliest Buddhist texts is a nuts-and-bolts meditation guide based on the more theoretical account presented here.

Acknowledgments

The influence of many great practitioners, scholars and teachers are found in these pages. I began serious systematic, scholarly examination of satipaṭṭhāna and samādhi sometime in 2021, shortly after finishing my book Dependent Coarising. Since then I’ve posted articles and podcasts online on these practices. Rethinking is built on a rich literature, and benefited further from early exchanges with Ven. Kumāra (Malaysia), Ven. Sunyo (Australia), Leigh Brasington and Happy Heilman (Tennessee). Of course, any errors found here are my own.

I began adapting the methods of my own sitting practice as I reached various conclusions, and last spring produced practice manual, Satipaṭṭhāna Rethought: a meditation manual based on earliest Buddhist texts. A number of pioneers had also begun adapting these methods in their own practice, particularly Alan Penton, Bruce Sebecke, John Tohkubbi, and Scott Conn. I offered my first Satipaṭṭhāna Retreat for about sixty participants at the American Bodhi Center in Hempstead, Texas on May 24-27, 2024. I am grateful to the staff and supporters of Jade Buddha Temple in Houston who made this retreat possible, particularly to Lee-Wen Teh, who handled the logistics, and to Lee Olsen who served as my participant-assistant.

I received much feedback from retreat participants concerning the methods  recommended in my research, both during the retreat in private interviews and in Q&A after my talks. I have also continued to benefit from ongoing discussions with a number of people during the last few months, particularly with Cory Provost, the aforementioned Scott and Lee, and Harry Adams. Reports on the increased efficacy of these methods experienced in the practice of a number of students has been gratifying.

Colleen Kastanek, Bruce Sebecke and Tiffany Determan served a proof readers for the initial draft of this book. Colleen continued with the proofreading of the current revision, and has been particularly instrumental, at a professional level, for improving the consistency of the style of each of the books I am currently preparing for global distribution. Loretta Draths designed the cover..

As a monk, I live in constant gratitude toward many monastery donors—during the course of this project I’ve dwelt at the Sitagu Dhamma Vihara in Minnesota, at the Sitagu Buddha Vihara in Austin, Texas, and at the Buddhist Temple in Nashville, Tennessee. The assurance of material support allows me to undertake projects such as this at will, in the absence of a salary or academic grant support. Additionally, the monks with which I live maintain a harmonious, uplifting and supportive environment in which to pursue meditation, study and writing.

May these teachings be a way to pay forward the generosity of those who have supported this project in one way or another, and may their merit be a causal factor in their awakening. Idaṁ me puññaṁ bodhiñāṇassa paccayo hotu.

Bhikkhu Cintita
Chisago City, MN
January, 2026

¹ For instance, some might find the subtitle “from investigating Dhamma to dwelling in jhāna” incoherent, even though it simply summarizes the seven awakening factors.

² A good account of the scope and provenance of the Early Buddhist Texts is provided by Sujato and Brahmali (2014).

1. A back-roads tour of
the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta

Advanced early Buddhist practice centers around developing, cultivating, refining and ultimately perfecting the twin skills of virtue and wisdom. Virtue has to do with how we behave in the world, and wisdom with how we comprehend the world. In this process, we are guided by the Dhamma, turning its conceptual know-what into our own, internalized, spontaneously applicable know-how. Satipaṭṭhāna constitutes the final stages of wisdom practice, requiring intense full skillful engagement in the process Dhamma investiga-tion, relying critically on finely tuned faculties of ardency, recollection (sati), and samādhi for its fulfillment. Satipaṭṭhāna is often awkwardly translated as the ‘four foundations of mindfulness.’ I will discuss the etymology of the word in 2.2, but ‘Dhamma investigation’ also provides an apt English translation.

The Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (MN 10) is a practice tutorial. It describes a practice of contemplating Dhamma in terms of direct experience through a series of exercises, which are grouped under the four thematic categories of body, feelings, mind, and dhammas. Their purpose is to develop right view, whereby individual Dhammic teachings are verified in experience, familiarized and internalized, such that Dhamma becomes ultimately a matter of direct perception, leading to the attainment of knowledge and vision of things as they are, fulfilling wisdom and effectively enabling the practitioner to see through the eyes of the Buddha.

This chapter describes the ins and outs of the central text of the Pali sati-paṭṭhāna literature, the Pali Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (aka “the Sutta,” which appears as an appendix). We will compare the parallel versions of other schools and related discourses as we go. I recommend that the reader flip back the actual Sutta in the appendix from time to time, in order to see the various features described her in their allocated space.

1.1. The opening of the Sutta

The Sutta begins:

Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was living in the Kuru country where there was a town of the Kurus named Kammāsadhamma. There he addressed the bhikkhus, “Bhikkhus.”

“Venerable sir,” they replied.

The Blessed One said this:

This is the one way, bhikkhus, the path for the purification of beings, for the surmounting of sorrow and lamentation, for the disappearance of pain and grief, for the attainment of the true way, for the realization of nibbāna, namely, the four satipaṭṭhānas.

‘One way’ ekāyano, (eka ‘one’ + ayana ‘way,’ ‘path’) is sometimes translated as ‘direct path’ or ‘only path.’ Its uniqueness as a way to nibbāna here suggests its ultimate importance in the attainment of awakening, but keep in mind that it is not capable in itself of fulfilling that goal. Rather it is a near-final step on a very long path of practice, with many prerequisites. For instance, in the Saṁyutta Nikāya we have:

Then, bhikkhu, when your virtue is well purified and your view straight, based upon virtue, established upon virtue, then you should develop the four satipaṭṭhānas in a threefold way.¹ (SN 47.3)

By analogy, pushing the garage door button might be the one and only way to arrive at home, but still a relatively minor step if we have yet to drive across two states, deal with restless children and tank up multiple times before we reach a point where the garage door will actually respond to a thumb’s touch.²

What are the four? Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu abides body-contemplat-ing in the body, ardent, discerning, and recollective, having put away covetousness and grief for the world. He abides feeling-contemplating among the feelings, ardent, discerning, and recollective, having put away covetousness and grief for the world. He abides mind-contemplating in the mind, ardent, discerning, and recollective, having put away covetousness and grief for the world. He abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas, ardent, discerning, and recollect-ive, having put away covetousness and grief for the world.

This paragraph lays out two intersecting schemes, which I will call the sati-paṭṭhāna factulties, and the satipaṭṭhāna contemplations. The contemplations, also referred to in the literature as ‘the four satipaṭṭhānas,’ are as follows:

body-contemplation in the body, …

feeling-contemplation among the feelings, …  

mind-contemplation in the mind, …

dhamma-contemplation among the dhammas …

We will see that contemplation in satipaṭṭhāna is also accurately described as investigation (vicaya) (see 1.5.2 below).

The satipaṭṭhāna faculties ensure full full skillful engagement in the practice of investigation by one who is:

ardent,

discerning,

recollective, and

“having put away covetousness and grief for the world.”

Discernment and recollection form the engine of investigation, in which we investigate and discern experiential observables (for instance, physical sensations within the field of breath) in terms of recollected Dhamma (for instance, teachings on impermanence). Just as recollection brings Dhamma to mind and keeps it there to guide investigation, so investigation improves our understanding of Dhamma. Dhamma becomes a kind of skill or know-how that apprehends the world spontaneously for what it is.

Ardency provides the energy or enthusiasm that keeps us engaged. Controlling “covetousness and grief” is also known as seclusion, a narrowing and stabilizing of the scope of attention through keeping the five hindrances at bay, so that we are not distracted from the practice task. Ardency and seclusion together achieve utmost attentiveness or engagement in the practice task.³

1.2. The exercises

Twenty-one targeted exercises organized as the four satipaṭṭhānas form the bulk of the Sutta, sandwiched between the opening and the conclusion. Each exercise has two parts:

(1) a unique signature exercise, and

(2) a variant of the common refrain.

The signature exercise identifies the observables, the refrain provides the Dhamma teachings under investigation. The exercises are as follows:

Body

 breath
 postures

 activities   

 body parts

 elements

 9 exercises about

 corpse decay

Feelings

 (only one exercise)

Mind

 (only one exercise)

Dhammas

  hindrances

 aggregates

 sense-spheres

 awakening factors

 noble truths

The signature exercise identifies a field of experiential observables for that exercise within the overarching theme of body, feelings, mind, or dhammas, such as qualities of breath, or elements in the body.⁴ The refrain uniformly describes how to investigate the same small set of critical Dhamma teachings in terms of those observables. The fourth satipaṭṭhāna has no unified overarching theme, but rather opens up wide the scope of Dhamma teachings that might come under investigation, as described below. All of the exercises are wisdom practices, that is, they develop and cultivate apprehension of the world, rather than behavior within it.

1.2.1. Signature exercises. The twenty-one signature exercises are cited in the Sutta in the appendix, but here, to save flipping, is an initial example:

Again, bhikkhus, when walking, a bhikkhu discerns, “I am walking.” When standing, he discerns, “I am standing.” When sitting, he discerns, “I am sitting.” When lying down, he discerns, “I am lying down.” Or he discerns accordingly however his body is disposed.

This passage serves to identify various movements and postures as observables within the overarching theme of body. These are to be investigated in terms of the Dhamma teachings cited in the refrain. They will serve to verify the teachings.

The observables of this particular passage are physically present in the practice situation. This is not always the case, for observables are quite often brought into awareness through visualization, as in the following signature exercise:

Again, bhikkhus, as though he were to see [seyyathāpi passeyya] a corpse thrown aside in a charnel ground, one, two, or three days dead, bloated, livid, and oozing matter, a bhikkhu compares this same body with it thus: “This body too is of the same nature, it will be like that, it is not exempt from that fate.”

Direct visualization of an observable stretches what it means to be observable, but makes sense if we are confident that such things are in fact directly present in other practice situations. In this case, we take for granted that a corpse in a charnel ground would at least sometimes be as we visualize it. Once again, this signature exercise identifies observables.

We should also note that the very first exercise (on breath) provides additional information not found in the subsequent exercises. Most importantly, it describes the establishment of a meditation context optimally supportive of the satipaṭṭhāna faculties, and conducive to the practice of most (but not all) of the other exercises as well:

Here a bhikkhu, gone to the forest or to the root of a tree or to an empty hut, sits down; having folded his legs crosswise, sets his body erect, recollectively attending to what is in front. Recollective, he breathes in, recollective, he breathes out. …

The phrase ‘… recollectively attending to what is in front’ translates parimukhaṁ [in-front] satiṁ [recollection’] upaṭṭhapetvā [having attended to], and thereby summarizes the satipaṭṭhāna faculties.⁵ ‘What is in front’ are the relevant observables which are discerned in terms of recollected Dhamma teaching in the practice of the particular exercise. Attentiveness in skilled engagement is achieved through discernment, ardency and seclusion.

1.2.2. The refrain. The refrain found in the body exercises is as follows (the refrain for the other three satipaṭṭhānas makes appropriate substitutions):

(1) In this way (a) he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, or (b) he abides body-contemplating in the body externally, or (c) he abides body-contemplating in the body both internally and externally.

(2) He abides contemplating in the body the nature of origination, or he abides contemplating in the body the nature of vanishing, or he abides contemplating in the body the nature of both origination and vanishing.

(3) Recollection that “the body exists” is simply established in him to the extent necessary for bare knowledge and recollection.

(4) He abides independent. He does not cling to anything in the world.

 That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

The refrain describes a specific mode of Dhammic analysis directed toward verifying and internalizing the foundational teachings of the three signs (tilakkhaṇa) of non-self, impermanence and suffering. Since there is little Dhammic content in most of the signature exercises themselves, we see that the three signs are the dominant (but far from only) Dhamma teaching verified and internalized in satipaṭṭhāna practice.⁶

Clause (1) has to do with non-self. This very teaching is highlighted in satipaṭṭhāna practice above all other. In fact, the importance of the first three satipaṭṭhānas is that they correspond to three facets through which we conceive “my self”:

my body,

my consciousness,⁷

my mind.

Each of these facets is examined in turn in the equivalent of clause (1). Clause (1) provides two modes of apprehension: (b) viewing the body, consciousness and the mind each as a whole “thing” (externally), and (a) viewing  these each as a “field” in which inner details are directly observable (internally). (c) challenges us to view both at the same time, effectively seeing the forest through the trees. We discuss the investigation of non-self further in 1.6 below.

Clause (2) of the refrain directs us to investigate bodily observables in terms of conditionality and impermanence. It is the basis of exploring subtle contingencies, and is also the topic of 5.2.

Clause (3) acknowledges the practical usefulness of the fabrication of the self (in its body facet) to be used when it is useful. This is explained in 5.5.1.

Clause (4) describes the fulfillment of the conditions for ending suffering. The refrain as a whole is clearly about the foundational three signs teaching of impermanence, suffering, and non-self. However, the reference to suffering here is indirect and cursory, alluding optimistically to its resolution in non-clinging.

1.2.3. Dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas. The dhamma exercises of the fourth satipaṭṭhāna work a bit differently from those of the body, feeling and mind exercises. Each signature here identifies the relevant observables in terms of a well-established, clearly named and general complex Dhamma teaching. For instance,

Again, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas in terms of the five aggregates of appropriation. And how does a bhikkhu abide dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas in terms of the five aggregates of appropriation? Here a bhikkhu understands: “Such is form, such its origin, such its disappearance. Such is feeling, such its origin, such its disappearance. Such is perception, such its origin, such its disappearance. Such are fabrica-tions, such their origin, such their disappearance. Such is consciousness, such its origin, such its disappearance.”

A dhamma, conventionally written in lower case, refers to a particular Dhamma teaching. It can also be any experiential factor, any observable. The aggregates of appropriation is a particular Dhamma teaching expounded in many places in the early texts. It refers explicitly to observable forms, feelings, perceptions, fabrications and instances of consciousness. The practitioner will become increasingly familiar with this teaching with repeated practice of this exercise, and as a result, what is brought to mind will be a progressively more internalized rendering of the teaching.⁸

The first three satipaṭṭhānas open only the dhamma of the three signs to investigation. It is easy to appreciate that the fourth satipaṭṭhāna extends that set to a wide, open-ended set of Dhamma teachings, including many that may not fall under any of the themes of body, feelings or mind. Effectively, each exercise declares its own thematic category to be whatever dhamma is being investigated. This is reflected in the wording of the refrain for the fourth satipaṭṭhāna. For instance,

… In this way he abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas in terms of the five aggregates of appropriation.

1.3. The concluding message of the Sutta

The Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta ends on a positive note:

Bhikkhus, if anyone should develop these four satipaṭṭhānas in such a way for seven years, one of two fruits could be expected for him: either final knowledge here and now, or if there is a trace of clinging left, non-return. Let alone seven years, bhikkhus. If anyone should develop these four satipaṭṭhānas in such a way for six years … for five years… for four years … for three years … for two years … for one year, one of two fruits could be expected for him: either final knowledge here and now, or if there is a trace of clinging left, non-return. Let alone one year, bhikkhus. If anyone should develop these four satipaṭṭhānas in such a way for seven months … for six months … for five months … for four months … for three months … for two months … for one month … for half a month, one of two fruits could be expected for him: either final knowledge here and now, or if there is a trace of clinging left, non-return. Let alone half a month, bhikkhus. If anyone should develop these four satipaṭṭhānas in such a way for seven days, one of two fruits could be expected for him: either final knowledge here and now, or if there is a trace of clinging left, non-return.

The humorous equivocation here might be partially explained in terms of the variation in how much progress the individual bhikkhu has made in the prerequisite factors of the path (the virtue and wisdom factors) prior to beginning satipaṭṭhāna contemplation, as well as in the level of ardency and talent he brings in applying the satipaṭṭhāna faculties in satipaṭṭhāna contemplation.

So it was with reference to this that it was said: “Bhikkhus, this is the direct path for the purification of beings, for the surmounting of sorrow and lamentation, for the disappearance of pain and grief, for the attainment of the true way, for the realization of nibbāna, namely, the four satipaṭṭhānas.”

This echos the opening of the Sutta. The Sutta concludes:

That is what the Blessed One said. The bhikkhus were satisfied and delighted in the Blessed One’s words.

… as they virtually always were.

1.4. The correlates of the Sutta

The Sutta I have been citing is the Pali version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (MN 10). The Pali tradition also includes many shorter, related satipaṭṭhāna discourses primarily in the Satipaṭṭhāna-saṁyutta (SN 47) and in the Anuruddha-saṁyutta (SN 52). The middle-length Ānāpānasati (MN 118) and the Kāyagatāsati (MN 119) Suttas also share thematic content with the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. Parallel texts to these were likewise transmitted in other early historical sects and then collected after translation into the Chinese Canon: Correlates of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta are found both in the Chinese Madhyama Āgama (which derives from the early Sarvāstivāda sect) and in the Chinese Ekottarika Āgama (which possibly derives from the early Mahāsaṅghika sect).⁹ The Saṃyukta Āgama (also from the Sarvāstivāda sect) contains a division parallel to the Satipaṭṭhāna-saṁyutta.

The Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and its parallels are widely considered a later addition to the early Buddhist literature, possibly compiled from earlier sources by disciples in the first two centuries after the Buddha. As evidence, the four satipaṭṭhānas are notably missing from the “Book of Fours” of the Aṅguttara Nikāya, and comparative evidence suggests complex historical development,¹⁰ since its parallels from other traditions differ significantly in structure and content. The Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, along with its parallel versions, has been called a “poorly organized” late compilation.¹¹ I emphatically disagree with the claim of poor organization. The Sutta is coherent in almost all of its details, and is highly consistent with the body of early teachings. This should be evident by the end of this chapter. I further note that the various correlates share in common:¹²

the four satipaṭṭhānas of body, feelings, mind and dhammas,

the satipaṭṭhāna faculties, and

the “threefold mode of analysis” in terms of internal, external and both internal and external.

However, these may be found in structurally different places in the different variants. For instance, the three-fold mode of analysis is found most commonly in the introductory passage of a given discourse. For instance, in the Saṁyutta Nikāya we have:

Here, bhikkhu, dwell body-contemplating in the body internally, ardent, discerning, recollective, having removed covetousness and displeasure in regard to the world, dwell body-contemplating in the body externally … dwell body-contemplating in the body internally and externally … dwell feeling-contemplating among the feelings … (SN 47.3)

Furthermore, I note also that the various correlates tend to share in common,

the integration of samādhi as an essential factor in satipaṭṭhāna.

For instance, each of the four satipaṭṭānas in turn is similarly demonstrated to fulfill the seven awakening factors (one of which is samādhi) in the founda-tional Ānāpānasati Sutta.¹³

Although the Theravāda Satipaṭṭāna Sutta itself does not highlight this role of samādhi (except locally within the awakening factors exercise), many of the other Theravāda correlates routinely refer to samādhi as a factor of satipaṭṭhāna. For instance, in the Saṁyutta Nikāya we have:

Come, friends, dwell body-contemplating in the body, ardent, discerning, unified, with limpid mind, in samādhi, with one-centered mind, in order to know body as it really is. Dwell feeling-contemplating among the feelings . . . Dwell mind-contemplating in the mind . . . Dwell dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas, ardent, discerning, equipoised, with limpid mind, in samādhi, with one-centered mind, in order to know dhammas as they really are. (SN 47.4)

‘In samādhi’ translates the participle form (samāhitā) of samādhi. ‘Equipoised’ (ekodibhūtā) and ‘one-centered’ (ekagga) are jhāna factors (see 3.3).

Nonetheless, the Sutta and its parallels differ markedly in their repertoire of exercises in the body-contemplation and dhamma-contemplation sections.¹⁴ Of the two parallel versions of the Sutta, the Majjhima Nikāya and the Ekottarika Āgama versions, only the anatomical parts, elements and corpse exercises are common to both body sections, and only the awakening factors and hindrances are common to both dhamma sections.

This sectarian variation has been explained by other scholars in terms of derivation from a single proto-discourse with a very small set of exercises (the ones common to all variants) from which the three parallel versions evolved only by adding but not subtracting exercises.¹⁵ However, the assumption that the evolution of sectarian variants, in general, traces back to singular proto-discourses has been questioned,¹⁶ and I would also point out that the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta is of a special nature that makes it highly unlikely that the texts evolved in this way: it is a practice tutorial.

It is of the very nature of a tutorial that it would be spoken many times in short order from the get-go, in many variations presented to different audiences of varying backgrounds, attainments and practice needs, and probably by many voices. As with a math tutorial, the range of exercises would likely have been unbounded. It is hard to imagine that it would not diversify into many variants in just this way, right from the beginning, as many teachers compose new exercises based on underlying principles. I suggest that early variants of this tutorial opened up to an inclusive or open-ended range of exercises, rather than restricting themselves to the handful of exercises that these venerable scholars suggest.

Moreover, since the satipaṭṭhāna is concerned with verifying and internalizing Dhamma teachings, and there are innumerable Dhamma teachings in the early texts, it would be surprising if the fourth satipaṭṭhāna, in particular, were not in principle flooded with qualifying exercises. Essentially, any Dhamma teaching that might in principle be verified in observable experience should be a potential candidate for satipaṭṭhāna contemplation.

1.5. Satipaṭṭhāna as development of right view

In the remaining sections of this chapter I look at the logic of satipaṭṭhāna: its function and how it fulfills that function. Although it is now commonly identified with right recollection (sati), I argue that the function of satipaṭṭhāna is to develop right view in investigating and internalizing Dhamma teachings through verification in observable experience. It makes critical use of the satipaṭṭhāna faculties and the jhānas in order to fulfill that function. I make a complementary argument in 2.4  that right recollection corresponds to the satipaṭṭhāna faculties., not to  satipaṭṭhāna contemplations.

The development of right view (sammā diṭṭhi) begins with a conceptual exposure to the Dhamma, acquired and remembered through hearing or (in later centuries) reading the Dhamma. This is followed by stages of reflection and contemplation necessary to make sense of the Dhamma, and to verify it in practice. Right view is ultimately internalized and woven into the fabric of experience, so that in the end Dhamma becomes how we perceive spontaneously in our experiential world. When developed to perfection, right view becomes knowledge and vision (ñāṇadassanā), a precursor to awakening.¹⁷ Through the practice of satipaṭṭhāna we learn to see through the eyes of the Buddha.¹⁸ Let’s examine two other teachings that place satipaṭṭhāna contemplation into this broader process of developing right view: the five stages of liberation and the seven awakening factors.

1.5.1. The five stages of liberation. Developing proficiency in right view is laid out systematically by the Buddha in five steps in the Stages of Liberation Sutta.¹⁹

(1) Here, bhikkhus, the Teacher or a fellow bhikkhu in the position of a teacher teaches [a/the] Dhamma to a bhikkhu. In whatever way the Teacher or that fellow bhikkhu in the position of a teacher teaches the Dhamma to the bhikkhu, … (AN 5.26 iii 21)

Keep in mind that at the time of the early texts, teaching would have consisted primarily of rote recitation, perhaps with a bit of explication. The refrain repeated at each stage actually begins mid-sentence:

… in just that way he experiences inspiration in the meaning and inspiration in the Dhamma. As he does so, delight arises in him. When he is delighted, rapture arises. For one with a rapturous mind, the body becomes tranquil. One tranquil in body feels pleasure. For one feeling pleasure, the mind attains samādhi. This is the ◖first◗ […,◖second◗, ◖third◗,…◗] stage of liberation, by means of which, if a bhikkhu dwells heedful, ardent, and resolute, his unliberated mind is liberated, his undestroyed corruptions are utterly destroyed, and he reaches the as-yet-unreached unsurpassed security from bondage. (AN 5.26)

What may surprise some readers is the arising of samādhi in the refrain simply through recitation with others. Section 3.2 documents the rarely recognized ubiquitousness of samādhi in the early texts in conjunction with a wide variety of practices.²⁰ The last sentence of the refrain describes liberation, which is the goal of the five stages as a whole, and which is equivalent to the goal of satipaṭṭhāna contemplation.

(2) Again, neither the Teacher nor a fellow bhikkhu in the position of a teacher teaches the Dhamma to a bhikkhu, but he himself teaches the Dhamma to others in detail as he has heard it and learned it. In whatever way the bhikkhu teaches the Dhamma to others in detail as he has heard it and learned it, …

… in just that way … and he reaches the as-yet-unreached unsurpassed security from bondage. (AN 5.26 iii 21-2)

The bhikkhu has yet to ponder or examine the teaching he has learned, so we can assume that he has memorized some texts and is merely reciting them for others at this stage, with or without supplementary explication.

(3) Again, … he recites the Dhamma in detail as he has heard it and learned it. In whatever way the bhikkhu recites the Dhamma in detail as he has heard it and learned it, …

… in just that way … and he reaches the as-yet-unreached unsurpassed security from bondage. (AN 5.26 iii 22)

Now he recites the teaching to himself, to complete the process of memoriza-tion.

(4) Again, … he thinks about, deliberates, and mentally inspects the Dhamma as he has heard it and learned it. In whatever way the bhikkhu ponders, examines, and mentally inspects the Dhamma as he has heard it and learned it, …

… in just that way … and he reaches the as-yet-unreached unsurpassed security from bondage. (AN 5.26 iii 22-3)

He is doing some serious pondering: he ‘thinks about, deliberates, and mentally inspects’ (anuvitakketi anuvicāreti manasānupekkhati) the teaching under consideration. This is the point at which what he is doing begins to align with satipaṭṭhāna contemplation. The wording here is significant, since thinking and deliberation (vitakka-vicāra) characterize the first jhāna, but not deeper jhānas.²¹ This is discursive thinking, and the samādhi attained in the refrain is therefore likely to be limited to the first jhāna.²²

It is elsewhere declared that there are three kinds of wisdom: based on hearing (sutamayā paññā), on reflection (cintāmayā paññā), and on development (bhāvanāmayā paññā).²³ The first two have been nurtured so far, the third comes in the final stage:

(5) Again, he has grasped well a certain theme [nimitta] of samādhi, attended to it well, sustained it well, and penetrated it well with wisdom. In whatever way the bhikkhu has grasped well a certain theme  of samādhi, attended to it well, sustained it well, and penetrated it well with wisdom, …

… in just that way … and he reaches the as-yet-unreached unsurpassed security from bondage. (AN 5.26 iii 23-4)

At this final stage, satipaṭṭhāna investigation is evident and it has clearly taken us into samādhi. However, given that there is no longer a reference to vitakka-vicāra, it has presumably taken us into the deeper (second to fourth) jhānas, where certain cognitive faculties are curtailed.²⁴ Notice that the teaching that is the theme of study and of contemplation has become a theme of samādhi (samādhi-nimitta, see 3.2, 6.2.2). This accords with the statement:

The four satipaṭṭhānas are the theme of samādhi. (MN 44 i 301)

This locates the theme of samādhi within the realm of body, feelings, mind, and dhammas. Continued contemplation and insight are critically dependent on the deeper jhānas in order to penetrate the Dhamma and to achieve knowledge and vision, for we are told:

When right samādhi does not exist, for one failing right samādhi, the proximate cause is destroyed for knowledge and vision of things as they really are. (AN 10.3)

Elsewhere the presence of samādhi, along with other faculties, is explicitly attributed to satipaṭṭhāna, as in the following practice, also cited above:

Come, friends, dwell ◖body-contemplating in the body◗, ardent, discerning, unified, with limpid mind, in samādhi, with one-centered mind, in order to know the body as it really is. (SN 47.4)

What has been achieved in this final stage of liberation? Knowledge and vision of things as they are, here is assuredly the result of discernment in dependence on recollected know-how. This is repeated with regard to ◖feeling-contemplating among the feelings◗, ◖mind-contemplating in the mind◗, and ◖dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas◗. Mastery of right view has now been developed through the five stages of liberation, from memorized scripture by rote, to something penetrated with wisdom. Dhamma has been internalized, where it has become intuitive, spontaneous and effortlessly applicable. The teaching has been integrated into a wide fabric of experience and internalized to the point that we implicitly perceive effectively through the eyes of the Buddha.²⁵ These belong to the development of right view.

1.5.2. The awakening factors. Closely related to the five factors of liberation are the better-known seven awakening factors, which zoom in for a closer look at these final stages of liberation. The seven awakening factors form a causal chain that can be summarized as:

recollection→ dhamma-investigation → energy → rapture →
                tranquility → samādhi → equanimity.  

For instance, the Virtue Sutta begins with hearing the Dhamma from monks of virtue and wisdom, then continues as follows:

… when one has heard the Dhamma from such bhikkhus one dwells withdrawn by way of two kinds of withdrawal: withdrawal of body and withdrawal of mind.

Dwelling thus withdrawn, one recollects that teaching and thinks it over. Whenever, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu dwelling thus withdrawn recollects that teaching and thinks it over, on that occasion the awakening factor of recollection is aroused by the bhikkhu; on that occasion the bhikkhu develops the awakening factor of recollection; on that occasion the awakening factor of recollection comes to fulfillment by development in the bhikkhu. (SN 46.3)

Recollection (sati) brings a particular teaching to mind. This is the same teaching that was carried through the stages of liberation. As the first awakening factor, sati brings “that teaching” (taṁ dhammaṁ) to mind. The Virtue Sutta²⁶ continues:

Dwelling thus, he examines that teaching with wisdom, investigates it, makes an exploration of it. Whenever …, on that occasion the awakening factor of dhamma-investigation is aroused by the bhikkhu; on that occasion the bhikkhu develops the awakening factor of dhamma-investigation; on that occasion the awakening factor of dhamma-investigation comes to fulfillment by development in the bhikkhu. (SN 46.3)

This step of dhamma-investigation (dhamma-vicaya) corresponds to the fourth stage of liberation, and is, in fact, none other than satipaṭṭhāna contemplation.  

While he discriminates that teaching with wisdom, examines it, makes an investigation of it, his energy is aroused without slackening. Whenever, on that occasion the awakening factor of energy is aroused by the bhikkhu; on that occasion the bhikkhu develops the awakening factor of energy; on that occasion the awakening factor of energy comes to fulfillment by development in the bhikkhu.  (SN 46.3)

This is ardency. Throw in seclusion, and we will have provided the satipaṭṭhāna faculties. We are skillfully engaged in the practice. The awakening factors continue by progressing into two antecedent factors that will usher in samādhi:

                → rapture → tranquility → samādhi

In both the stages of liberation and the awakening factors, examination continues into samādhi, the insight factory in which that teaching is turned to wisdom.²⁷

1.5.3. Dhamma-contemplation as the general case. Surely, the five stages of liberation and the seven awakening factors offer an open invitation to subject any teaching to this process, insofar as it admits of identifiable observables. In fact, verification in terms of observable experience is a general quality of the Dhamma across the board:

The Dhamma is well expounded by the Blessed One, directly visible, immediate, inviting one to come and see, applicable, to be personally experienced by the wise. (SN 11.3, AN 3.70, AN 11.12, AN 11.13)

The claim that the fourth satipaṭṭāna is restricted to a limited set of teachings is unwarranted. There is no reason to doubt that the five dhamma exercises of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta are but representative members of a large, open-ended set,²⁸ as are the alternative sets described in the Chinese Āgama parallels.

I conclude that satipaṭṭhāna is a development of right view.

1.6. Investigating non-self

Although the refrain does not mention self (atta) or non-self (anatta) directly, and satipaṭṭhāna investigation is potentially extensible to all of the wisdom teachings that are verifiable through observation, the Sutta itself is substantially about non-self. In fact, it is the topic of clause (1) of the refrain, which introduces a three-fold mode of analysis.

In this way
(a) he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, or
(b) he abides body-contemplating in the body externally, or
(c) he abides body-contemplating in the body both internally and
 externally.

This passage introduces two fundamental perspectives we might assume when observing breath. The internal perspective observes movements and pressures, or even sounds, in the body. This is “breath” as a field of experience, but not “the” breath. Observation is grounded in direct experience. The external perspective is cognizant of “the” breath, body or self as a whole, the thing which is “doing” the breathing. As we attend to one and then the other, we have the sense that the field of breath is inside the thing we call the breath. Observation  of “the” breath is less direct, more conceptually laden.

Worldlings will find that in the bustle of everyday life the mind tends to concern itself with things. Meditators, on the other hand, will find that in stillness the mind tends to rest in fields. Worldlings accordingly have trouble practicing (a). Practitioners in meditation, on the other hand, have trouble recovering (b). Either is challenged to practice (c), experiencing both at the same time.  The various exercises in the Sutta investigate this difference between internal and external modes of observations from different angles, and their implication for our conceptualization of the self. Our conceptualization of the self has three facets:

the body/self,

the consciousness/self, and

the mind/self.

For instance, it is natural to think, “I have a body, therefore I am!” or “I witness the ‘world out there,’ therefore I am!” or, more famously, “I think, therefore I am!”  We notice that these three facets correspond respectively to the overarching themes of the first three satipaṭṭhānas.²⁹

The point of these exercises is to reveal the self as an unreliable and highly presumptive mental construct that we do well to abandon. We can observe the self, in the sense that it seems real to us. But we cannot observe it directly, we must presume³⁰ it, much as if we are lying on the sofa and hear purring behind our head (a direct observation) then presume the whole cat is there (he probably is, in this case) doing the purring. Then we organize our apprehension of the world around this presumption, and suffer as a result. We live with this problematic presumption, and are further vexed by some additional presumed qualities:

that the self is permanent, at least relatively fixed or unchanging,

that the self is substantial, and manifests what is directly observable,

that the self is consciously aware of a world “out there,”

that the self has a degree of control, both over its observable manifestations, and as an agent acting in the world “out there.”

The practice of non-self is to quell (weaken or eliminate) these presumptions. In order to do this, we consider every form of direct observable we can think of that has the potential for verifying the presumption, and then find it wanting.

In summary,

Internal contemplation focuses on the field of direct observables described in the signature exercises, particularly with respect to the nature of origination and vanishing.

External contemplation focuses on the presumption of the self in one of its facets, particularly with respect to the presumed qualities of the self as a thing listed above.

Both internal and external contemplation notes the incongruities that result from holding the thing and the field in mind at the same time.

The incongruities between what is internal and what is external may be felt intuitively, but in many cases the Buddha gives us an explicit conceptual explanation of the incongruities of both internal and external contemplation. For instance, the following walks us through one of the incongruities we might discover:

A pleasant feeling is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, bound to decay, to vanish, to fade away, to cease; and so too is a painful feeling and a neither pleasant not painful feeling. So anyone who, on experiencing a pleasant feeling, thinks, “This is my self,” must, at the cessation of that pleasant feeling think: “My self has gone!” and the same with a painful and a neither pleasant not painful feeling. Thus whoever thinks, “Feeling is my self,” is contemplating something in this present life that is impermanent, a mixture of happiness and unhappiness, subject to origination and passing away. Therefore it is not fitting to maintain: “Feeling is my self.” (DN 15 ii 66-7).

This passage considers the prospect that feelings are equivalent to the self, and argues that this cannot be. The presumption of the thing is unsupported by the directly observable field. Whatever we experience as feelings is always fragmentary, situation-specific, and ever-changing, that is, lacking the substantial fixedness that accompanies the presumption of the self. Similarly, the Buddha argues in terms of lack of control over observables assumed to manifest in the consciousness facet of the self:

Consciousness is non-self. If consciousness were self, this conscious-ness would not lend itself to un-ease. It would be possible [to say] with regard to consciousness, “Let my consciousness be thus. Let my consciousness not be thus.” But precisely because consciousness is non-self, consciousness lends itself to un-ease. And it is not possible [to say] with regard to consciousness, “Let my consciousness be thus. Let my consciousness not be thus.” (SN 22.59)

A more detailed exposition of the threefold mode of analysis performed in the first clause of the refrain is undertaken in 5.5.

1.7. Conclusions

This back-roads tour of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (MN 10) recognizes the Sutta as a practice tutorial for developing and internalizing our understanding of Dhamma through contemplation of specific teachings in terms of direct observables. The scope of the Sutta is largely specialized on the foundational teaching of the three signs of non-self, impermanence and suffering, which are represented in the Sutta’s recurring refrain. However, it also extends to the contemplation of Dhamma across the board, insofar as Dhamma is reflected in observed experience. As such, the purpose of satipaṭṭāna is to develop and train mastery of right view. This extends beyond conceptual understanding of Dhamma to the point of knowledge and vision of things as they are, effectively to see intuitively through the eyes of the Buddha.

The brilliance of satipaṭṭhāna is that (once the prerequisite trainings are in place, including a strong foundation in virtue, solid familiarity with Dhamma, and an understanding of the satipaṭṭhāna framework itself) the daily practice of the exercises is simple, grounded, intuitive, and progressively more effortless as the various Dhamma teachings are internalized (see 6.3). It becomes a simple matter of dwelling quietly in samādhi, watching the Dhamma verify itself in observed experience. You will find more about the role of samādhi in chapters 3 and 6.

¹ The three ways are “internally,” “externally,” and “both internally and externally,” which we will describe in 1.6 below.

² See 4.6 on the danger of neglecting prerequisite practices.

³ See 2.1 for more details on these four faculties, and chapter 2 overall for the profound roles these faculties play in the development and cultivation of practice.

⁴ See 5.1 for a detailed discussion of observables

⁵ I analyze parimukhaṁ as the object of the verb, and satiṁ as an adverbial accusative.

⁶ See Cintita (2025, 8.4) on the three signs.

⁷ The single exercise of the second satipaṭṭhāna refers specifically to feelings, but feelings initiate and stand for a continuum of awareness factors that constitute consciousness, as explained in 5.4.

⁸“Internalization” turns “know-what” into “know-how” and eventually integrates it into the whole of memory. This is basic to acquiring the “skill” of Dhamma. See 6.1.2 for further discussion.

⁹ Translations into English from the Chinese Canon are found in the appendices of Kuan (2008).

¹⁰ Kuan (2008, pp. 112, 133, and chapter 5).

¹¹ Sujāto (2012, p. 133).

¹² Sujāto (2012, pp. 190, 193, 204).

¹³ MN 118 iii 85-7.

¹⁴ Anālayo (2014, pp. 3-8) compares point by point the lists of exercises for the Pali text with its two early parallels.

¹⁵ Sujāto (2012, p. 140) and Anālayo (2014, p. 176).

¹⁶ For instance, Shulman’s (2021) “play of formulas” model of the genesis of the early texts.

¹⁷ See Cintita (2025, 10.5) on knowledge and vision.

¹⁸ Shulman (2014, pp. 105-8, 152).

¹⁹ Vimuttāyatana Sutta. AN 5.26, DN 33 iii 241-2 is similar.

²⁰ Rote recitation is a primary basis of meditation for most Burmese monastics today.

²¹“Jhāna factors” are detailed in 3.3 and 6.3.

²² See 3.3.

²³ DN 33 iii 219. ‘Development’ generally denotes refinement of a skill through repeated practice.

²⁴ On curtailment see 3.3.0 and 6.3.1.

²⁵ See 6.1.2 on internalization.

²⁶ See also MN 10 i 61-2 (the Sutta in the appendix) and the suttas in SN 46.

²⁷ See 3.1.3 for discussion of the significance of this progression.

²⁸ Contrary to Sujāto (2012, p. 140) and Anālayo (2014, p. 176).

²⁹ This is not immediately apparent in the case of the second satipaṭṭhāna, in which one literally “feeling-contemplates” rather than “consciousness-contemplates.” However, as 5.4.4  shows, feelings are at the root of the conditioning factors that produce consciousness.

³⁰ See 5.1 and 5.5.1 for further discussion of presumptions.

2. Satipaṭṭhāna faculties

Having spotted the lone rōnin standing on the dusty street, the miscreants arrayed themselves in a show of opposition, with weapons drawn. However, the ten of them together were about to prove no match for Sanjuro. His keen gaze assessed the situation impassively as he approached at a steady pace. When warned to come no closer, he quickened his pace, but with sword still sheathed. When the pistoleer drew and aimed his weapon, Sanjuro shot a hidden dagger through the gunman’s wrist, leaped into the fray, and within seconds had dispatched all but one of the men, a young coward whom Sanjuro out of compassion allowed to flee.¹

Sanjuro displayed masterful behavior that day that his ten opponents, even collectively, could not match. We might ask, What qualities did he bring into the fray? They certainly would have included ardency, discernment, know-how and composure. Sanjuto’s ardency might have been based in a compassionate urgency to protect the innocent and restore justice, in a fully internalized moral code, or in the intrinsic need to excel in the practice that he had mastered. Sanjuro’s discernment captured the fine details of the unfolding practice situation through his gaze, providing a deep level of assessment that was already pregnant with possibilities for action, enabling him to respond instantaneously, precisely, and without thought. Sanjuro’s know-how was the cumulative fruit of many years of intense training under samurai masters, acquiring the elements of an ancient practice tradition step by step until it had become second nature. Sanjuro’s composure was the careful management of his cognitive faculties, placing his attention unwavering exactly where it needed to be, and putting aside emotional reactiveness, even concern for his very life. What a guy!

These are the well-cultivated faculties that set Sanjuro’s manner of full skillful engagement in the fray apart from the ineptitude of his opponents. These same faculties are also ubiquitous well beyond the martial arts. Buddhism is also a practice tradition, but in which the practitioner is skillfully engaged in the acquisition and manifestation of virtue and wisdom. These same faculties of full skillful engagement are employed by the advanced satipaṭṭhāna practitioner as well.

2.1. Satipaṭṭhāna: practice and faculties

In the beginning passage of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta we read:

Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body, ardent, discerning, and recollective, having put away covetousness and grief for the world. He abides feeling-contemplating among the feelings, ardent, discerning, and recollective, having put away covetousness and grief for the world. He abides mind-contemplating in the mind, ardent, discerning, and recollective, having put away covetousness and grief for the world. He abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas, ardent, discerning, and recollective, having put away covetousness and grief for the world. (MN 10 i 56)

2.1.1. Satipaṭṭhāna practice. This passage outlines satipaṭṭhāna practice in terms of two intersecting schemata. The first is the four satipaṭṭhānas, outlined in terms of four themes of contemplation:

body-contemplating in the body,

feeling-contemplating among the feelings,

mind-contemplating in the mind, and

dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas.

The Pali word that I’m translating as ‘contemplating,’ used throughout the satipaṭṭhāna, is a variant of the gerund anupassanā, literally ‘seeing along’ or ‘watching.’ These four primary practices involve a kind of deep or penetrating seeing of Dhamma in terms of direct experience that also constitutes investigation. Here our interest falls on the second schema.

2.1.2. Satipaṭṭhāna faculties. Full full skillful engagement in satipaṭṭhāna practice requires of the practitioner:

ardency,

discernment,

recollection, and

putting away covetousness and grief for the world.

We will see in the course of this chapter that these faculties also play a role in the range of virtue and wisdom practices, as well as in satipaṭṭhāna contemplation. In fact these faculties are the basis of right effort, right recollection, and right samādhi. In the meantime, let’s look at these critical faculties in more detail:

Ardency (ātappa) is also translated as ‘zeal,’ or ‘exertion.’² It is the active energy of Buddhist practice, closely aligned with “right effort” (sammā vāyāma),³ motivated by Buddhist values and by an untold variety of other factors. It establishes full engagement.

Discernment (sampajañña) is also translated as ‘clear comprehension,’ ‘watchfulness,’ ‘alertness’ or ‘deliberation.’ It is an executive function that determines a Dhammically apt interpretative or behavioral response to relevant circumstances in the current practice situation, and is guided by what is recollected.

Recollection (sati) is most commonly translated as ‘mindfulness.’⁴ What is recollected (brought to mind, and borne in mind) is the acquired Dhammic know-how relevant to the practice task. Recollection provides the “skill” of full skillful engagement. Sanjuro’s know-how is likewise the object of his recollection.

Absence of “covetousness and grief for the world” limits attention by eliminating worldly self-concern. It is commonly equated with the removal of the hindrances⁵ and with seclusion (viveka). Sanjuro’s composure likewise began here.

 I will most often refer to this faculty more tersely as ‘seclusion.’ Seclusion is a close precursor of samādhi (‘composure’) (see 3.2, 6.2.2), a further narrowing of attention around the practice task.⁶ This is close to Sanjuro’s composure.

Recollection provides the practical skill or know-how of Dhamma. We commonly think of Dhamma as know-what, a set of declarative statements about doctrine: standards, values, conceptualizations and systems of thought. However, know-how is its practical, procedural, and readily engaged offshoot that determine our perceptions and behaviors in practice. Although know-how begins with know-what, it is developed through training and eventually internalized so that Dhammic perception and behaviors eventually become effortless and beyond thought (consider the immediacy and fluidity of Sanjuro’s mastery).

Discernment is the assessor that draws on know-how to determine the course of engagement under currently unfolding circumstances. These two work intimately together, as reflected in the common occurrence of the compound sati-sampajañña (‘recollection-discernment’) in the early texts.⁷ Ardency and seclusion provide utmost attentiveness to determine the depth of full skillful engagement. I will generally refer to these satipaṭṭhāna four faculties as constituting full skillful engagement, since its range of applicability (as we will see) is much broader than satipaṭṭhāna contemplation.

2.1.3. Acquiring know-how. The faculties of full skillful engagement optimize performance, whether in satipaṭṭhāna contemplation, in ethical practices, or in non-Buddhist practices such as martial arts. They also optimize the acquisition of further know-how for improved future performance. What is recollected benefits from study, but it particularly improves with repetition and further insight in practice. We “learn by doing” and “practice makes perfect.”

The process of acquiring know-how is described repeatedly in the early texts as ‘development and cultivation’ (bhāvanā bahulīkamma). As development, successful results of discernment become a basis for improved know-how. Through cultivation (bahulīkammaṁ means literally ‘doing a lot’), our know-how across the board is habituated and restructured in memory and thereby internalized (see 6.1.2), such that it becomes more automatic and intuitive, requiring less and less thought or deliberation. This gives us the famous “learning curve” that we are all familiar with.

Consider, for instance, how a toddler has to give full attention to bumbling around in learning to walk, but how an adult normally walks effortlessly with almost no awareness of the movement of feet and knees. Or consider how you had to give full attention to trying to navigate through traffic while learning to drive, but now drive effortlessly on autopilot, while giving your attention to life’s other problems or enjoyments. Full skillful engagement optimizes learning of this sort even while it optimizes performance. In sum, we begin with the know-what of Dhamma, which is presented to us explicitly as values, conceptualizations, procedures, constraints on behavior and so on. Then through practice Dhamma-based know-how is internalized, transformed and packed into an intuitive means of processing.⁸

2.2. The etymology of satipaṭṭhāna

Let me point out something that has not been appreciated: the word satipaṭṭhāna refers literally to the faculties, not to the contemplative practice, of satipaṭṭhāna. The word is a compound of two words:

sati ‘recollection’ + upaṭṭhāna ‘attending to.’

It might well be translated ‘recollection-attentiveness.’ Let me explain.

2.2.1. Recollection. Sati ‘recollection’ is one of the four satipaṭṭhāna faculties introduced above. The Pali word is a derivation of a root meaning ‘memory’ or ‘recollection’ and corresponds to the verb sarati ‘remember’ or ‘recollect.’ The cognate word in Sanskrit, smṛti, has a similar meaning and was also commonly used at the time of the Buddha specifically in reference to memory of sacred Brahmanic texts, or even to the body of sacred texts itself, which for many centuries were preserved in rote memory before they were committed to palm leaf.⁹

Indeed, sati refers always (!) to some form of memory in the early texts, virtually always in support of the performance of some task or practice. Let me cite some key examples. First, sati is the first of the seven awakening factors (bojjhaṅga), where it is clearly allocated the function of bringing some aspect of Dhamma to mind so that it can be examined and investigated:

Whenever, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu, dwelling thus withdrawn, recollects that dhamma and thinks it over, on that occasion the awakening factor of sati is aroused by the bhikkhu . The bhikkhu develops the awakening factor of sati at that time. The bhikkhu completes the awakening factor of sati at that time. (SN 46.3)

As a practical matter, a Dhamma teaching is brought to mind as the first awakening factor as the practitioner’s associated know-how at its current state of development. This fulfills recollection. The second awakening factor, dhamma-investigation, then begins to examine how this teaching manifests in present experience. This fulfills discernment. The third factor fulfills ardency and the rest of the series fulfills composure. Recollection based on the Dhamma is what we must continually bring to mind and hold in mind in order to practice satipaṭṭhāna contemplation,¹⁰ or in order to engage in virtually any other Buddhist practice.¹¹

Elsewhere the Buddha offers us the following example of recollection:

Just as the gatekeeper in the king's frontier fortress is wise, recollective, and intelligent, one who keeps out strangers and admits acquaintances, for protecting its inhabitants and for warding off outsiders, so too a noble disciple is recollective, possessing supreme recollection and discrimination, one who remembers and recollects what was done and said long ago. With recollection as his gate-keeper, the noble disciple abandons the unwholesome and develops the wholesome, abandons what is blameworthy and develops what is blameless, and maintains himself in purity. (AN 7.67 iv 110-1)

The gatekeeper performs his occupation by bringing previous know-what and know-how to bear in assessing each person who seeks entry. Aside from any acquired intuition about what constitutes looking suspicious (developed naturally through repeated practice), he will draw on this memory of particular incidents involving particular people that he might now recognize from the (ofttimes distant) past. This is his recollection. The noble disciple is then asked to develop an analogous recollection in Dhammic practice in assessing which of his own thoughts and intentions to be kept out and which to be admitted.¹²

Recollected know-how is far more important for our purposes than know-what. Know-how includes not only learned principles that can be put into practice to perform tasks, but also their internalized manifestations, whose application has become automatic and effortless through years of practice, much as years of learning scales and chords manifest in spontaneous movements of the virtuoso’s fingertips. In Buddhism, I daresay, our develop-ment and cultivation of know-how in practice also marks our progress on the path. In acquired know-how lie the ultimate fruits of our practice, and in recollected know-how lie their immediate applicability.

2.2.2. Recollection-attentiveness. With regard to the second part of the compound satipaṭṭhāna, two alternative etymologies have been proposed:

sati ‘recollection’ + paṭṭhāna ‘foundation,’‘establishment,’ or
sati ‘recollection’ + upaṭṭhāna ‘attending to.’

In the first etymology, favored in the Pali commentaries, the word paṭṭhāna is literally

pa- ‘forth’ + ṭhāna ‘standing,’

hence ‘foundation’ or ‘establishment.’ In the alternative etymology, the word upaṭṭhāna, in which the ‘u’ is elided to produce the ambiguous compound, is literally

upa- ‘close’ + ṭhāna ‘standing,’

hence something like ‘caring for’ or ‘attending to.’¹³ Most modern scholars seem now to agree that this second analysis is correct¹⁴ for several reasons:

The equivalent of satipaṭṭhāna in Sanskrit Buddhist texts is smṛtyupasthāna, which is unambiguously built on the cognate of upaṭṭhāna, not on that of paṭṭhāna.

The gerund form paṭṭhāna does not occur by itself in the early Pali texts.

The other inflections of the verb upaṭṭhahati routinely occur in association with sati, for instance, upaṭṭhitā sati (‘attentive recollection’).

In fact, the description of the first exercise in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta reveals this etymology in alternative inflections of cognate terms,

… parimukhaṁ satiṁ upaṭṭhapetvā …
                ‘… having attended recollectively to what is in front …’¹⁵

I will translate upaṭṭhāna as ‘attentiveness,’ which connotes a more active degree of engagement than ‘attending.’ The compound satipaṭṭhāna can accordingly be translated literally as ‘recollection-attentiveness,’ but I will generally leave it untranslated for reasons that will become clear.  

Picture a nurse standing close to her patient in order to attend to his needs caringly. She is alert, sensitive and composed. This is upaṭṭhāna. In her attentiveness, she brings all of her training and knowledge to bear to the assessment of their needs in order to respond appropriately. This is sati. The nurse is skillfully engaged in her profession. Likewise, a Buddhist practitioner sits close to experiential factors in the present practice situation—raw sensa-tions in the eye, the arising of perceptions, of ill-will, and so on—with the same attentiveness. That is upaṭṭhāna. In attending to their experiential world, the practitioner brings Dhammic know-how to bear in order to interpret experiences and to recognize the conditions by which they arise. This is sati. In this way, they skillfully engage in satipaṭṭhāna practice.

2.2.3. Satipaṭṭhāna as ‘full skillful engagement.’ Notice that the etymology of the compound ‘satipaṭṭhāna’ reflects quite closely the satipaṭṭhāna faculties themselves. Nothing in the term suggests the practice of contemplation (anupassanā) as opposed to any other skillful practice. In fact, the phrase “full skillful engagement” also reflects the meaning of satipaṭṭhāna, albeit not literally: “skillful” is the quality mediated by recollection, and “engagement” is the attentiveness of discernment backed by ardency and seclusion. None-theless, in spite of all this, the term satipaṭṭhāna is almost always used with reference specifically to the contemplative practice. This suggests an historical semantic shift of the nominal compound form away from its literal meaning. To avoid confusion, I will clearly distinguish, where appropriate in what follows, the satipaṭṭhāna faculties from the satipaṭṭhāna (contemplative) practice.

However, the broader applicability of the faculties beyond the contemplative practice is illustrated in the following passage:

And how is recollection its [the spiritual life’s] authority?

Recollection is internally well-attentive: ‘In just such a way I will fulfill the training pertaining to good conduct that I have not yet fulfilled, or assist with wisdom in various respects the training pertaining to good conduct that I have fulfilled.’
                …
Recollection is internally well-attentive: ‘In just such a way I will scrutinize with wisdom the teachings that I have not yet scrutinized, or assist with wisdom in various respects the Dhamma that I have scrutinized. (AN 4.245)

Two distinct tasks are cited here to which recollection is attentive: (1) training in good conduct and (2) scrutinizing the Dhamma. The first pertains to developing and cultivating virtue, and the second pertains to developing and cutivating wisdom. The second is also the task of the contemplative practice of satipaṭṭhāna itself. The phrase ‘recollection is … well-attentive’ is sati su-upaṭṭhitā hoti, part of which is cognate with satipaṭṭhāna. This demonstrates that the satipaṭṭhāna faculties of attentive recollection apply to full skillful engagement both in virtue and in wisdom practices. However as noted, the nominal compound satipaṭṭhāna is limited to the wisdom practice of satipaṭṭhāna. All of the exercises of the Sutta, for instance, pertain to how we apprehend the world, not to how we behave in it. A semantic shift must have effected only the nominal compound, and not the verbal cognates.

2.2.4. Recollection-discernment. We should note that the compound sati-sampajañña (‘recollection-discernment’) mentioned earlier, seems also to be used to refer to the satipaṭṭhāna faculties, albeit by including ardency and seclusion only implicitly. The existence of this near-synonym would help explain the semantic shift of satipaṭṭhāna away from its literal reference to the satipaṭṭhāna faculties. ‘Recollection-discernment’ seems to occur widely always in reference to the satipaṭṭhāna faculties of full skillful engagement. It occurs sometimes in wisdom contemplation:

This is Nanda’s recollection-discernment: Nanda knows feelings as they originate, as they remain present, as they disappear; he knows perceptions as they originate, as they remain present, as they disappear; he knows thoughts as they originate, as they remain present, as they disappear. That is Nanda’s recollection-discernment. (AN 8.9 iv 168)

However, sati-sampajañña occurs most commonly in the early texts in association with virtue practices, where the theoretically equivalent term satipaṭṭhāna is noticeably absent. Here it is with shame and conscience:

Bhikkhus, when there is no recollection-discernment, for one deficient in recollection-discernment, shame and conscience lack their proximate cause. (AN 8.81 iv 336)

Here it is with sense restraint:

Restraint of the sense faculties, too, I say, has a nutriment; it is not without nutriment. And what is the nutriment for restraint of the sense faculties? It should be said: recollection-discernment (AN 10.16 v 115)

In short, the term sati-sampajañña refers to the satipaṭṭhāna faculties (for full skillful engagement) as a stand-in for what satipaṭṭhāna would otherwise mean literally. The availability of the term sati-sampajañña is likely to have facilitated the semantic shift of the term satipaṭṭhāna from its literal to its accepted meaning as the contemplative practice.

2.3. Training in full skillful engagement

Full skillful engagement is not generally a stand-alone practice. It works to optimize performance and skill acquisition of some “primary practice,” such as martial arts, or satipaṭṭhāna contemplation.  It can be thought of as an auxiliary practice, or a faculty. Samādhi is similarly an auxiliary practice or faculty. However, full skillful engagement is itself a skill that can be developed and cultivated, as a skill of skillfulness. In fact, full skillful engagement can be trained independently of any particular primary practice, as a stand-alone practice. A simile in the Saṁyutta Nikāya graphically illustrates how training in the skill of skillfulness is accomplished:

The Blessed One said this: “Bhikkhus, suppose that on hearing, ‘The most beautiful girl of the land! The most beautiful girl of the land!’ a great crowd of people would assemble. Now that most beautiful girl of the land would dance exquisitely and sing exquisitely. On hearing, ‘The most beautiful girl of the land is dancing! The most beautiful girl of the land is singing!’ an even larger crowd of people would assemble. Then a man would come along, wishing to live, not wishing to die, wishing for happiness, averse to suffering. Someone would say to him: ‘Good man, you must carry around this bowl of oil filled to the brim between the crowd and the most beautiful girl of the land. A man with a drawn sword will be following right behind you, and wherever you spill even a little of it, right there he will fell your head.’ What do you think, bhikkhus, would that man stop attending to that bowl of oil and out of negligence turn his attention outwards?”

“No, venerable sir.” (SN 47.20)

The task to be performed here is that of carrying the bowl without spilling a drop of oil. However, we can see each of the factors of full skillful engagement fully at work: the sword represents ardency and the girl represents a potential challenge to seclusion. Discernment and recollection are represented by the task of keeping the oil in the bowl. Although the scope of the man’s attention must be very broad, it must at the same time be sharply circumscribed: by all means it must strictly exclude the girl dancing and singing, for she could easily become a fatal distraction. Although the basis for ardency is “wishing to live, not wishing to die,” the hindrance of fear must also be put aside, alongside the hindrance of lust.

What is recollected in this simile is not Dhammic, it is the know-how concerning subtle movements of the body, particularly in walking. Most of this know-how was certainly internalized long ago, and therefore not commonly brought to attention. However, in this instance, the skill of movement must be brought to mind. Why? Because each movement must be monitored by discernment with care and deliberation, for any careless lapse in control of a single movement might be fatal, and movements are conditioned by many random factors: the movements of the various people present, potentials for being bumped, the reliability of walking surfaces, the improper placement of any step, down to the potentially fatal effects of a gust of wind.

The discourse concludes:

“I have made up this simile, bhikkhus, in order to convey a meaning. This here is the meaning: ‘The bowl of oil filled to the brim’: this is a designation for recollection directed to the body. Therefore, bhikkhus, you should train yourselves thus: ‘We will develop and train recollec-tion directed at the body, make it our vehicle, make it our basis, stabilize it, exercise ourselves in it, and fully perfect it.’ Thus, bhikkhus, should you train yourselves.” (SN 47.20)

This conclusion is striking. It recommends training in recollection-attentive-ness itself, through choosing physical tasks connected with the body and then skillful engaging in those tasks, attentive to details as if our life depended on it. Developing and cultivating recollection directed to the body (kāyagatā sati), making it our vehicle, making it our basis, stabilizing it, exercising ourselves in it, and fully perfecting it, is an effective way to train our skills in the satipaṭṭhāna faculties. By extension, we might do something similar to whatever task we undertake, not only to tasks defined by Dhamma, and not necessarily to tasks having to do with the body. The preference for the body is echoed in another sutta:

… one thing, when developed and cultivated, leads to recollection-discernment … What is that one thing? Recollection directed to the body. (AN 1.276)

This training in the faculties themselves is taken to heart in the following passage from the Samaññaphala Sutta describing one stage of the gradual training, notably a practice stage prior to a stage at which satipaṭṭhāna contemplation is begun:

And how, great king, is the bhikkhu endowed with recollection-discernment? Herein, great king, in going forward and returning, the bhikkhu acts with discernment. In looking ahead and looking aside, he acts with discernment. In bending and stretching the limbs, he acts with discernment. In wearing his robes and cloak and using his alms-bowl, he acts with discernment. In eating, drinking, chewing, and tasting, he acts with discernment. In defecating and urinating, he acts with discernment. In going, standing, sitting, lying down, waking up, speaking, and remaining silent, he acts with discernment. In this way, great king, the bhikkhu is endowed with recollection-discernment.¹⁶
(DN 2 i 70-1)

The challenge of this practice is that the bhikkhu is already so masterful in these observable routine activities that they require little effort and rarely any thought or attention. Under these conditions, the attention of the untutored worldling would normally be scattered. Yet, even without the urgency facilitated by the sword in the previous example, the bhikkhu is asked to elevate what is normally overlooked into explicit attention. That is where the challenge lies, in maintaining attentiveness anyway, where know-how is so great that the task is otherwise devoid of challenge.¹⁷ This requires seriously narrowing of attention and stilling of the mind (see 6.2.2, 6.3.1).

2.4. Right recollection

Right recollection (sammā sati) is the seventh factor of the noble eightfold path. In this chapter we’ve managed to look at recollection (sati) itself, as well as its progressive enhancements as recollection-discernment (sati-sampa-jañña), as satipaṭṭhāna faculties (full skillful engagement) and finally as the satipaṭṭhāna contemplative practice. We would hope that right recollection would correspond in the Buddhist context to one of these degrees of elaboration, if not to the root concept of recollection itself.

I will suggest here that right recollection is, in fact, the satipaṭṭhāna faculties (recollection-attentiveness or full skillful engagement) applied to properly understood and internalized Dhammic know-how. But to reach that conclu-sion, we must first look at two alternative and seemingly inconsistent ways in which right recollection is described in the early texts. The first is as something that runs and circles around the other factors of the path. The second is as the “four satipaṭṭhānas” themselves.

2.4.1. Right recollection runs and circles around everything else. Let’s begin by looking at how the Buddha incorporated the combination of right view, right effort and right recollection as factors at work in virtually all of Buddhist practice.

Right view is the forerunner. And how is right view the forerunner? One discerns wrong ◖action◗ as wrong ◖action◗, and right ◖action◗ as right ◖action◗. … One tries to abandon wrong ◖action◗ and to enter into right ◖action◗: This is one's right effort. One remembers to abandon wrong ◖action◗ and to enter and remain in right ◖action◗: This is one's right recollection. Thus these three factors–right view, right effort, and right recollection–run and circle around right ◖action◗. (MN 117 iii 72-76)

This passage is stated verbatim for each of the first five factors of the noble eightfold path: ◖view◗, ◖attitude◗, ◖speech◗ ◖action◗ and ◖livelihood◗. The path practices in which we gain know-how fall under the categories of wisdom (right view and right attitude¹⁸) and virtue (right speech, right action and right livelihood). The remaining factors are the faculties of right effort, right recollection and right samādhi. They serve as auxiliary practices in boosting the efficacy of these five primary practices.¹⁹ A wisdom factor and two auxiliary faculties are claimed to run and circle around all of the wisdom and virtue practices. Understanding right recollection with the help of right effort in terms of skillful engagement makes perfect sense in this passage:

Right view is the primary practice of developing a correct, mature and accessible understanding of the Dhamma, which serves as a guide for all of the other path factors. Right view begins with study, but turns to satipaṭṭhāna contemplation, an advanced practice within right view.²⁰

Right effort is the energy that drives actual engagement in a practice, in speech, body and mind, under the guidance of right recollection.

 Right effort is responsible, for instance, for dispelling the impulse to wack a pest or fabricate a whopper, while right recollection makes what the proper Dhammic behavior is, clear.

Right recollection is the intermediate factor between right view and right effort, between the guiding light of Dhamma and momentary practice choices. It determines what thought or behavior in the practice situation is Dhammically appropriate, then awaits right effort’s implementation.

In short, right recollection of Dhamma along with the aid of right effort is Dhammically appropriate full skillful engagement. An attentive and well-cultivated faculty of full skillful engagement is necessary in making proper ethical choices as we find ourselves repeatedly in morally charged situations, weighing a constellation of factors such as our own motivations, our vows and commitments, the imperative to harmonize with others and to do no harm, and our rough calculations of anticipated benefits or harm.²¹ With even a momentary lapse in attentiveness, we may fail to act appropriately at a critical time.

As a quick simile, if right cuisine were a path practice, right view would be our cookbook and right effort the mixing, stirring, baking, and so on that actually happens. Right recollection would be the executive function between book and spoon that knows precisely what to do when, and that also gains in adeptness as it fulfills its function. With recollection-attentiveness the art of cuisine is gradually mastered.

2.4.2. Right recollection as the four satipaṭṭhānas. Right recollection is alternatively defined in an oft-repeated formula as follows:

And what, bhikkhus, is right recollection? Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu dwells contemplating ◖body◗ in the ◖body◗, ardent, discerning, recollective, having removed covetousness and displeasure in regard to the world. … This is right recollection. (SN 45.8)

The middle clause is repeated as for ◖body◗, also for ◖feelings◗, ◖mind◗, and ◖dhammas◗, thereby enumerating the four satipaṭṭhānas. This passage appears to equate right recollection specifically with satipaṭṭhāna contem-plative practice, even though it also highlights the satipaṭṭhāna faculties of the previous definition. The two definitions seem incongruous. For instance, if right recollection as satipaṭṭhāna contemplation were to run and circle around right speech, then its task would be the contemplation of right speech, rather than the skillful performance of right speech. In fact, among the many contem-plative practice exercises found in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and in other satipaṭṭhāna texts, none touches on right speech, nor shows interest in any other virtue practices.²² Nor does the term satipaṭṭhāna seem ever to occur anywhere in the early texts in association with ethical practices, like guarding the senses.

2.4.3. Reconciliation. There is a way to reconcile these two seemingly incompatible descriptions of right recollection. Definitions in the early texts are often definitions “by example.” For instance, the following defines perception:

And why do you call it ‘perception’? It perceives; that’s why it’s called ‘perception.’ And what does it perceive? It perceives blue, yellow, red, and white. It perceives; that’s why it’s called ‘perception.’ (SN 22.79)

Clearly, the four colors mentioned are merely representative examples, and are implicitly understood to generalize to orange, green, maroon, birds, faces, tastes, harmonious sounds, the moon, and anything else that can be perceived. Similarly, the following defines fabrication (saṅkhāra) in its three facets by example:

Friend Visāka, in-breathing and out-breathing are the bodily fabrication, thought and deliberation are the verbal fabrication, and perception and feeling are the mental fabrication. (MN 44 i 301)

I propose that the definition of right recollection as the four satipaṭṭhānas is similarly a definition by example. The path practices around which full skillful engagement runs includes satipaṭṭhāna contemplation, but alongside a wide range of other path practices, unmentioned in the second definition.

The choice of satipaṭṭhāna contemplative practice to exemplify right recollection in the definition is natural, for satipaṭṭhāna contemplation is emblematic of the satipaṭṭhāna faculties. First, the contemplative practice is utterly dependent on the faculties (such that the faculties are built into the practice instructions). Second, the contemplative practice commonly provides optimal conditions for the full force of the faculties (since one commonly sits in a quiet place while practicing). Third, the contemplative practice opens the faculties to immediate inspection (as in contemplation of the seven awakening factors). Fourth, the definition as the four satipaṭṭhānas explicitly refers to the satipaṭṭhāna faculties. Even though the faculties are broadly applied throughout Buddhist practice, never is it as successfully applied and so vividly apparent as when one is sitting, secluded, under a tree in meditation posture, engaged in satipaṭṭhāna contemplation. This is why satipaṭṭhāna practice is emblematic of right recollection.

The same conditions that make this contemplative practice emblematic for right recollection also help explain the semantic shift of the term satipaṭṭhāna from the faculties to the practice. It is a case of “metonymy,” based on the salient association between the faculties and this specific practice. We’ve already seen that the availability of an almost synonymous alternative term for the faculties (sati-sampajañña) might also have facilitated the shift.²³ However, we have also seen that the shift is incomplete, in that its non-nominal cognates (e.g., sati upaṭṭhitā ‘attentive recollection’) retain the literal meaning as faculties.

There seems to be an exception that proves the rule: in a single instance in the Pali suttas, the nominal compound satipaṭṭhāna refers to a primary practice other than satipaṭṭhāna contemplation. In the Majjhima Nikāya the Buddha describes himself as practicing “the three satipaṭṭānas,” but in this case his task is to

“… teach the Dhamma to his disciples out of compassion,”

under three alternative conditions:

“his disciples will not give ear and exert their minds to understand,”

“some of his disciples will give ear and exert their minds to understand,” and

“[all] his disciples will give ear and exert their minds to understand.”
(MN 137 iii 121)

Here the practice is teaching rather than contemplating, but certainly the application of the satipaṭṭhāna faculties is what the two identically named practices share in common.²⁴

I conclude that right recollection is the application (running and circling around) of the faculties of full skillful engagement (the satipaṭṭhāna faculties) to the five primary factors of the noble eightfold path.

2.5. Conclusions

We began this exploration by catching the thread of a foundational teaching in the introduction to the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, in which we recognized the faculties of full skillful engagement. We then found the faculties reflected in the etymology of the compound satipaṭṭhāna (as well as sati-sampajañña), and noted the ambiguity of that term in referring either to the faculties of full skillful engagement or to satipaṭṭhāna contemplative practice. We found that these satipaṭṭhāna faculties are applicable to many practices beyond satipaṭṭhāna contemplation, and even beyond Buddhist practice, and that there are Dhammic practices for developing and cultivating these faculties independently of any particular primary practice. Finally, we argued that right recollection (sammā sati) is none other than full skillful engagement (the application of satipaṭṭhāna faculties) in the context of Dhamma.

Common similes for Buddhist concepts draw repeatedly from music, crafts and professional life. Buddhism is a practice tradition concerned with learning, internalizing, mastering and eventually becoming a virtuoso in what we might call the skill of life, or in the skills of wisdom and virtue. The thought-world of Buddhism is accordingly organized around skill in practice: around action (kamma), both skillful (kusala) and unskillful (akusala), around competence (pariyatti) and performance (patipatti), around development (bhāvana) and cultivation (bahulīkata) of know-how. Those firmly on the path are in training (sekha) and those who have mastered it, beyond training. (asekkha). This chapter has highlighted the art of full skillful engagement in practice, and has located its rightful position in the noble eightfold path.

¹ This is a depiction of the climax of Akira Kurosawa’s 1961 film Yojimbo.

² According to the PTS dictionary.

³ Thanissaro (2012, pp. 2, 13).

⁴ I deliberately avoid translating sati as ‘mindfulness,’ whose meaning has become corrupted in modern usage (see chapter 4). ‘Recollection’ is a literal translation of sati.

⁵ Scholars and teachers generally consider that “covetousness and grief for the world” refers to the first two of the five hindrances, and to stand for all five. This makes sense, since each has a potential for distracting us from full skillful engagement.

⁶ See chapters 3 and 6 for a detailed discussion of samādhi and the jhānas in the context of skilled engagement.

⁷ Several scholars have described the function of recollection-discernment in similar terms: Rhys Davids, who aptly translated sati as ‘mindfulness’ some 140 years ago, noted “the constantly repeated phrase 'mindful and thoughtful' (sato sampajâno) … [is] that activity of mind and constant presence of mind which is one of the duties most frequently inculcated on the good Buddhist.” Shulman (2014, pp. 112-4) describes sati in terms of the fusion of memory and attention, and Thanissaro (2012, pp. 1, 15) in terms of active memory that provides an immediate “framework” for understanding experience and what has to be done in this regard. Sati is a faculty of memory that bears in mind the Dhamma in a manner relevant to the practitioner’s spiritual quest.

⁸ See 6.1.2 for discussion of the cognitive mechanics of “internalization.”

⁹ We should not forget that this same practice of rote memorization of scriptures was successfully emulated in the early Buddhist Saṅgha as well, apparently uniquely among non-Brahmanical schools. It therefore makes sense that sati would have an analogous connotation in the early texts, as recollection of (Dhammic orVedic) know-what, if not know-how.

¹⁰ In fact, the three beginning awakening factors correspond to the satipaṭṭhāna contemplative practice.

¹¹ See 1.5.2 on the seven factors of awakening.

¹² In SN 48.9  the noble disciple’s recollection is described in exactly the same way, including the recollection and bearing in mind of things that were done and said long ago.

¹³ The PTS dictionary lists “attendance, waiting on, looking after, service, care, ministering.”

¹⁴ See Anālayo (2007, pp. 29-30). Yet, oddly, most continue to gloss it as ‘foundations’ or ‘establishment.’

¹⁵ MN 10 i 56. Here, parimukhaṁ (‘what is up front,’ that is, what is thematically relevant to the practice task at hand) is the object of the verb, and satiṁ is an adverbial accusative.

¹⁶ This passage also shows up almost word for word as an exercise in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta itself, at MN 10 i 57, but (given the following refrain) as a basis for contemplating the Dhamma teachings of impermanence and non-self.

¹⁷ Notice that this practice of recollection directed to the body looks a lot like what is often called “everyday mindfulness” by Nhat Hanh (1975) .

¹⁸ Mettā meditation is an example of practice in right attitude (sammā saṅkappa).

¹⁹ I claim that samādhi is also an “auxiliary practice.” In chapters 3 and 6, I argue that this role is tightly aligned with right recollection, fine-tunes seclusion and composure and promotes insight and internalization.

²⁰ That satipaṭṭhāna contemplation belongs to right view is advanced in 1.5.

²¹ In fact, the Buddha classifies recollection as a “faculty,” along with both effort and samādhi. See Cintita (2025, ch. 10).

²² In fact, if Sujāto (2012, pp. 140, 192, 305) and Anālayo (2014, p. 176) were right, the earliest satipaṭṭhāna practice would be limited to an even further pared down set of wisdom exercises.

²³ Note that the term paticca-samupāda (‘dependent co-arising’) seems similarly, but not so completely, to have shifted semantically from a principle based on conditional relations, to the twelve links of dependent co-arising that manifest that principle.

²⁴ Kuan (2008, p. 31) assesses that satipaṭṭhāna is the same concept in both cases, but points out that Bhikkhu Bodhi disagrees.

3. The miracle of samādhi

Samādhi, the meditative state per se, occupies a prominent role in the early Buddhist texts. It is the final factor of the noble eightfold path to which the higher achievements of wisdom, or of “knowledge and vision of things as they are” (yathā-bhūta-ñāṇa-dassana) are attributed. It is a profound state of serenity, differentiated into the four jhānas, through which the mind becomes progressively stilled and centered, various cognitive faculties are silenced, and complete but transitory ease and equanimity are attained.  

Etymologically, samādhi is derived from sam ‘together’ + ādhi ‘put,’ and so has to do with gathering or collecting something together. Samādhi is most commonly translated as ‘concentration,’ implying a narrowing or focusing of attention. However, as we will see, concentration is one of two dimensions that characterize samādhi; the other is the progressive curtailment of various cognitive faculties as we progress through the jhānas. At every stage samādhi establishes an orderly array of mental faculties, and this (consistent with its etymology) recommends a translation as ‘collectedness’ or ‘composure.’¹ I will, for the most part, simply leave samādhi and jhāna untranslated to avoid confusion.

Etymologically, jhāna is the gerund of the verb jhāyati, apparently in use before the Buddha’s time to denote almost any contemplative or meditative activity.² The Buddha sometimes uses this term in its common meaning, but alongside the technical sense of the “four jhānas,” which seems to have been novel at the time of his teachings. In its technical sense, the Buddha equates the fourfold jhāna with samādhi,³ such that there is no samādhi independent of the four jhānas in the early texts.⁴

Unfortunately, samādhi has become a controversial topic within the Theravāda tradition, where much confusion seems to have resulted historically first from a redefining of samādhi, then from an attempt to reconcile contrasting frameworks that don’t in principle cohere. The debate persists even among the adherents to the authority of the early Buddhist texts, where contrasting evidence is cited for “hard” or “soft” jhānas (respectively difficult and easy-ish to attain), and where there is still no consensus about how Dhammic insight is even possible in jhāna.

In this chapter, I put forward an account of what samādhi is and how it works according to the early Buddhist texts. I will point out some common, but widely neglected, passages concerning the ubiquitousness and spontaneous nature of samādhi, and about the fruits of samādhi. I will also examine some details of how samādhi is claimed to integrate in practice with other factors. I hope thereby to contribute to a fuller illumination of this remarkable multifaceted culminating factor of the noble eightfold path.⁵

3.1. How samādhi arises

Many of us learn, as beginning meditators, a special technique to induce a meditative state. Typically, we pick a meditation object (like the sensation of the breath, a kasiṇa, an imagined sound, etc.), fix our attention right there one-pointedly and keep it there for a while. Although this might induce a profound state of absorption, there is, surprisingly, almost no hint of the employment of such “synthetic” techniques in the early texts.⁶

3.1.1. Samādhi arises naturally. Instead, the early texts repeatedly report a “natural” transition into samādhi from any of a number of underlying conditions, apparently unassisted. For instance:

Bhikkhus, for a virtuous person, one whose behavior is virtuous, no volition need be exerted, “Let satisfaction [non-regret] arise in me.” It is natural that satisfaction arises in one who is virtuous, one whose behavior is virtuous.
… It is natural that delight arises in one with satisfaction.
… It is natural that rapture arises in one who is delighted
… It is natural that the body of one with a rapturous mind is tranquil.
… It is natural that one who is tranquil in body feels pleasure.
… It is natural that the mind of one feeling pleasure dwells in samādhi.
(AN 11.2)

The arising of samādhi while practicing recollection of the triple gem is likewise attested in similar terms:

When a noble disciple recollects the Buddha, on that occasion his mind is not obsessed by lust, aversion, or delusion; on that occasion his mind is simply straight, based on the Buddha. A noble disciple whose mind is straight gains inspiration in the meaning, gains inspiration in Dhamma, gains delight connected with Dhamma. When he is delighted, rapture arises. For one with a rapturous mind, the body becomes tranquil. One tranquil in body feels pleasure. For one feeling pleasure, the mind comes into samādhi. … You should develop this recollection of the Buddha while walking, standing, sitting and lying down. You should develop it while engaged in work and while living at home in a house full of children. (AN 11.12)

Notice that in each of these passages we begin with some recognized Buddhist practice, after which a common series of antecedent states unfolds before samādhi blooms. This series is found often in the suttas:⁷

                SOURCE → delight (pāmujja) → rapture (pīti)→
                                 tranquility (passaddhi)→pleasure (sukha) → samādhi.

In some texts only two of these antecedent factors are mentioned:

                SOURCE → rapture→ tranquility→ samādhi.

In yet another instance, we find this same stepwise unfolding of samādhi in the context of learning Dhamma through group or private recitation in the stages of liberation:⁸

In whatever way …, he experiences inspiration in the meaning and inspiration in Dhamma. As he does so, delight arises in him. When he is delighted, rapture arises. For one with a rapturous mind, the body becomes tranquil. One tranquil in body feels pleasure. For one feeling pleasure, the mind gains samādhi. (AN 5.26)

The seven awakening factors provide the best known example of this same series of antecedent states leading to samādhi:⁹

recollection→ investigation of dhammas → energy → rapture →
                tranquility → samādhi → equanimity.

“SOURCE” in this case seems constituted in the first three links, which together likely correspond to satipaṭṭāna contemplation, whereby individual Dhamma teachings, such as mind or aggregates of appropriation, are brought to mind (recollection), then investigated in terms of observable experience. It is abundantly clear in the early texts that satipaṭṭhāna is practiced routinely in conjunction with samādhi.¹⁰ In any case, SOURCE is a matter of active engagement under the guidance of Dhamma (see 2.1), in the midst of which samādhi may emerge to bring composure or order to the mind.

The Buddha makes the natural and spontaneous nature of this unfolding into samādhi unmistakeably clear in the following:

Just as, bhikkhus, when rain pours down in thick droplets on a mountain top, the water flows down along the slope and fills the cleft, gullies, and creeks; these, being full, fill up the pools; these, being full, fill up the lakes; these, being full, fill up the streams; these, being full, fill up the rivers; and these, being full, fill up the great ocean; so too, …  with faith as proximate cause, delight; with delight as proximate cause, rapture; with rapture as proximate cause, tranquility; with tranquility as proximate cause, pleasure; with pleasure as proximate cause, samādhi; with samādhi as proximate cause, the knowledge and vision of things as they really are; … (SN 12.23)

Likewise, within samādhi we proceed from one jhāna to the next spontane-ously: the mind simply lets go of what it is holding onto in one jhāna when it is ready, “you don’t even have to wish for it.”¹¹ The conditioned natural unfolding of samādhi found in the early texts is in sharp contrast with synthetic techniques found in later traditions for inducing samādhi.¹²

3.1.2. The Buddha discovered samādhi. Recognizing the natural unfolding of samādhi gives us some insight into the meaning of the following statement:

The Buddha awakened to jhāna.¹³ (SN 2.7 i 48)

‘Awakened’ (bujjhā) in Pali means figuratively ‘discovered’ in many contexts. Either way, it suggests that he did not invent jhāna, but appropriated something already present in human cognition, ready to arise under certain conditions. A synthetic technique would have been invented. In fact, this is exactly what is described when, as a young child, the Buddha-to-be entered the first jhāna “spontaneously” while sitting under a rose apple tree.¹⁴

What makes the fourfold jhāna uniquely Buddhist,¹⁵ if samādhi is already a natural faculty? I think the answer is that the Buddha taught the practitioner to “develop and cultivate” it: he recognized its potential and the processes whereby it could bear fruits, and then refined and internalized it accordingly. He made it into an art. “Feeding” similarly comes naturally to humans, but through  cultivation we get haute cuisine, plates, avocado slicers, and table manners.¹⁶

3.1.3. Right recollection gives rise to samādhi. I have declared SOURCE” as the root condition that gives rise to samādhi. However, exactly what constitutes SOURCE? Do all Buddhist practices qualify? Can non-Buddhist practices qualify? The answer advanced here is, in a nutshell, that samādhi arises in the context of active full skillful engagement in a practice task. This answer may surprise some, given samādhi’s reputation for stillness and ease.

Buddhism is a practice tradition and practice is a matter of developing and applying skills. The arahant has perfected the skill and performance of virtue and wisdom to become a kind of virtuoso of Dhamma. Like the would-be piano virtuoso, the would-be arahant gave whatever it took to achieve perfection, and this was full skillful engagement at its finest. To see how full skillful engagement works, we need look no further than the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, which requires that four qualities be maintained by us as practitioners (see also 2.1.2). We must be …  

… ardent, discerning and recollective, having put away covetousness and grief for the world. (MN 10 i 56)

These are the satipaṭṭhāna faculties described in chapter 2. Ardency is motivation or energy. Discernment is Dhammically correct understanding of the practice situation. Recollection is what develops and brings Dhammic know-how aptly to mind to guide discernment. Finally, “putting away covetousness and grief” (elsewhere known as ‘seclusion,’ viveka) keeps attention on track. Full skillful engagement keeps us focused, energetic, wholehearted and discerning as we bring all our relevant skills to bear in performing the practice task.

Subjectively, people delight in such full skillful engagement, particularly if they are challenged but not overwhelmed by the task (at which point their skills are developing quickly), even to the point of taking up dangerous sports to gain that feeling. Identifying full skillful engagement as SOURCE thereby explains the source of the factors of pleasure, delight and rapture that are antecedent to the arising of samādhi.

Right recollection is in fact full skillful engagement in the practice of Dhamma (see 2.4). With respect to recollection of Dhamma,

One remembers to abandon wrong ◖view◗ and to enter and remain in right ◖view◗. This is one's right recollection. (MN 117 iii 72-76)

This passage is repeated as for ◖view◗, for ◖attitude◗, ◖speech◗, ◖action◗ and ◖livelihood◗, making all of the factors of the wisdom and virtue groups in the noble eightfold path subject to the constraints of right recollection. This is to let one’s Dhammic know-how guide these practices. I will call practices within the scope of the first five path factors primary practices. The remaining three factors (right effort, right recollection, and right samādhi), are faculties or auxiliary practices (see 2.3, 2.4.1), for they play a supportive role in improving the efficacy of the primary practices. Since right recollection applies to all of the wisdom and virtue factors, we predict the arising of samādhi in a swath of diverse practices.

Right recollection is the faculty in the eightfold path just prior to right samādhi. And in fact the Buddha tells us at one point:

                For one of right recollection, right samādhi springs up. (SN 5.25-6)

Since samādhi is a natural phenomenon, albeit particularly refined in Buddhist practice, we should expect that it will arise under similar circumstances outside of the Buddhist context. In fact, the phenomenon of “flow” (see 6.3.1), widely studied in positive psychology, seems to be the unrefined counterpart of Buddhist samādhi. Flow is described as associated with states of elation, of intense concentration and of altered consciousness. It also arises naturally under conditions of full skillful engagement in some task, particularly in which someone has attained a level of advanced expertise.¹⁷

3.2. Samādhi as concentration

Attention for the untutored worldling is typically scattered or engaged in multiple tasks at the same time. However, in skillfully engaged Buddhist practice, the “scope of attention” is optimally centered around the theme of the primary practice task, whereby the experiential factors relevant to the task fall within that scope. For instance, the theme might be investigation of impermanence of breath, to which observable features of breath and teachings related to impermanence are relevant. To be functionally optimal, the scope of attention must be as broad or narrow as the practice task demands. It optimally excludes that which is irrelevant to the task.

However, it is critical that the narrowing of the scope of attention not overshoot the theme, lest it choke off the primary practice. It should be stable, but dynamic, as the demands of the practice task evolve. The phrase “having put away covetousness and grief for the world” delineates a base level for the narrowing of the scope of attention imposed in right recollection. Samādhi takes over from there to center even more tightly around the single theme. Narrowing the scope of attention to the theme of the practice task is one-centeredness.

Samādhi is one-centeredness of mind. (MN 34 i 301)

What I am translating as ‘one-centered,’ ekagga, is commonly translated as ‘one-pointed’ (eka ‘one’ + agga), with the understanding that  the mind is thereby willfully fixed on a single object and held there. This seems to be the general principle behind most synthetic techniques for entering states of deep concentration. However, these seem to be absent in early Buddhist practice.¹⁸

In fact, agga does not mean ‘point,’ and ekagga does not mean ‘one-pointed.’ Rather agga seems to be associated with two semantic “clusters”:¹⁹ one is a salient feature, like a mountain peak, or like the finest of delicacies, that easily becomes the center of attention.²⁰ The other is a meeting place, like a medita-tion center. ‘One-centered’ seems to capture both senses. Eka ‘one’ seems to convey that the mind avoids occupying more than one mountain peak (as in multitasking), and avoids jumping from one meeting house to the next (as in restlessness). Cittass’ ekaggatā ‘one-centeredness of mind’ is the condition in which there is a single well-defined theme for the practice task at hand, around which attention is concentrated.

In sum, the dynamically one-centered mind optimizes task performance, and no further narrowing of concentration is desirable. Right samādhi manages concentration. With the arising of samādhi, the primary task becomes the theme of samādhi (samādhi-nimitta).²¹ This explains the following:

One-centeredness of the mind is samādhi. The four satipaṭṭhānas are the themes of samādhi. The four right efforts are the prerequisites for samādhi. The pursuit, development and cultivation of these very same things are the development of samādhi. (MN 44 i 301)

Sometimes it is desirable to nudge ourselves into samādhi in pursuit of its fruits, and this is accomplished by managing its conditioning factors. Achieving stability in one-centeredness is often challenging, because the arising of samādhi is acutely sensitive to a range of subtle factors, particularly to external disruptions and responsibilities and to internal restlessness. Stability is more likely to be present, for instance, when one is sitting cross-legged, secluded under a tree, surrounded by the hushed sounds of nature. However, if we habituate the entrance into samādhi, this will enable us routinely and more quickly to enter into samādhi as an inclination of mind. For instance, in practicing satipaṭṭhāna we are told we can develop samādhi naturally, in an undirected manner, but:

While he is body-contemplating in the body, there arises in him, based on the body, either a fever in the body or sluggishness of mind, or the mind is distracted outwardly. That bhikkhu should then direct his mind towards some inspiring theme [pasādanīye nimitte]. … It is in such a way, Ānanda, that there is development by direction. (SN 47.9 v 156)

He chooses a theme conducive to samādhi temporarily, then, after the mind has settled, returns to his bodily theme. With familiarity we will find that we, as in all things, learn to manage subtle conditions intuitively, much as a child learns (but cannot explain) how to swing higher in a playground.

3.3. The jhānas

Samādhi operates in two dimensions:

 Concentration is the narrowing of the scope of attention, as described in
                the last couple of pages.  

 Curtailment is the narrowing of available “cognitive faculties,” about to
                be described in this section (see also 6.3.1 for further discussion).

As we pursue a primary practice task, right recollection abandons wrong view and enters and remains in right view. As a result we may, with a bit of skillful nudging, spontaneously enter samādhi. Beyond this, we are commonly encouraged further to develop and train this practice by making a point of allowing it to pass through the progressive stillness and silence of the jhānas. From the first jhāna, the second jhāna unfolds, and so on. From jhāna to jhāna, cognitive or cognitive/affective faculties are curtailed. The Buddha took great care to define which faculties are present and which are absent in each of the jhānas; he must have felt that it is important for us to be able to navigate among them.²²

Let’s consider an example. Mettā (‘kindness’) contemplation is a fundamental practice of right attitude:

When, bhikkhu, your mind is firm and well settled internally, and arisen bad unwholesome states do not obsess your mind, then you should train yourself thus: “I will develop and train the liberation of the mind by mettā, make it a vehicle and basis, carry it out, consolidate it, and properly undertake it.” Thus should you train yourself.
(AN 8.63 iv 299)

Mettā practice is optimized through right recollection, from which samādhi is expected to arise naturally under favorable conditions. In the phrase “develop and cultivate,” development (bhāvanā) indicates a restructuring of recollected know-how, and cultivation (bahulīkata, literally ‘done a lot’) indicates repeated practice which internalizes such restructurings.²³

3.3.1. The first jhāna. The sutta continues:

When this samādhi has been developed and cultivated by you in this way, then you should develop this samādhi with thought and deliberation. … (AN 8.63 iv 299-300)

Thought and deliberation are cognitive faculties, which together constitute discursive thinking, and which are generally available and employed incessantly by the untutored worldling outside of Buddhist practice. The first jhāna is certainly intended in this passage, in which we are free to make use of these faculties, since nothing has yet been curtailed. This is a standard description at this first stage of samādhi:

(1st jhāna) Here, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the first jhāna, which is accompanied by thought and deliberation, with rapture and pleasure born of seclusion. (MN 141 iii 252)

Being secluded (vivicca) from sensual pleasures and unwholesome states is the definitive factor in the first jhāna. It is often equated with the elimination of the five hindrances (nīvaraṇa)²⁴ as well as with the expression in the opening paragraphs of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta “having put away covetousness and grief for the world” (see 3.1). Thought and deliberation (vitakka-vicāra) are ubiquitous factors outside of samādhi. They are simply the discursive (and ofttimes rambling) mind:

Thought and deliberation are the verbal fabrication, one breaks into speech. (MN 44 i 301)

Their presence in the first jhāna indicates that no major cognitive faculties are curtailed in the first jhāna, even while the mind is one-centered on the theme of mettā. In the first jhāna, the mind is not free to wander into choosing a color for that new addition, into plotting revenge, nor into worrying about paying off our credit cards, because seclusion narrows the scope of attention from wandering that far.²⁵ “Born of seclusion” indicates that seclusion gives rise to the first jhāna.²⁶

3.3.2. The second jhāna. The mettā practice continues:

… you should develop it without thought but with deliberation only;²⁷ you should develop it without thought and deliberation. You should develop it with rapture; … (AN 8.63 iv 299-300)

When we are without thought and deliberation, we have reached the second jhāna. The second jhāna arises wherever thought and deliberation subside in favor of some quieter mode of cognition. This represents a significant narrowing of cognitive faculties. This is a standard description:

(2nd jhāna) With the stilling of thought and deliberation, he enters upon and abides in the second jhāna, which has tranquility and mental equipoise without thought and deliberation, with rapture and pleasure born of samādhi. (MN 141 iii 252)

The disappearance of the discursive faculty in the second jhāna is perhaps the most abrupt instance of curtailment in the series of jhānas. The Buddha accordingly calls the second jhāna “noble silence” (ariya tuṇhībhāva).²⁸ We can anticipate that curtailment will tend also to have the effect of stabilizing seclusion and one-centeredness, since over-energetic faculties are the primary potential promoters of distraction. On the other hand, if the remaining active faculties (such as simple perception) absorb some of this excess energy, it is plausible that they will function with enhanced lucidity.

‘Equipoise’ (ekodibhāva, often translated ‘unity’) is widely regarded a synonym for ‘one-centeredness’ (ekaggatā). However, its etymology suggests (very tentatively) that it might be the curtailment counterpart of the concentration term ‘one-centeredness.’²⁹ “Born of samādhi” refers to the prior presence of the samādhi of the first jhāna. Rapture and pleasure would have been, as we have seen, already present as antecedent states prior to entering samādhi, and for now they remain.

3.3.3. Can full skillful engagement persist in jhāna? Many have puzzled over the question of whether Dhammic know-how  can work together with samādhi at all. This is particularly relevant to satipaṭṭhāna practice, which deals with some of the most intellectually sophisticated teachings (see chapter 5). The early texts make clear that they do work together in satipaṭṭhāna practice, yet most scholars resist that conclusion; they seem to presume that this would be beyond the capabilities of human cognition.³⁰ However, Shulman (2014) presents two convincing arguments for the viability of bringing Dhamma into samādhi. At least I’m convinced:

First, he argues that Dhamma, in its very early form, tended to be descriptive of actual experience. For instance, the four noble truths are sometimes described in this way:

Bhikkhus, develop samādhi. A bhikkhu who is in samādhi understands things as they really are. And what does he understand as it really is? He understands as it really is: “This is suffering.” He understands as it really is: “This is the origin of suffering.” He understands as it really is: “This is the cessation of suffering.” He understands as it really is: “This is the way leading to the cessation of suffering.” (SN 56.1)

He notices that the pronoun ‘this’ (idaṁ/ayaṁ in Pali) is reserved for objects that can be pointed to explicitly (e.g., “this instance of suffering/craving”) or that the bhikkhu is experiencing right now. Only later did the noble truths become generalized to describe abstract universals. For instance, the formula for the second noble truth (in its best known formulation) came to be:

Now this, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of the origin of suffering: it is this craving which leads to renewed existence, accompanied by delight and lust, seeking delight here and there; that is, craving for sensual pleasures, craving for existence, craving for extermination.
(SN 56.11 v 421)

The later rendering of the second noble truth would, indeed, be very difficult to hold or internalize as a theme of samādhi, but the earlier is quite nuts-and-bolts.³¹ In accord with Shulman’s position, I argue that investigation in satipaṭṭhāna always involves verifying Dhamma teachings in terms of experiential observables (See 5.1).

Second, Shulman argues that through repeated study and meditative practice, Dhammic knowledge is restructured in a way that is generally unacknow-ledged by scholars.³² For Shulman, satipaṭṭhāna is a method by which “philosophy” is turned into an “active way of seeing,” in which it is beyond rational thinking but not beyond some restricted understanding.³³ In fact, we tend to sell the power of the silent jhānas short, for it is the curtailed quick and quiet cognition of the deeper jhānas that is most directly associated with the highest levels of expertise in task performance. Training in any skill internal-izes (see 6.1.2), through repetition, abilities that are less conceptually and more intuitively based, that in their highest manifestations become virtuosity almost devoid of any thought. For instance, a novice violinist will think, deliberate and annoy neighbors at every step, while a virtuoso simply steps out of the way and lets the music express itself through their fingers to the delight of all without thinking about it. The novice has yet to internalize their incipient know-how to acquire an intuitive grasp, to make it their own. A practice task in the second or deeper jhānas will be possible only if the task is sufficiently internalized. Chapter 6 explains how the jhānas facilitate the internalization of potentially complex concepts.

3.3.4. The third jhāna. The mettā practice continues:

… you should develop it without rapture; you should develop it accompanied by comfort. … (AN 8.63 iv 299-300)

Here we are in the third jhāna. The antecedent factor of rapture has been curtailed. This is a standard description:

(3rd jhāna) With the fading away as well of rapture, he abides in equanimity, recollective and discerning, still feeling pleasure with the body, he enters upon and abides in the third jhāna, on account of which noble ones announce: “He has a pleasant abiding, who is equanimous and recollective.” (MN 141 iii 252)

Although rapture is ostensibly an affective factor, with its fading away any remaining conditioned cognitive factors caught up in the excitement of rapture will also fade away. Concentration will become particularly stable and this reallocation of energy will produce a particularly lucid experience centered around the theme of samādhi, which in this case is mettā. “Recollective” and “discerning” refer to the central factors of right recollection (see 2.2.4) and therefore mark continued full skillful engagement in the practice task. However, with the curtailment of cognitive faculties in the deeper jhānas, this engagement is likely to be intuitive and not consciously apparent. Their reference here seems to be a reassurance that this engagement will continue to operate under the radar of consciousness on behalf of the practice task, even in deep jhāna.³⁴

3.3.5. The fourth jhāna. The mettā practice concludes:

… and you should develop it accompanied by equanimity.
(AN 8.63 iv 299-300)

Finally we have arrived at the fourth jhāna. This is its standard description:

(4th jhāna) With the abandoning of pleasure and pain, and with the previous disappearance of joy and grief, he enters and abides in the fourth jhāna, which has neither-pain-nor-pleasure and purity of recollection due to equanimity. (MN 141 iii 252)

“The abandoning of pleasure and pain” is the abandonment of feelings, and since feelings are a primary conditioning factor of perception (saññā), perception is also significantly curtailed. Little of conceptual experience remains, which is to say any engagement in the practice task is almost entirely intuitive and under the radar. Nonetheless, “purity of recollection” in the fourth jhāna suggests an advanced development of recalled know-how, a refined continuation of development and cultivation, which seems to be an important source of intuitive insight (see 3.5.2 below and 6.4.2). The fourth jhāna refines mettā into its purest form.

3.3.6. Jhānas support many practices. The development of mettā benefits somehow from abiding in each of the jhānas while centered on this theme. This same process is then repeated in AN 8.63 as for mettā also for the three remaining brahmavihāras (karuṇa, mudita, upekkhā). It is then repeated for the four satipaṭṭhāna contemplations (body, feelings, mind, dhammas). These last four practices belong to right view (they are concerned with verifying and internalizing Dhamma), which are also optimized by right recollection.

The curtailment of cognitive faculties is itself a natural process, requiring no effort, but is nonetheless developed and cultivated in Buddhist practice to become readily invoked and managed. Experience shows that we can also move from one jhāna to the next simply “by wishing it.”³⁵ Progressing from one jhāna to the next is experienced as the mind settling, enabled by the progressive familiarization and internalization of the specific practice, and accompanied by a corresponding “shift in consciousness.”

3.4. The fruits of samādhi

It is easy to appreciate that a primary practice will benefit from right recollection. But what does samādhi do for us? Samādhi is declared to lead to four benefits, some of which bring us close to the soteriological goals of Buddhist practice:

Bhikkhus, there are these four developments of samādhi. What four?

(1) There is a development in samādhi that, developed and cultivated, leads to dwelling happily in this very life.

(2) There is a development in samādhi that, developed and cultivated, leads to obtaining knowledge and vision.

(3) There is a development in samādhi that, developed and cultivated, leads to recollection-discernment.

(4) There is a development in samādhi that, developed and cultivated, leads to the destruction of the corruptions. (AN 4.41)

We will provide a brief explanation for each development in samādhi in turn. Section 6.4 provides a more detailed analysis on the basis of a deeper under-standing of the cognitive process of internalization. Since many of these explanations rely on the full skillful engagement in the primary practice task that gives rise to samādhi, how synthetic methods might produce these fruits remains unexplained.

3.4.1. Dwelling happily in this very life. The Buddha-to-be recognized that there are pleasures that transcend mundane sensual pleasures, when he recalled that, as a boy sitting under a rose apple tree, he had spontaneously entered the first jhāna, and found there:

… that pleasure that has nothing to do with sensuality, nothing to do with unskillful mental qualities. (MN 36 i 247)

Mundane (or everyday) pleasure is based in sensuality, for instance, in food, sex, a stock portfolio, catchy tunes, roller skating, and illicit drugs. Such pleasures tend to be problematic, fraught and unsatisfying, because they are fleeting and get entwined with craving and appropriation (upādāna) as “me” and “mine.” In contrast, spiritual, immaterial or non-carnal (nirāmisa) pleasures arise spontaneously, beginning in the states that are antecedent to samādhi, and self-concern (and with it the allure of sensuality) dissolves as the mind becomes progressively secluded, one-centered, silent and equanimous. Once one experiences spiritual pleasure, one is eager to upgrade from one’s more problematic sensual pleasures.³⁶ Spiritual pleasure, aside from being valuable in itself, is thereby an incentive for Buddhist practice in general, as a substitute for the pursuit of mundane pleasures that keep us locked in saṁsāra.

3.4.2. Obtaining knowledge and vision. We should note that samādhi and particularly jhāna are discussed in the early texts repeatedly in association with attainments that approach awakening.³⁷

When right samādhi does not exist, for one failing right samādhi, the proximate cause is destroyed for knowledge and vision of things as they really are. (AN 10.3)

Such “knowledge and vision” are factors of wisdom attributed to samādhi repeatedly in the early texts. They represent a stage close to final liberation, at which it might be said that we see what the Buddha saw.

There is no jhāna for one with no wisdom, no wisdom for one without jhāna. But one with both jhāna and wisdom, he's on the verge of nibbāna. (Dhp 372)

I can think of five reasons why samādhi should result in such wisdom:

First, bringing practice into silence might serve ongoing internalization of recollected know-how by pushing the novice practitioner more quickly to abandon reliance on thinking and deliberation.³⁸ This is much as a soldier learns to disassemble and reassemble his rifle in five minutes, then to do the same blindfolded. “OK, private, now let’s see it in the third jhāna!”

Second, progressive curtailment of cognitive faculties entails a “shift in consciousness.” This develops our flexibility to reach new understandings of Dhamma, “experiencing otherwise,” and providing a clear demonstration of the mental constructedness of what we take to be real and substantial.³⁹

Third, our worst presumptions, such as of the existence of a substantial self, are generally upheld by our most abstract and conceptual forms of overthinking. These are among the first faculties to be curtailed.⁴⁰

Fourth, curtailment of the more complex faculties directs energy to simpler faculties more grounded in direct experience, resulting in lucid clarity of experiential observables.

Fifth, silence encourages those “aha” moments when we finally “get it” in a deeper way. Such an insight typically begins with thought and deliberation about a challenging problem, which then reaches an impasse. This is followed by an “incubation period,” during which there is little or no discernible process of analysis concerning the problem, but out of which the solution suddenly erupts spontaneously.⁴¹ Deep jhāna provides the incubation period.

A single insight is momentary and, though remarkable, is only a glimpse of what the Buddha saw routinely. Through repetition, what we at first only glimpse becomes integrated as a matter of spontaneous perception, and we begin to see as if through the eyes of the Buddha. The internalized content of recollection weaves it into the very structure of perception.⁴²

3.4.3. Recollection-discernment. We’ve seen that recollection and discernment are the core factors of full skillful engagement. Recollection brings “Dhammic know-how” aptly to mind, and discernment draws on this know-how in evaluating how to respond in the experiential context. Together they create the spark from which samādhi arises, which acts as an aid to their operation and therefore development. In ongoing practice, recollected know-how develops as something more intuitive, quicker and quieter, and discernment becomes less challenging, less effortful. Samādhi facilitates this “pursuit, development and cultivation” (see 3.2 above) of recollection-discernment.

3.4.4. The destruction of the corruptions. The corruptions (āsava) are sensuality (kāma), becoming (bhava), and ignorance (avijjā), the fundamental misguided tendencies of the mind. The destruction of the corruptions (āsavak-khāya) is thereby a common reference to final liberation. Progress toward awakening is progress in the development of recollected know-how in the practice of Dhamma. Liberation is the perfection of this know-how, effectively virtuosity in the skill of life. In the silence of samādhi the corruptions are destroyed.

3.5. Conclusions

In summary, the meditative state that is described in the early Buddhist texts is almost too good to be true. It is a state associated with delight, rapture, serenity and contentment that settles into four stages, the jhānas, through which attention is narrowed and the cognitive and affective functions of the mind are progressively curtailed. Yet it produces the fruits of clarity, insight, and intuitive understanding, which lead ultimately to knowledge and vision of things as they are, and thereafter to liberation. Moreover, samādhi makes its appearance often, spontaneously, naturally, and effortlessly. The early texts tell us this. Samādhi is a “miracle.”

¹ These two translations are recommended by Kumāra (2022).

² There seems to be no pre-Buddhist precedent for the term samādhi. See Walshe (1987, p. 556), who attributes this conclusion to Rhys Davids.

³ For instance, in SN 45.8.

⁴ In distinguishing the two senses in the early texts, Arbel (2016, p. 39) points out that in the technical sense the “four jhānas” never appear in verbal form. Rather one “enters and abides” (upasampajja vihārati) in this kind of jhāna.

⁵ Chapter 6 supplements this chapter with greater attention to the evidence of general human cognition, particularly of skill acquisition and deliberative vs. intuitive cognition.

⁶ The absence of such a mechanism in the early texts has been pointed out by Vetter (1988, p. xxv), Arbel (2017, especially pp. 46, 156), Polak (2011, p. 206). Polak (2024, ch. 5) devotes a whole chapter to this issue, and points out (p. 260) that the Chan/Zen school makes use of no such mechanism. I will draw some contrasts between what the early texts tell us and the  highly influential Visuddhimagga (Buddhaghosa, 2003) as we go along. The Visuddhimagga forms the basis of modern Vipassanā meditation, in which samādhi resorts to synthetic techniques. It is now widely acknowledged in modern scholarship that the meaning of samādhi in this later tradition had become something quite distinct from its meaning in the early texts. See Shankman (2008, esp. pp. 101-4), Kumāra (2022, pp. 10-22), Thanissaro (1996, pp. 248-51),  Polak (2011).

⁷ In addition to the examples above, we have additional sources: AN 11.1, MN 40,
MN 7, SN 54.13, SN 54.14, MN 118, SN 47.10, SN 47.8, SN 42.13, SN 35.246, SN 35.97, AN 11.1, AN 6.10,  AN 11.15, AN 3.95, SN 12.23. The conditioning practices in these cases are heavy on ethics, faith and sense restraint, in addition to wisdom, and uniformly lead to samādhi through the same antecedent factors.

⁸ See also 1.5.1 on the stages of liberation.

⁹ MN 10 i 61-2 (see the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta in the appendix), SN 46.1, etc.

¹⁰ This association is mentioned in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta itself, but only in the exercise specific to the awakening factors. However, the suttas repeatedly depict satipatthana practice in close association with samādhi or the jhānas, e.g., MN 44 i 301, SN 47.8, 47.40, AN 4.94, AN 4.170, Dhp 372. Moreover, AN 8.63 iv 300-1 even refers to each satipaṭṭhāna as “a samādhi.”

¹¹ Gunaratana (2009, pp. 142, 149).

¹² Polak (2011, pp. 30, 206).

¹³ Jhānam bujjhā buddho.

¹⁴ MN 36 i 246.

¹⁵ As Arbel (2017, p. 39) claims it is.

¹⁶ I would venture to speculate that the meditations in which the Buddha-to-be cultivated were synthetic, preempting the natural unfolding of samādhi, and that this produced a state less integrated into other aspects of practice. He then recalled the natural state of samādhi he had discovered as a child and ran with that. Sujāto (2012, p. 155) suggests that the Buddha uniquely discovered “deep absorption,” which is exactly the opposite of what I claim here.

¹⁷ See 6.3.1. Csikszentmihalyi (1990) is one of many references on flow.

¹⁸ Ekagga is analyzed as ‘one-pointed’ in the Visuddhimagga. Arbel (2017, pp. 46, 175) finds no evidence in the Nikāyas for such deep concentration. Thanissaro (2012, p. 27) points to full-body awareness in descriptions of the jhānas in MN 119 iii 92-4, AN 5.28, etc. as counterexamples to deep concentration. Kumāra (2022, p. 47) likewise points to examples of listening to Dhamma or of moving around with an “ekagga mind”:

                While listening to the good Dhamma … one listens to the Dhamma with an                 undistracted and one-centered [ekaggacitto] mind; one attends to it                 appropriately. (AN 5.151)

Iti 111 and AN 4.12 provide similar examples.

¹⁹ Thanissaro (2016).

²⁰ The point of a needle, its most salient feature, is indeed agga, but so is the sharp edge of a knife or the peak of excellence in Dhamma.

²¹ The more common translation ‘object of samādhi’ is not appropriate, because the theme ranges potentially widely over many actively relevant objects and relations. I adapt the term ‘theme’ from Thanissaro (2012, p. 31), used in a similar context.

²² Curtailment as a separate dimension of samādhi makes ‘concentration’ inadequate as a translation of samādhi. ‘Composure,’ as a kind of cognitive stance, comes closer to capturing both dimensions.

²³ This restructuring is called internalization (see 6.1.2).

²⁴ DN 2 i 73.

²⁵ In the Visuddhimagga, vitakka-vicāra is described as “initial and sustained application” of the mind on a fixed object, providing the “synthetic technique” by which “one-pointedness” is achieved in order to enter a meditative state. However, there is no support for this technical meaning of what is elsewhere an everyday phrase in the early texts: Cousins (1992) identifies forty occurrences  of the combination of vitakka and vicāra, all of which have to do with ordinary modes of thought. See also Arbel (2017, p. 68), Shulman (2014, p. 22), Polak (2011, p. 14), Kumāra (2022, pp. 56-60).

²⁶ This suggests a gap between the beginning of seclusion and the onset of samādhi (with one-centeredness).

²⁷ The words vitakka and vicāra almost always occur in combination, and Kuan (2008, p. 38) suggests that they are synonymous in the early texts. If this is the case, the absence of either one might simply indicate a more subdued, intermediate level of both thought and deliberation.

²⁸ E.g., SN 21.1 ii 273.

²⁹ Kumāra (2022, pp. 49-52) proposes this translation. Ekodi = eka ‘one’ + udi ‘rising.’ My theory is that equipoise harmonizes the various faculties, curtailing some, to optimize the practice task in a way that reflects how much the task has been internalized. See 6.3.1.

³⁰ Accordingly, as Shulman (2014, pp. 9-11) points out, Gomrich, Conze, Rahula, Collins and Hamilton downgrade samādhi, either as unnecessary or as a means of preparing the mind before contemplation, leaving final liberation as a primarily intellectual endeavor. Wayne and Bronkhorst, on the other hand, view samādhi itself as the basis of liberation, independent of any conceptual content. The Visuddhimagga tradition similarly marginalizes the role of right samādhi, contrary to what the early texts tell us.

³¹ In chapter 1 I argue that satipaṭṭhāna contemplation is a matter of verifying and internalizing Dhamma in terms of directly experienced “observables,” consistent with, and in fact inspired by, Shulman’s proposal. In chapter 5 I analyze the various Dhamma teachings presented in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta in observable terms.

³² This restructuring is “internalization,” described in 6.1.2.

³³ Shulman (2014, pp. 32, 47, 111).

³⁴ See chapter 6.

³⁵ Again, as Gunaratana (2009, pp. 142, 149) puts it.

³⁶ Thanissaro (1999).

³⁷ Arbel (2017, p. 4).

³⁸ The mechanics of this process is explained in 6.1.2 and 6.4.2.

³⁹ The value of recognizing the constructedness of the world is discussed in 5.4.

⁴⁰ The danger of presumptions is discussed in 1.6 and 5.1.

⁴¹ Slingerland (2014, p. 147).

⁴² As Shulman (2014, pp. 106-7) puts it. See Cintita (2025, 10.5) for more on knowledge and vision.

4. Sati no longer means “mindfulness”

By 1881 the scholar T.W. Rhys Davids found the optimal translation for the Pali word sati. Previous translators had variously tried ‘remembrance,’ ‘memory,’ ‘recollection,’ ‘thinking of or upon,’ ‘calling to mind,’‘active state of mind,’ ‘fixing the mind strongly upon any subject,’ ‘attention,’ ‘attentive-ness,’  ‘thought,’ ‘reflection,’ ‘consciousness,’ ‘correct meditation,’ and so on.¹ Most of them seem to have understood that the root meaning of the noun sati was ‘memory,’ and that the Buddha explicitly defined it that way himself, but were looking for something more narrowly suggestive of its specific active role in Buddhist practice.

Rhys Davids explained his choice of ‘mindfulness’ with respect to sammā sati ‘right mindfulness’:

“Sati is literally 'memory' but is used with reference to the constantly repeated phrase 'mindful and thoughtful' (sato sampajâno); and means that activity of mind and constant presence of mind which is one of the duties most frequently inculcated on the good Buddhist.”²

On the basis of his later works it’s clear that Rhys Davids understood that what the good Buddhist was mindful of were “facts” like impermanence, and “natural law” (Dhamma) more widely, much as devout Christians are mindful of the glory of God in everything they do.³

That was then and this is now. Unfortunately the felicitous marriage of sati and ‘mindfulness’ did not survive the contingencies of the twentieth century. One hundred and twenty-five years later, the Buddhist scholar B. Alan Wallace emailed the scholar-monk Bhikkhu Bodhi,⁴

“As you well know, in the current Vipassanā tradition as it has been widely propagated in the West, sati is more or less defined as ‘bare attention,’ or the moment-to-moment, nonjudgmental awareness of whatever arises in the present moment. There is no doubt that the cultivation of such mindfulness is very helpful, but, strangely enough, I have found no evidence in traditional Pāli, Sanskrit, or Tibetan sources to support this definition of sati (smṛti, dranpa).”

It seems that Rhys Davids’ original intent grounded in the earliest scriptures had become obscured.

As Wallace alludes, the concept “mindfulness” (I use the double quotes throughout to indicate roughly whatever is commonly understood nowadays under the word ‘mindfulness’) is a critical point of reference for most Buddhist practitioners, around which we orient ourselves as we navigate our world of practice. It certainly shaped my early practice, for instance. For each of us, it corresponds subjectively and individually to very real experiences that we learn to cultivate, and through which we make progress in our practice. My intention is not to deny such experiences, but to point out that because of a semantic shift in the word ‘mindfulness,’ the word no longer serves as a viable translation of sati. As long as it is retained, the Dhamma will never quite make sense in English translation. This acknowledgment is critical for scholars and for anyone who is intent on a deep understanding of the Dhamma in any of its traditional forms.

We will first consider in more detail how “mindfulness” is understood in modern Buddhism and then contrast that with how sati was used as a technical term in the early texts. We will then attempt to trace how “mindfulness” has been shaped by the demands and fashions of modern popular culture.

4.1. Modern understandings of “mindfulness”

“Mindfulness” is widely regarded as a meditative state. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines ‘mindfulness’ as,

“The practice of maintaining a nonjudgmental state of heightened or complete awareness of one’s thoughts, emotions, or experiences on a moment-to-moment basis.”

Perhaps the definition most consequential for the modern understanding was that of the German monk Nyanaponika Thera in 1954, apparently initially as a provisional definition for those beginning meditation practice, but widely regarded as definitive:

“Mindfulness (sati) applies preeminently to the attitude and practice of Bare Attention in a purely receptive state of mind.”⁵

The great Sri Lankan-American monk, meditation teacher and scholar Bhante Guṇaratana clarifies ‘bare’ as ‘non-conceptual’:

“Mindfulness is non-conceptual awareness. Another English term for sati is ‘bare attention.’”⁶

Gunaratana also makes explicit that “mindfulness” is not about memory:

“It just observes everything as if it was occurring for the first time. It is not analysis that is based on reflection and memory.”⁷

Sylvia Boorstein is often cited:

“Mindfulness is the aware, balanced acceptance of the present experience. It isn’t more complicated than that. It is opening to or receiving the present moment, pleasant or unpleasant, just as it is, without either clinging to it or rejecting it.”

“Mindfulness” is similarly described as a state of open “choiceless awareness,” or simply receptive of present experience without elaboration. Thich Nhat Hanh tells us:

“Mindfulness is the energy that helps us recognize the conditions of happiness that are already present in our lives. You don’t have to wait ten years to experience this happiness. It is present in every moment of your daily life.”⁸

And Jon Kabat-Zinn states:

“Mindfulness means paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally.”⁹

4.2. Early Buddhist understanding of sati

The Pali word sati is a derivation of a root meaning ‘memory’ or ‘recollection’ and corresponds to the verb sarati ‘remember’ or ‘recollect.’ It occurs in its adjectival form as one of the factors of what I call “the satipaṭṭhāna faculties,”¹⁰ described in the following phrase from the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta,

… ardent, discerning, and sati-ful, having put away covetousness and grief for the world.

The cognate word in Sanskrit, smṛti, has a similar meaning but is also commonly used specifically in reference to memory of sacred Brahmanic texts or even to the body of sacred texts itself. For many centuries these were preserved in memory before they were committed to palm leaf.¹¹

Sati is explicitly described as a form of memory in the earliest texts.¹² Sati is the first of the seven awakening factors (bojjhaṅga), where it is clearly allocated the function of bringing a Dhamma teaching to mind so that it can then be examined and investigated by means of the second awakening factor, dhamma-investigation (dhamma-vicaya):

… when one has heard the Dhamma from such [accomplished] bhikkhus …, a bhikkhu dwelling thus withdrawn recollects that dhamma and thinks it over, on that occasion the awakening factor of sati is aroused by the bhikkhu . … The bhikkhu fulfills the awakening factor of sati at that time. Whenever, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu dwelling thus recollective [satimā] discriminates that dhamma with wisdom, examines it, makes an investigation of it, on that occasion the awakening factor of dhamma-investigation is aroused by the bhikkhu. (SN 46.3)

Elsewhere the Buddha offers us the following definition of sati :

And what is the faculty of sati? Here, monks, the noble disciple is sati-ful, possessing utmost sati and prudence, recalling and bearing in mind even things that were done and said long ago. This is called the faculty of sati. (SN 48.9, also similarly at MN 53 i 356)

Moreover, various examples and similes that the Buddha offers for sati involve the skillful performance of some task¹³ (each of which demands attentiveness, and also some degree of know-how), bringing to mind the relevant background knowledge, standards, perspectives and skills one has learned, and holding them there. In fact, almost all examples of sati in the early Dhamma are specifically activated in working memory for quick interpretation or response with regard to present circumstances.¹⁴

For instance, as an example of “sati directed at the body” (see 2.3), the Buddha tells us of a man tasked with carrying a bowl of oil filled to the brim past the most beautiful girl of the land, who is dancing and singing before a great crowd, without spilling a drop, lest he lose his head.¹⁵ Then there is the gatekeeper, who is “wise, recollective [satimā], and intelligent, one who keeps out strangers and admits acquaintances, for protecting its inhabitants and for warding off outsiders” (see 2.2.1). In either case, it is imperative that one draw on all of one’s know-how to accomplish a practical task. The Buddha declares once again that “a noble disciple” is like that: “recollective, possessing supreme sati and discrimination, one who remembers and recollects what was done and said long ago.”¹⁶

Then there is the example of someone walking through a thorny forest without being pricked, a simile in which the thorns represent sensual attractions.¹⁷ This case exemplifies perhaps the most common type of reference for sati, having to do with restraint of the senses, a practice that demands the continuous remembrance of learned Dhammic standards throughout the day. As Rhys Davids put it: “one of the duties most frequently inculcated on the good Buddhist.” Remembering our standards is the basis of restraining our behavior and is compared in another simile to binding animals to a post in order to constrain their movements.¹⁸

Skillfull engagement is perhaps the most central concept in this book, in which sati serves to bring to mind and maintain in mind those aspects of Dhamma that are relevant to the fulfillment of the current practice task.¹⁹ Recall that Rhys Davids actually adopted ‘mindfulness’ on the basis of two Pali words that commonly co-occur: sato [sati] and sampajâno [sampajañña]. Sampajañña is translated here as ‘discernment,’ and elsewhere often as ‘(clear) comprehension.’ Sati-sampajañña (‘recollection-discernment’) comes to a clear understanding of the immediate needs of the practice task in the current situation in accordance with Dhamma:

And what is the nutriment for restraint of the sense faculties? It should be said: recollection-discernment. (AN 10.16 v 115)

I argue that these two factors together form the core of full skillful engage-ment, or of right recollection (sammā sati)²⁰ to support performance in accordance with Dhamma of any aspect of Buddhist wisdom or ethical practice. Right recollection thereby works alongside right effort and alongside right view:

Right view is the forerunner. And how is right view the forerunner? One discerns wrong ◖action◗ as wrong ◖action◗, and right ◖action◗ as right ◖action◗. … One tries to abandon wrong ◖action◗ and to enter into right ◖action◗: This is one's right effort. One remembers to abandon wrong ◖action◗ and to enter and remain in right ◖action◗: This is one's right sati. Thus these three qualities–right view, right effort, and right sati–run and circle around right ◖action◗.
(MN 117 iii 72-76)

This passage is presented with respect to ◖view◗, ◖attitude◗, ◖speech◗, ◖action◗, and ◖livelihood◗. Buddhist practice across the board is thereby performed on the basis of Dhammic proficiency: standards, values, viewpoints, and learned skills, which have been acquired in developing right view, internalized through repeated practice, brought to bear in right sati, and energized through right effort.

The practice of right sati often gives rise spontaneously to right samādhi:²¹

For one of right recollection, right samādhi springs up. (SN 5.25-6)

Accordingly, we remember our precepts as we go about our lives. We remember to monitor our intentions. We remember our standards for differentiating wholesome and unwholesome intentions. We keep in mind the values of renunciation, kindness and non-harming as guiding principles throughout the day, as well as our commitment to living a Buddhist life. We recall what the Buddha taught about impermanence and non-self.

4.3. Differences in early and modern understandings

The disconnect between sati in the early texts and modern “mindfulness” is easily and strikingly apparent if we try to imagine how the gatekeeper, or how the bloke carrying the oil past the dancing girl mentioned in the similes above, would gain any help whatever through entering into a state of “bare, pre-conceptual or non-judgmental awareness.” Moreover, how would we guard the senses with no idea of what is evocative of unwholesome desires that we need to guard against? How would “mindfulness” help if it were to circle around right action, for instance, if it cannot fulfill its function of discerning wholesome and unwholesome? Moreover, how would we revisit or cultivate insights previously obtained through “mindfulness” if we “observe everything as if it were occurring for the first time”?

The disconnect is also apparent in noting that “mindfulness” is consistently represented as passive or receptive in modern literature, whereas in the early texts, sati is actively involved as a conditioning factor in the successful performance of particular tasks. For instance, if a “CRASH!” were suddenly to occur in the next room, it would likely disrupt our “mindfulness” but draw our attention along with recollection of similar crashes and their causes, in order to assess what the hell is going on.

A striking difference between the early and modern accounts of these matters is how comparatively precise and detailed the early teachings are in marked contrast to the hazy and variant descriptions of a stand-alone “mindfulness” factor. For instance, “mindfulness” is often described as “being present.” How can one not be present? Even reminiscence, or a daydream arises in the present moment. Many of the exercises of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta depend on “visualizing” what is not immediately physically apparent in the present situation, for instance, visualizing the body in future states of decay, or visualizing the body parts hidden deep below the skin. Would the requirement of presence preclude these? Suppose you were following this guided meditation: “… If you should be distracted from your daydream by a noise in the room, just let the distraction go, and gently return to where you were in the daydream ….” Would the requirement of presence preclude this? I’m not sure.

4.4. The genesis of “mindfulness”

The story of how the meaning of Rhys Davids’ ‘mindfulness’ became “mindfulness” seems to begin in colonial Burma about the turn of the twentieth century and takes us to the United States by the 1970’s.

4.4.1. Burma. The influence of European colonial power in the nineteenth century was very disruptive of the traditional cultural and religious fabric in many Asian lands, with varying indigenous responses. Prior to British occupation, the Buddhasāsana had been supported by three pillars of society in Buddhist Burma: the royal government, the Saṅgha and the society at large. However, the British deposed the king in 1885 to fully control the levers of governmental power throughout Burma, showed little interest in supporting the Sāsana themselves, and curtailed the ability of the Saṅgha to participate in domestic affairs. This resulted in great concern in Burma for the viability of the Sāsana and for the continued well-being of Burmese society at large.

A prominent monk, Ledi Sayadaw (1846–1923),²² encouraged a doubling-down on Buddhist practice by householders as a way to respond to the situation: in ethics, in doctrinal study (largely of Abhidhamma), and later in “insight meditation” (vipassanā, based on the fifth-century Visuddhimagga²³) for all Buddhists. Ledi began a lecture circuit throughout Burma, established ad hoc study and practice groups wherever he went, and published widely,²⁴ in order to convey this message. He had already been a well-known public figure and popular speaker before the king was deposed, with a knack for teaching complex Dhammic concepts in simple terms, and without the traditional heavy reliance on the Pali language.

Let’s pause here for a moment to make a quick reality check of something I happen to have run across in Eric Braun’s book on Ledi Sayadaw with regard to the topic of interest. He describes Ledi’s understanding of sati as follows:

“… the ability to bring knowledge of the dhamma to bear on the present moment, rooted in one of the ‘establishings’ (upaṭṭhānas). In other words, it is a sort of double-faceted mental state: recollection of Buddhist truths combined with awareness of immediate sensate experience.”²⁵

Ledi was precisely on board with the age-old traditional view described above as the early Buddhist understanding, and recognized by his contemporary, Rhys Davids. Now, back to our story:

Ledi’s promotional efforts are generally regarded as the primary impetus for a mass movement of lay participation in aspects of Buddhist practice, there-tofore largely pursued by monastics. Many prominent teachers of Dhamma and vipassanā (almost all of them monks) facilitated this development. The degree of the popular interest in meditation practice was almost unprecedented in Buddhist history, such that various meditation teachers attracted large followings and founded schools that are still well known in Burma today, now almost certainly the meditating-est nation in the world.²⁶

Many teachers promoted techniques that were well integrated with the body of Buddhist practice and understanding, ethics and doctrinal study. For instance, Mohnyin Sayadaw was popular in the 1930’s and required that students learn Abhidhamma before beginning vipassanā practice. Mogok Sayadaw taught a method rooted in studying dependent co-arising before beginning vipassanā practice. However, it should be noted that vipassanā schools across the board tended to disregard the teaching of samādhi or jhāna, since these were treated as extremely difficult and unnecessary in the seminal Visuddimagga, in stark contrast to the early texts.²⁷ This marginalization of jhāna would play a significant role in our story of how “mindfulness” would come to be understood in modernity.

4.4.2. Popular vipassanā. Other early vipassanā masters recognized the limits in time and energy available to most householders, and so promoted methods whereby vipassanā could be taken up wholeheartedly as a stand-alone practice, largely isolated from ethics and doctrine, as well as from an ascetic lifestyle. This second trend naturally garnered more popular appeal, but also evoked criticism for “weakening the Dhamma,” as discussed below.

In early twentieth century Burma, one of the most successful popularizers was U Ba Khin (1899–1971), a government official, second in a rare non-monastic teaching lineage, whose first teacher was apparently authorized to teach by Ledi himself. U Ba Khin downplayed study, developed a simple method that was intentionally congenial even to non-Buddhists, but also advocated a rigid schedule of meditation with ten-day periods of intense practice. U Ba Khin’s disciple, S.N. Goenka (1924–2013), a businessman who emigrated to India in 1969 and further marginalized doctrine, claimed that the Buddha had only taught an “art of living” rooted in meditation. Goenka founded a world-wide meditation movement that significantly, but not entirely, distanced itself from its Buddhist roots.

Most influential among the early popularizers was Mingun Jetavana Sayadaw (1870–1955), from whom most modern vipassanā teachers in Myanmar descend.²⁸ He endeavored to strip the teaching of Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta down to its most essential elements so that it could be mastered with minimal effort. He seems to have taken very seriously the description of the satipaṭṭhāna as ‘the one way’ (ekāyano maggo) to liberation as justification for treating it as a stand-alone practice, and as the basis of the claim (unsupported in the early texts) that one could acquire an initial stage of awakening in very short time through vipassanā alone.²⁹ With the downplay of Dhammic wisdom and of virtue as skills acquired through long and sustained practice, progress was measured in terms of transformational “spiritual experiences” or “altered states of consciousness.”³⁰

Mingun appears to have developed the expedient of making sparse reference to Dhamma, at least in the introductory stages of his method,³¹ in contrast to many of his peers in Burma. Like U Ba Khin, he made use of an intensive retreat format, and in fact had founded the very first group meditation center in Burma in 1911. A clever, innovative, and valuable method of “noting” allowed practice to be brought into ever-changing contexts ubiquitously and fluidly throughout the day. Rather than taking up the standard exercises of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta one by one, this turned even distractions into opportunities for practice.

Mingun’s most prominent student was Mahāsi Sayadaw (1904–1982). Mahāsi refined his teacher’s techniques and founded what is the most widely known internationally among the Burmese vipassanā schools, after receiving a large boost through Burmese government sponsorship in the 1950s. The German monk Nyanaponika Thera (1901–1994), who had long lived in Sri Lanka, studied meditation in Myanmar under Mahāsi Sayadaw in the early fifties, and became highly influential abroad through his 1954 book, The Heart of Buddhist Meditation, in which he coined the term ‘bare attention.’

In this book Nyanaponika describes what he calls “the Burmese method,” based on the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta as explicated by Mingun and Mahāsi, as a practice of continuous observation in a manner that breaks down common experience into discrete momentary and localized events. To achieve this requires careful management of attention and non-distractedness. The first steps of this method are grounded in the practitioner’s own experience without theoretical explanation, although a meditation master can provide some input by suggesting that a student turn their attention to a particular experience, so that the practitioner might gain insights into phenomena as they present themselves.³²

4.4.3. America. Mahāsi’s technique, as well as that of Goenka, were designed to be taken up quite readily by anyone at any level of Buddhist commitment and opportunity in Burma, and each was easily exported to foreign lands.³³ Jack Kornfield, Joseph Goldstein, and Sharon Salzburg were three young pioneers who traveled separately to Asia and studied vipassanā with Mahāsi, Goenka, and others. They also studied in Thailand and India. They collaborated in the United States to found the Insight Meditation Society (IMS) in Massachusetts in the mid-1970s, which came to focus on the Mahāsi method. They would exert an enormous influence on the American vipassanā movement, and on the development of westernized Buddhism in general.

It was a match made in heaven when the Mahāsi method and other methods adapted for popular application in Burma encountered American popular culture. The culture of the Wild West of Buddhism valued personal experience and, in all its individualism, was suspicious of institutions and external authority.³⁴ Rather than promoting Dhamma, it asked that one “find one's authentic voice, one's own inner truth.”³⁵ The early vision of IMS was of bare practice with almost no rituals, nor non-meditation activities. For IMS, authority came from meditation practice itself.

Moreover, “spirituality” was being increasingly commodified in America as a kind of spiritual marketplace arising in a pluralistic context in which free agents need no longer accept the authority of family traditions. One might attend a vipassanā retreat one month and learn Sufi dancing the next. The term “spirituality” itself, as in “I'm spiritual but not religious,” apparently came into vogue in the 1950's with the rise of the consumerist lifestyle,³⁶ with a mix-and-match, plug-and-play, “build-your-own” quality to which “mindfulness” as a stand-alone practice was amenable. It is therefore not surprising that meditation methods that were modular, that led quickly to intense personal experiences, and that minimized doctrine would have great appeal in this modern culture.  

4.5. The limits of “mindfulness” practice

A fundamental thesis of this book is that satipaṭṭhāna is a process of acquiring and internalizing the skill of Dhammic perception. Dhamma is not totally absent in “mindfulness” meditation, but it tends to be limited to the teachings of impermanence and conditionality. Bhikkhu Bodhi expresses his concern that contemporary teachers seldom emphasize right view and right attitude in their understanding of “mindfulness,” in favor of merely being present. They go so far as regarding Dhamma—quoting other teachers—as “claptrap” or “mumbo-jumbo,” while their meditation is “unconstrained by dogma,”³⁷ presumably referring to Dhamma. Meanwhile, Alan Wallace is concerned that vipassanā had become a radically simplified teaching for the general lay public, “dumbed down” and overlooking the richness of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta.³⁸ Robert Sharf bemoans the lack of engagement of “mindfulness” with Buddhist doctrine and Buddhist ways of life.³⁹ Jay Garfield regards “mindfulness” as hijacked by the “mindfulness industry and missing its earliest resonances, including its sense of ethical commitment.”⁴⁰

Sharf⁴¹ likewise regards historical popularization movements quite critically and draws striking parallels between the early twentieth century movement in Burma and historical developments in the Chan/Zen tradition in eighth-century China. In the latter case, Buddhist masters in the capital simplified meditation practice for the benefit of elite lay devotees without doctrinal training, nor grounding in an ascetic lifestyle. The masters promised quick results and thereby promoted an effective democratization of awakening. As a result, meditation widely evolved to become a matter of setting aside distinctions and conceptualizations, and letting the mind rest in the flow of here and now. This is similar to what we see with in the modern vipassanā movement. Sharf points out that, at the time, traditionalists in China had criticized such methods as weakening the Dhamma.

With the weakening of Dhamma, the function of popular meditation is often reconceptualized in terms of facilitating certain subjective “experiences” or “states of consciousness”: religious, spiritual, or mystical. Often these experiential states are popularly identified with degrees of awakening (such as stream entry), levels of jhāna, or glimpses of awakening (kensho, satori). However, traditional Theravada or Mahayana texts, including the early Buddhist texts, provide scant reference to the value of personal experiences. Such experiences do occur, but where such experiences are mentioned in the early texts, they generally serve only as reference points in traditional instructions, rather than as goals of practice.⁴²

4.6. The danger of “mindfulness” practice

David McMahan spotlights what may be the greatest pitfall of modern “mindfulness.” Modern “mindfulness” teachers often claim that “mindfulness” and popular vipassanā facilitate personal discovery of the Dhamma in our personal experience.  Sometimes “mindfulness” is even described as a technology for gaining a transparent, objective view of the content of the mind in order to realize “things as they are” (yathā-bhūta), shorn of all cultural conditioning, biases, and emotional entanglements, and beyond concepts and doctrine.⁴³ This claim sounds like trying to reinvent the Dhamma wheel, leaving one wondering, “Why did the Buddha teach so much Dhamma, if simple ‘mindfulness’ is all we need to accomplish what he had accomplished?”

In fact, this account has it backwards:⁴⁴ in Buddhist practice one starts with Dhamma, then perfects it through right recollection and satipaṭṭhāna. In fact, for best results, one immerses oneself in Dhamma, lives in a like-minded community (ideally with crackerjack paragons of Dhammic virtue and wisdom), studies Dhamma, and attempts to embody the principles and practices of Dhamma in one’s daily life.⁴⁵ Those intent on musical virtuosity must similarly immerse themselves in music, musical culture and musical training. For McMahan, without a proper, sociocultural context, meditation practice is unintelligible.⁴⁶

However, if “mindfulness” is not practiced in a proper Dhammic context, and “mindfulness” does not generate its own Dhamma, what exactly does “mindfulness” do? I think the answer is that it serves to support and strengthen the principles and practices of whatever context it happens to be embedded in. These are likely to include secular cultural conditioning, biases, emotional entanglements, concepts, and doctrine of the dominant culture. Let me give an example:

“Individualism,” is a pervasive concept and practice in modern culture, perhaps nowhere more than the United States. The “inner” self is regarded as autonomous, as the home of spirituality, creativity and morality, along with the imperative to be “true to oneself,” in opposition to social pressures.⁴⁷ This ideology is so familiar to most of us, that it is rarely questioned; it is “common sense,” a form of blind faith. Nonetheless, this way of thinking arose only in 17th to 18th century Europe, to be promoted in the European Enlightenment, Romanticism, humanistic psychology, and the human potential movements, where it had no influence on Buddhism until recently.

In spite of its obscure, non-Buddhist origins, the autonomous self is presented by many western Buddhist teachers as being at the core of Buddhism itself,⁴⁸ according to which one’s purpose is to “discover your true self.” From a Buddhist perspective, this ideology is based on a questionable metaphysics that is inimical to understanding the Buddhist teaching of non-self. I propose that this manner of teaching arose as a result of “mindfulness” and vipassanā practice that was grounded in secular culture, rather than grounded in Dhamma. Modern Buddhism is burdened, as McMahan puts it, with “cultural baggage.”⁴⁹

Unfortunately, corporations have gotten wind of the kind of docility produced in secular “mindfulness,” and adapted it to the corporate context. Regarding it as a kind of mental capital,⁵⁰ they have invested heavily in promoting “mindfulness” practices in the workforce. Google’s “Search Inside Yourself” mindfulness training program is one of the best known examples.⁵¹ The pervasiveness of such programs in the corporate world has prompted Slavoj Žižek to declare that “mindfulness” is “establishing itself as the hegemonic ideology of global capitalism,” helping us “to fully participate in the capitalist dynamic while retaining the appearance of mental sanity.”⁵² Marianne Williamson, speaking at Google, and in response to a particular protest whose “heartfelt message” had been been glibbly addressed through “mindful” reflection, critiqued, “Only in modern America could we come up with some ersatz version of spirituality that gives us a pass on addressing unnecessary human suffering in our midst.”⁵³

How does Buddhist practice retain its integrity in the context of the modern secular world? McMahan reminds us that early Buddhism developed in an ascetic counter-cultural movement that was disillusioned with the dominant society and skeptical of its goals, values and religious institutions.⁵⁴ This movement formed the core of the early Saṅgha, in which disciples of the Buddha—drop-outs from conventional life—were able to immerse themselves in Dhamma in a like-minded community. Because of the way the Saṅgha is constituted, they were able to do this in relative isolation from the counter-vailing influences of the dominant culture, yet from there could serve as role models, and project Dhammic influence back into the prevailing society. The Saṅgha continues to play this role to this day, generally sustaining its radical qualities in any prevailing culture.⁵⁵

4.7. Conclusions

“Mindfulness” is an historical accident, nonetheless useful in its time and place as a provisional understanding of mental cultivation. I have no doubt that “mindfulness” practice will continue to have a large following in the west and will continue to benefit many people. I would hope, however, that its promoters will understand and be forthright about its ultimate limits, and make clear that it is unlikely to fulfill the Buddhist fruits often attributed to it as a stand-alone practice. In this way, those of high aspiration and opportunity will be aware of an opportunity for Buddhist practice beyond the limits of the “mindfulness” movement.

Moreover, serious scholars and teachers, in particular, do well to reconsider critically this provisional teaching as the Buddhasāsana matures in the modern world. We need to look beyond “mindfulness” in order to develop an accurate and complete understanding of the practice of Dhamma reflective of ancient traditions. Unfortunately Rhys Davids’ once apt translation of sati is, I am convinced, firmly co-opted, and perhaps irrevocably bound to, our pervasive modern understanding of “mindfulness.” This suggests that it might be best not only to shed the naïve concept “mindfulness” from our discussion of the ancient texts, but to find a new translation for sati, as well. Quite simply, scholars and teachers of traditional Buddhism no longer own the English word ‘mindfulness,’ and must appropriate another.

In the other chapters of Rethinking Satipaṭṭhāna I simply revert to translating sati as ‘recollection,’ with the understanding that this is recollection of Dhammic know-how. I am also partial to Garfield’s⁵⁶ recommendation of ‘conscientiousness’ as a translation of sati. It captures much of Rhys Davids’ original (but now lost) intent in translating sati as ‘mindfulness.’  

¹ Gethin (2011, pp. 264-5).

² Rhys Davids (1881, p. 145). Sampajâno is a variant of sampajañña ‘discernment,’ discussed in 4.2 below.

³ Gethin (2011, pp. 264-5).

⁴ The resulting correspondence was subsequently made public as Wallace and Bodhi (2006).

⁵ Nyanaponika (1973, p. 15).

⁶ Gunaratana (1996, p. 140).

⁷ Gunaratana (1996, p. 190).

⁸ Nhat Hanh (2010).

⁹ Kabat-Zinn (2005).

¹⁰ See chapter 2.

¹¹ Levman (2017).

¹² This is also affirmed in key texts of the later tradition as well, such as the Visuddhismagga (xiv 141), the Milindapañhā (Gethin 2011, p. 269). Levman (2017) provides many examples.

¹³ Kuan (2015) provides an overview of such similes.

¹⁴ See Dreyfus (2011) on sati as working memory.

¹⁵ SN 47.20. See 2.3 for more discussion of this example.

¹⁶ AN 7.67 iv 110-1.

¹⁷ SN 35.244 iv 189.

¹⁸ SN 35.247 iv 199-200.

¹⁹ See 2.1.2, 6.1.1, 6,2,1 for further discussion of full skillful engagement.

²⁰ The near equivalence of these terms is explained in 2.4.

²¹ See 3.2 for further discussion of this point.

²² Braun’s (2013) excellent book on Ledi Sayadaw recounts much of what follows.

²³ Cousins (1994, p. 41) claims that insight or vipassanā meditation did not exist in anything like its current form before the nineteenth century.

²⁴ It was apparently under the British that the mass publication of Buddhist books first became possible.

²⁵ This is Braun’s (2013, p. 143) paraphrase or summary from a source he does not cite.

²⁶ Author’s assessment.

²⁷ It is now widely acknowledged in modern scholarship that the meaning of samādhi in this later tradition had become something quite distinct from the early meaning, for instance Shankman (2008, esp. pp. 101-4) Kumāra (2022, pp. 10-22), Thanissaro (1996, pp. 248-51), Polak (2011). See also chapter 3.

²⁸ Braun (2013, p. 161).

²⁹ Sharf (2014, p. 944). I argue against this justification in 1.1.

³⁰ Sharf (1995) argues convincingly that the role attributed to meditative experience is characteristic of Buddhist modernism, but has little precedent in scripture. For instance, “by rendering Buddhist wisdom a mental event as opposed to an acquired skill, the rigors of monastic training could be circumvented” (p. 267).

³¹ Braun (2013, p. 161), Sharf (2014, p. 952).

³² Nyanaponika (1973, pp. 90-91).

³³ Sharf (2014, p. 942).

³⁴ McMahan (2008, pp. 58, 188). The essence of Buddhism was to become an inner experience (pp. 42-43).

³⁵ McMahan (2008, p. 189).

³⁶ Carrette and King (2004, pp. 42, 128).

³⁷ Wallace and Bodhi (2006).

³⁸ Wallace and Bodhi (2006).  

³⁹ Sharf (2015, p. 477).

⁴⁰ Garfield (2012, p. 86).

⁴¹ Sharf (2014, 2018, etc.).

⁴² Sharf (1995).

⁴³ McMahan (2023, pp. 16, 83).

⁴⁴ The chapters of this book should make this clear.

⁴⁵ Satipaṭṭhāna is never a stand-alone practice in the early texts, but an advanced practice with Dhammic prerequisites (see 1.1), particularly in the development of virtue.

⁴⁶ McMahan (2023, p. 55). McMahan (2023, p. 154) makes the claim that the context is always sociocultural.

⁴⁷ McMahan (2023, pp. 147-149).

⁴⁸ McMahan (2023, pp. 150-151). McMahan (2008) and Thanissaro (2013) catalog ideologies of Western origin often presented in modernity as Buddhist.

⁴⁹ McMahan (2023, p. 134).

⁵⁰ Purser (2018, p. 29).

⁵¹ Purser (2018, p. 131).

⁵² This is quoted by Purser (2018, p. 29).

⁵³ This is quoted by Purser (2018, p. 181).

⁵⁴ McMahan (2023, p. 137).

⁵⁵ The role of the monastic Saṅgha in sustaining the integrity of Buddhism is the theme of Cintita (2014).

⁵⁶ Garfield (2021, p. 86).

5. Major themes of satipaṭṭhāna investigation

The contemplative practice of satipaṭṭhāna is a process of investigating Dhamma teachings (aka dhammas), in terms of observable experience (See 1.5). The algorithm is simple: One chooses a teaching (say, impermanence), and a relevant range of observables (say breath), and discovers the teaching in the observables.

dhamma  → investigation ←  observables

Then one repeats, a lot. The result is the development and cultivation of a skill (Dhammic know-how), the skill of apprehending the world spontaneously in terms of Dhamma. This is much as a birdwatcher develops and cultivates the skill of identifying individual species. At first, the birdwatcher takes a lot of time consulting a field guide, just as we depend on a close reading of our texts. Later, the birdwatcher can identify a particular species without thought on the basis of a rustle in a tree, just as we can see impermanence immediately as all things arise and fall.

The Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (MN 10, “the Sutta,” found in an appendix) is a practice tutorial that presents a series of twenty-one exercises through which this practice is to be pursued. Each exercise investigates a set of Dhamma teachings in terms of defined observables. The exercises are grouped into four overarching themes, known as the four satipaṭṭhānas. The twenty-one exercises so grouped in the Sutta are as follows.

I. Body

 1. breath
 2. postures

 3. activities   

 4. body parts

 5. elements

 6-14. corpse decay

II. Feelings

 (only one exercise)

III. Mind

 (only one exercise)

IV. Dhammas

  1. hindrances

 2. aggregates

 3. sense-spheres

 4. awakening factors

 5. noble truths

I will sometimes refer to individual exercises as “Ex. I.3,” “Ex. II,” and so on. Each exercise consists of two parts:

                signature exercise  +  refrain

The signature exercise delineates the range of observables relevant to the respective exercise and generally does not make reference to teachings themselves (except in the case of the dhamma satipaṭṭhāna). For instance, here is the signature exercise of Ex. I.3, an exercise of the body satipaṭṭhāna:

Again, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu is one who acts with discernment when going forward and returning, who acts with discernment when looking ahead and looking away, who acts with discernment when flexing and extending his limbs, who acts with discernment when wearing his robes and carrying his outer robe and bowl, who acts with discernment when eating, drinking, consuming food, and tasting; who acts with discern-ment when defecating and urinating; who acts with discernment when walking, standing, sitting, falling asleep, waking up, talking, and keeping silent.

Notice how this particular exercise seems to describe what we nowadays think of as “everyday mindfulness” of bodily actions. The difference is that everyday “mindfulness” doesn’t come with a refrain. The refrain consistently brings in the same set of teachings for investigation, collectively know as the three signs (tilakkhaṇa) of non-self, impermanence and suffering. Here is the refrain that follows Ex. I.3, and each body exercise.

In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, or he abides body-contemplating in the body externally, or he abides body-contemplating in the body both internally and externally.

He abides contemplating in the body the nature of origination, or he abides contemplating in the body the nature of vanishing, or he abides contemplating in the body the nature of both origination and vanishing.

Recollection that “the body exists” is simply established in him to the extent necessary for bare knowledge and proficiency.

He abides independent. He doesn’t cling to anything in the world. That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

The refrain for the feelings, mind, and dhammas satipaṭṭhānas are analogous to this body refrain.

The necessary starting point for performing each of these twenty-one exercises is an initial intellectual understanding of the relevant teaching. Through repetition within satipaṭṭhāna practice, that initial understanding will subsequently become internalized as Dhammic know-how, a skill that eventually can be performed without thought, non-conceptually, even unconsciously. (I’m simply describing the pattern of all human skill acquisition, including learning to walk, to drive a car or to play basketball. Dhammic skills work the same way.) This chapter undertakes to provide a nuts-and-bolts, intellectual understanding of the initial Dhamma teachings referred to in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, in which the relevant observables are readily apparent. For how these dhammas are actually internalized in the skill of satipaṭṭhāna, see chapters 1, 2, 3 and 6.

5.1. How to experience Dhamma as observables

Buddhism is a practice tradition: Rather than learning an abstract speculative philosophy for its own sake, the practitioner trains perception and behavior with Dhamma as a guide. Accordingly, the Buddha invites us to “come and see,” and declares that the Dhamma is “experienced by the wise” in the oft recited “Recollection of the Dhamma” (dhammānussati),

The Dhamma is well expounded by the Blessed One, directly visible, immediate, inviting one to come and see, applicable, to be personally experienced by the wise.
(SN 11.3, AN 3.70, AN 11.12, AN 11.13, Thag 6.2)

Unfortunately, the Dhamma of later traditions came to be represented in many places as sweeping, abstract “philosophical” statements. Shulman (2014) doesn’t buy it; he argues across the board for a very nuts-and-bolts (my description) interpretation of Dhamma in which the terms used in the earliest Dhamma teachings make consistent reference to factors in observable practice experience. As a consequence, the teachings are almost entirely subject to verification in terms of direct observables. I submit that there would be no satipaṭṭhāna practice if this were not the case.

In Satipaṭṭhāna practice we begin by choosing one of the exercises, then one of its teachings along with its associated observables as the current theme of investigation. The theme might, for instance, focus on impermanence of breath if we choose Ex. I.1, or on any of the five appropriation-aggregates if we choose Ex. IV.2. It is important that we already have an adequate under-standing of the teaching, beginning with studying the suttas or derivative resources, such as this chapter. Through the practice based on that theme we will discover deeper levels of understanding for ourselves through familiarization.

The observables should provide potential verification of the teaching. The five aggregates, for instance, are collections of “awareness events,” and awareness events are indeed observable in experience as they originate and vanish moment by moment. Direct observables, furthermore, should be distinguished from presumptions (maññita). The latter are things that we experience and are convinced are there or true, but that we do not directly observe. For instance, you directly observe the purring emanating from behind the sofa, but you presume the cat is there. You thereby observe the cat in a sense, but not directly, only presumptively. The existence of the self is the foremost presumption addressed in the Sutta. A presumption, in principle, might turn out to be true or false, but, in either case, ungrounded in direct observation.¹ Through satipaṭṭhāna practice, we tend to gain direct observables while we shed presumptions. We now possess the basis for practicing a chosen exercise.

The challenge for me, as author, is to describe the various Dhamma teachings in nuts-and-bolts terms. Many might think that it can’t be done. In the rest of this chapter we will explore the various Dhammic teachings referred to in the Sutta in order to gain a minimal understanding of each one, so that we might undertake the exercises of the Sutta.² However further study of the texts will provide a better initial understanding. It should be noted that a much broader open-ended set of Dhamma teachings can, in principle, be included within the dhamma satipaṭṭhāna. In fact the Chinese correlates of the Sutta present alternative but overlapping sets of exercises.³

5.2. Impermanence and conditionality

Impermanence is a major theme of Dhamma in general, but specifically within the refrain. Since each exercise repeats the refrain, impermanence is in principle one dhamma subject to investigation in each exercise. The second clause of the refrain for the first (body) satipaṭṭhāna (and equivalently for each of the four satipaṭṭhānas) is as follows:

He abides contemplating in the body the nature of origination, or he abides contemplating in the body the nature of vanishing, or he abides contemplating in the body the nature of both origination and vanishing.

Direct observables come and go, but what we presume to exist might appear permanent to us. For instance, “the self” or “the body” is practically permanent (I say “practically,” since we treat it as permanent for practical purposes, except in marginal cases, like death). However, what is observable directly, without presumption will appear impermanent upon close investigation.

I translate the Pali word samudaya as ‘origination’ here, in lieu of the also common translation, ‘arising.’ ‘Origination’ is better, because it suggests discerning not only the arising of an observable, but also what an observable arises from.⁴ Samudaya is the word used, for instance, where the origin of suffering in the second noble truth is equated with craving. That is, samudaya integrates impermanence and conditionality. Conditionality is very simple for the Buddha:

When this is, that is.
From the arising of this follows the arising of that.
When this isn’t, that isn’t.
From the cessation of this follows the cessation of that. (Ud 1.3)

In short, conditionality consists in observable relations among observables. It does not invite investigation of hypothetical underlying mechanisms, in the manner of modern science, which would be presumptuous.⁵ “Contingency” is a nice English word that expresses the necessarily transitory nature of phenomena as critically dependent on other contingent phenomena. We can visualize the scope of origination as a network of contingencies in constant flux. When we fail to recognize the highly contingent nature of the things of our world of experience, we live in terms of many presumptions about things that are practically fixed, such as the self and other objects of clinging. Such presumptions lead to a disappointing life of broken promises and we suffer for it. This is the message of the Sutta’s refrain.

5.3. Mind

Mind is the theme of the third satipaṭṭhāna. ‘Mind’ is citta in Pali, a term used rather informally in the discourses as something that assumes different qualities at different times (for example lust, delusion, kindness, serenity, agitation, samādhi, or even liberation) or as something to be tamed, guarded, directed or purified in practice, or as something that can cause problems for us.

There are actually three mind exercises: the lone exercise of the third (mind) satipaṭṭhāna is supplemented by two more complex and overlapping exercises of the fourth (dhamma) satipaṭṭhāna, which seem to me to fall under the overarching theme of mind: the five hindrances and the seven awakening factors.⁶

5.3.1. The simple mind exercise. The observables listed for Ex. III are states that tend to dominate the mind temporarily, and that for the most part have distinctive significance in Dhamma and practice. The signature exercise reads as follows:

Here a bhikkhu discerns mind affected by lust as mind affected by lust, and mind unaffected by lust as mind unaffected by lust. He discerns mind affected by hate as mind affected by hate, and mind unaffected by hate as mind unaffected by hate. He discerns mind affected by delusion as mind affected by delusion, and mind unaffected by delusion as mind unaffected by delusion. He discerns contracted mind as contracted mind, and distracted mind as distracted mind. He discerns exalted mind as exalted mind, and unexalted mind as unexalted mind. He discerns surpassed mind as surpassed mind, and unsurpassed mind as unsurpassed mind. He discerns composed mind as composed mind, and uncomposed mind as uncomposed mind. He discerns liberated mind as liberated mind, and unliberated mind as unliberated mind.

Lust, hate and delusion are pervasive in the discourses in reference to unskillful or unwholesome factors of mind. ‘Lust’ is sometimes replaced by ‘greed’ in the early texts. We can also understand these as neediness, aversion and confusion. Lust and hate are forms of craving: wanting to acquire or keep something, and wanting to avoid or get rid of something. Delusion is not seeing what is going on. The opposites of lust, hate and delusion are renunciation, kindness and wisdom. At any time, one of these six might dominate the mind.

These first three clauses bear highlighting because they underlie the ethical qualities of our everyday behavior. Lust, hate, delusion, and their opposites are strongly implicated in ethical practices, and we have here an opportunity to examine their roles in the network of contingency. In particular greed, hate and delusion are the roots of unwholesome kamma. When they arise and when we then act on them, we commonly end up doing some harm. We don’t see things clearly when under the influence of lust or hate, so we might fail to see their downside in the heat of the moment. You should try to recognize that these unwholesome roots are accompanied by immediately observable suffering or a degree of discomfort. You do well to examine your intentions in these terms before any deliberate action.⁷

The word I translate as ‘compact’ more broadly means “concise, thin, slender or contracted.” The word for ‘scattered’ is derived from the same root, but with a contrary prefix, and can mean “distracted, mentally upset, disturbed or perplexed.” Bones can also be scattered. Is your mind ever like that? Attentive-ness is required for satipaṭṭhāna practice, but when we sit down to meditate, out minds might instead be scattered. The resolution: attend to the scatteredness.

‘Exalted’ seems to mark continued progress in practice. Mind is unexalted when we start out in Buddhist practice, then becomes exalted as we develop qualities like renunciation, kindness and wisdom and we begin to experience exalted states more readily and frequently.

‘Superior’ and ‘unsurpassed’ refer to higher qualities of mind identified with spiritual progress. These might encompass unworldly feelings, including rapture, a precursor to a composed mind, described as one of the awakening factors.

What I translate as ‘composed’ means “in samādhi,” best observed on the cushion during satipaṭṭhāna practice. Normally, during satipaṭṭhāna practice, the mind will settle into composure and into the jhānas. The exercise of the seven awakening factors traces the process of settling the mind into samādhi during satipaṭṭhāna practice, first passing through antecedent states of rapture, and serenity.  

The distinction between ‘liberated’ and ‘unliberated’ is generally with respect to awakening. However practitioners may sometimes experience fleeting states of liberation when lust, hate, delusion, life’s problems, and suffering all spontaneously absent, only to return a bit later.

5.3.2. The five hindrances. Ex. IV.1 investigates the basic types of distraction which obstruct satipaṭṭhāna, as well as other wisdom and ethical practices. These are the five hindrances of sensual desire, ill will, sloth and torpor, restlessness and remorse, and doubt. The hindrances are highlighted, albeit indirectly, in the opening of the sutta:

He abides contemplating body in the body, ardent, discerning, and recollective, having put away covetousness and grief for the world.

“Having put away covetousness and grief for the world” concentrates the scope of attention by excluding unwholesome worldly distractions. This is widely regarded as shorthand for abandoning the five hindrances, after which one is also said to be secluded, a condition for entering samādhi at the first jhāna (see 2.1, 3.2, 3.3.1).

Each of the hindrances not only potentially disrupts practice, but is also categorized as unwholesome, that is, rooted in lust, hate, or delusion as described earlier. It is significant that the more wholesome states of mind rarely distract us from practice. We might complain, “I was so angry, I just couldn’t meditate,” but we are not likely to say, “I was so darn overwhelmed with kindness that my mind wouldn’t settle.”

The hindrances are as follows:⁸

Sensual desire is the neediness for things of the world: food, sex, companionship, money in the bank, status or reputation, our Oscar.

Ill-will includes hate or aversion, anger, fear, envy, vexation, etc.

Sloth and torpor together constitute a muddled, dull or sleepy mind.

Restlessness and remorse represent an overactive mind.

Doubt is lack of conviction either in the efficacy of the practice, or in our ability to live up to it.

For most of the hindrances, we might notice two distinct parts: One is a narrative. In the case of anger, for instance, this might be a string of thoughts like, “He had no right to do that. I would never do that to anyone. I’m going to get back at him!” The other part consists of particular sensations in body and mind. In the case of anger, this is likely tightness in the chest, flushing of the face, a kind of bubbling sensation in the mind. The narrative is conditioned by mundane circumstances that turn to a proliferation of distracting thoughts, and then becomes fuel for bodily and mental sensations that constitute anger.

The narrative is generally not a suitable subject for contemplation, because attention to it would make things worse, much like a lone news reporter trying to work in the midst of a barroom brawl. However, if we strip the narrative away, even momentarily, we can productively focus on the bodily and mental sensations, simply acknowledging their origination in narrative. This is much like the more astute news reporter who stands outside of the bar and reports on the injured or stunned individuals as they are ejected from the bar though the door or windows. Deprived of narrative fuel, the bodily and mental feelings will be short-lived.

5.3.3. The seven awakening factors. Ex. IV.4 examines the origination of samādhi during satipaṭṭhāna practice itself. (At one point in the early texts, satipaṭṭhāna is even referred to as “a samādhi.”) Samādhi is critical to producing optimal results in satipaṭṭhāna practice, and similar fruits are attributed elsewhere to each (also see 1.5.2 on the awakening factors). The seven awakening factors are:

(1) recollection                                                (4) rapture

(2) dhamma-investigation                                (5) tranquility

(3) energy                                                 (6) samādhi

                                                                (7) equanimity

Notice that the first three factors can be understood to describe satipaṭṭhāna contemplation itself. They correspond respectively to recollection, discernment and ardency among the satipaṭṭhāna faculties (2.1.2). The missing standard, seclusion, is already implicit as a precursor to samādhi (3.2, 3.3.1).

The remaining factors arise as a consequence of full skillful engagement in satipaṭṭhāna practice, beginning with rapture. Have you ever been totally engaged in some activity, like fly fishing, or playing chess, or hang gliding, so that an elated state arises while everything but the activity fades into the background. Engagement in Dhammic investigation is often like this. Psychological research likewise indicates that a state of “flow” arises typically from an activity in which we have developed a level of recollected know-how, in which our skills are presently challenged, but in which they nonetheless serve the activity well (see 6.3.1 on flow). Outside oncerns have disappeared and we feel completely alive. That’s rapture. It is a kind of spiritual pleasure that has a degree of energy or excitement, along with a sense of well-being.

The first four factors are active and energized. With the fifth factor, tranquility, the trajectory of the mind begins to change toward greater stillness. This seems to come from the sense of well-being connected with the confidence that our skills are up to the task. Mind becomes still, yet part of mind remains engaged, such that energy and rapture persist. This shift toward greater stillness boosts attentiveness and inhibits distraction. We are “in the groove.”

The sixth factor is samādhi itself, reached at the point at which attention has become one-centered (see 3.2), that is, reliably single-mindedly centered around the task at hand, that is, around the relevant teachings and observables, and to the exclusion of what is not relevant. Samādhi differentiates into four jhānas of progressively greater depth. The seventh awakening factor, equanimity, is equated with the deep third and fourth jhānas.

5.4. Consciousness

We are “in here,” but we are conscious of things of the world “out there.” We have only to show up and the world “out there” shows up for us in all of its complexity, awaiting our examination and manipulation. We presume that the world “out there” is reliably fixed and very real, and that it would be there even if we were not “in here” to be conscious of it. Accordingly, we experience a reality divided into two parts: (1) Me, with my body and mind, the subject that is “in here,” and (2) the things of the world, the objects “out there.” A wall separates what is “in here” from what is “out there.” That I can be “in here,” look through the wall, and see “out there” confirms that there is a “me” “in here.” At least this is how things appear.

Nonetheless, seeing things as real is not the same as seeing real things. Appearance is not necessary reality. For the Buddha, seeing things in this way is highly presumptive. Moreover, this presumed subject/object dualism leads to a heap of suffering, for (as the great Sinhalese scholar-monk Ñaṇananda put it) “Where there is a fence, there is offense and defense,” greed and hatred. Moreover, the presumed, reliably fixed and independent nature of the objective world limits our capacity for “experiencing otherwise,” which is necessary for progress on the path.⁹

There are three exercises in the Sutta that explore consciousness. These are the single feeling (Ex. II), the appropriation-aggregates (IV.2) and the sixfold sphere (IV.3) exercises. The exercises in the consciousness group derail the subject/object duality by demonstrating the mentally or subjectively constructed nature of what we presume to be the world “out there,” securing for us a basis for experiencing the world more fruitfully “otherwise.”

5.4.1. How do we know? Consciousness is highly presumptive. The Buddha compares it to a magic show, in which the magician, through all of the tricks of the trade, convinces us of an illusory version of the world, but it is the Buddhist practitioner's job to see through the illusion:¹⁰

Now suppose that a magician or magician's apprentice were to display a magic trick at a major intersection, and a man with good eyesight were to see it, observe it, and appropriately examine it. To him, seeing it, observing it, and appropriately examining it, it would appear empty, void, without substance: for what substance would there be in a magic trick? In the same way, a monk sees, observes, and appropriately examines any consciousness that is past, future, or present; inner or outer; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near. To him, seeing it, observing it, and appropriately examining it, it would appear empty, void, without substance: for what substance would there be in consciousness? (SN 22.95)

Our task is to try to get behind the stage, figuratively, where we have a view of the props (mirrors, black boxes, secret passage ways, and so on), and slight of hand that create the illusion that is consciousness. How do we do that? Through being aware of our awareness!

Consciousness is the culmination of various stages of awareness. The inter-mediate stages, as well as consciousness itself, are directly observable as momentary awareness events. These include perceptions, seeing, hearing, feelings, inferences and so on. Consciousness itself is observable only as a series of peeks into the world: we presume to have immediate access to the whole world all at once, but are at any one instant observably focused on some (generally tiny) part.

An awareness event is different from other mental factors, such as sadness or restlessness, in that it refers (or has the intention to refer, as phenomenologists would say more precisely) to something outside of itself, generally to something “out there.” We are not just aware, we are aware of a house or of a mountain. Awareness is always “awareness of” something. Consciousness is an awareness event: we are “conscious of” something. But likewise, we have an “feeling of” something, we “perceive” something, we “smell” something, we “infer” something. We even have a “presumption of” something. These are all awareness events. We will call the “something” the content of the event. Even if it turns out to be illusory, it has entered our world of experience. Words and sentences, pictures, and thermometers analogously have the quality of referring to something outside themselves.  

Awareness is observable: even if the water we are aware of turns out to be a mirage, we can still have the experience of water. Moreover, the content is typically physical. We commonly presume that anything we are “conscious of” will accurately reflect something “out there” in the world, barring certain anomalies, like optical illusions or mirages.

In investigating consciousness from behind the stage, we do not simply take the world “out there” at face value. Rather than asking, “What do I know?” we ask, “How do I know?” This gets behind appearances to what is really going on. Let’s look at an analogy:

Suppose we see a UFO “out there.” We see lights moving in the sky, say, in a bizarre pattern, and infer it is a UFO. We might seek to explain what we have seen in either of two ways.

First, we might seek to explain the UFO objectively: “It must be of extraterrestrial origin, because the technology to produce that pattern is unknown on earth. But from what planet did it come? How did it get here?” This is to be credulous.

Alternatively, we might seek to explain it epistemically: “Am I hallucinating? Did I pop one too many pills? Is a twiddle bug larva creeping across my glasses? Can weather or optical effects explain what I am seeing?” This is to be skeptical.

Worldlings tend to be credulous. The skeptical “man with good eyesight” watching from behind the magician’s stage employs an epistemic approach. He holds off on accepting what he might at first experience as real, and instead investigates the processes that gave rise to that experience, for the most part the accrual of various kinds of awareness events in support of consciousness. This is exactly what we do in the appropriation-aggregates and in the sixfold sphere exercises. The purpose is not to recognize what is really real, but to recognize how the world “out there” that we presume to be real is substantially constructed in the mind, and then projected “out there.” This is to “see through the illusion.”

5.4.2. Appropriation-aggregates. These are the topic of many discourses and of Ex. IV.2. Let’s begin with a little story.

Suppose you are slow to wake up. At first, the world is a conceptual blur, much like one’s naïve first impression of abstract art: colors, sounds, but with no sense to it. Then certain patterns begin to stand out and draw your attention. Some of these materialize into recognizable objects: your alarm clock, and it’s ringing. Then thinking kicks in: “Alarm clock. Gotta get up. Oh no! Gotta be at work by 8:00.” A goal has come into awareness. It might take a few minutes more and a cup of coffee before you become fully aware of the world and able to focus on its details at will.

This describes how five cognitive faculties kick in one by one, from the simplest to the most complex. Once set in motion, they will all be active and mutually conditioning throughout the day. These faculties underlie the five aggregates, which are classifications of observable awareness events big and small.

In Pali, an aggregate (khaṅdha) is an unordered heap of something: an aggregate of rice, an aggregate of firewood, and so on. Appropriation (often translated as ‘attachment’ or ‘clinging’) is the presumption of certain things as “me” and “mine.”¹¹ In the Sutta, the heaps represent five categories of aware-ness events ranked from the simplest to the most complex. Our observables are the instances of these aggregates; they are awareness events coming and going. The aggregates are:

Form (rūpa) refers to the raw, largely pre-conceptual “sensations” within sense fields: visual appearances (shapes and colors), sounds, odors, tastes and bodily sensations.

Feeling (vedanā) arise from forms, but also from perceptions, fabrications and consciousness itself. They mark things that “matter,” and therefore condition attention and further analysis.

Perception (saññā) is the spontaneous recognition of objects and qualities in the world of experience. For instance, a pattern of shapes and colors in the visual sense field becomes, in an instant, a familiar face, or our coffee mug.

Fabrication (saṅkhāra) are literally “puttings together” in Pali, the compounding of experiential factors to derive new factors, often by inference or by assembling parts into wholes. They also take the form of calls to action, that is, volition as well. “Presumptions” are fabrications that are taken as real.

Consciousness (viññāṇa) is a self-fulfilling peek into the world “out there,” which is an immediate unfolding in awareness of details located at the focal point of “attention.”

A river of all these kinds of awareness events is passing by you right now, as you read the words on this page, or play with your dog. The repeated arising of consciousness at various focal points leads to the illusion that the world “out there” is continuously present all together in all of its depth and breadth; we just show up and decide what we want to look at or do. However, the coherence and continuity of the world are themselves presumptions that seem to be confirmed by the fluidity with which scattered conscious glimpses arise into that presumed world. Wherever consciousness “descends” or “alights,” the world “grows” or “blooms” through the aid of the other aggregates. In this way an illusion is “magically” constructed.¹²

The aggregates are not as distinct from one another as advertised, but rather merge and flow in association with each other.

Feeling, perception, and consciousness, friend: these states are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of these states from the others in order to describe the difference between them. For what one feels, that one perceives; and what one perceives, that one is conscious of. (M 43 i 293)

So expect some ambiguity as you classify observables in this exercise. Close analysis often reveals the fabricated character of feeling, perception and consciousness. An effective strategy for investigation is to focus on one aggregate at a time, starting with form. Other aggregates will likely intrude into your experience, and even while you attend to form, you may be able to observe these individually, most easily percepts (a table, a chair, etc.) and then instances of the other aggregates.

5.4.3. The sense spheres. The sixfold sphere (saḷāyatana, often translated as the ‘six sense spheres’) is another very prominent Dhamma teaching indeed. It is a link in dependent co-arising, and the theme of Ex. IV.3. Central to this teaching is the role of the senses: eye, ear, nose, tongue body and mind. According to the Buddha, the eye (along with the others) is important to understand.

Without directly knowing and fully understanding the ◖eye◗, without developing dispassion for it and abandoning it, one is incapable of destroying suffering. (SN 35.111)

This is then said of ◖ear◗, ◖nose◗, etc.¹³ The importance both of the aggregates and of the sixfold sphere is that, in investigating them, we actually gain insight into the process whereby our presumptions are constructed.

The following gives a quick overview of the observables we are asked to discern in investigating the sense spheres.

Interior sphere                 exterior sphere

 eye                                 forms                                  eye-consciousness
ear                                 sounds                  ear-consciousness
nose                                 odors                                  nose-consciousness
tongue                                 flavors                  tongue-consciousness
body                                 tangibles                  body-consciousness
mind                                 phenomena                 mind-consciousness

Let’s begin with the exterior sphere. The category of form (sensation) in the aggregates is differentiated into six distinct sense fields in the sixfold sphere: Forms (visual sensations), sounds, odors, flavors and tangibles. These are “exterior,” apparently in that they seem not to be conditioned by other observables, as if emanating from outside.

The text of Ex. IV.3 actually refers to fetters rather than consciousness. However, consciousness is more common in other texts concerned with the sixfold sphere. Consciousness is a fetter because its presumptive nature holds back progress in our practice, but fetters get ahead of the game. Consciousness always has something to sell: It offers us alluring content, something that is “out there” and that is more substantial than a mere transitory awareness event. It presumes its content in an unrealistically favorable light as substantial, discrete, relatively fixed, existing independently, reliable, ripe for craving and appropriation. And most of us believe it all. However, when we recognize that these are fetters to our well-being and spiritual progress, we gain the incentive to abandon them. Like the exterior sphere, consciousness is differentiated into six channels. We generally have no difficulty distinguishing that certain aspects of consciousness are visually based, or audibly based, etc.¹⁴

Let’s turn to the interior sphere. We can think of the eye (and each of the other elements of the internal sphere) functionally as a “probe,” comparable to a thermometer, an oscilloscope, or even a Mars probe. A probe is something we place into a rich sense field (where sense data can be detected: auditory, visual, but in principle also electrical, temperature, pressure, and so on) in order to gain meaningful intelligence (which is a “reading,” such as degrees Fahrenheit, displayed data from a three-dimensional MRI scan, DNA sequences, and so on). A probe performs some degree of analysis for us in order to produce a meaningful result, sometimes a quite sophisticated analysis, as in the case of an MRI scan.

Similarly, an eye is a probe that begins with observable form and finishes with an observable instance of consciousness. If we place the eye into a visual field (form), it returns a reading as an instance of consciousness of some visible object or situation. An eye is therefore a conditional relation whereby observable form gives rise to eye-consciousness. For instance, a small, vague red shape within a bright color scheme appears within the visual field as form, and eye-consciousness arises of a bird, of a cardinal. The descent of conscious-ness is generally followed by a rapid growth of details at the point of descent, facilitated by instances of the various aggregates. An eye is focused within a narrow field, but a relentless stream of eye probes jumping from one focal point to another against the background presumption of spatial continuity, gives us the conviction that we are exploring a coherent and immediately present world “out there.”

The Buddha made a claim about the eye that further reveals how it functions:

And what, bhikkhus, is old kamma? The ◖eye◗ is old kamma, to be seen as generated and fashioned by intention, as something to be experienced. (SN 35.146)

Equivalent statements are made for ◖ear◗, ◖nose◗, ◖tongue◗, ◖body◗ and ◖mind◗. Old kamma refers to learned dispositions that result from past actions. These dispositions condition present fabrications. As a result, our experience of the world, presumed to be there even in our absence, is highly dependent on our past conditioning.

The Buddha is adamant that our whole experience of the world can be traced back to what happens in the sixfold sphere. Here he calls it “the all.”

And what, bhikkhus, is the all? The eye and forms, the ear and sounds, the nose and odors, the tongue and tastes, the body and tangibles, the mind and mental phenomena. This is called “the all.” If anyone, bhikkhus, should speak thus: “Having rejected this all, I shall make known another all,” that would be a mere empty boast on his part.
(SN 35.23)

There is nothing independent of the senses and their fields. And similarly,

In the six the world has arisen,
In the six it holds concourse.
On the six themselves depending,
In the six it has woes. (SN 1.70)

Ultimately, liberation comes not from seeing what is “out there” in some reality independent of experience, but from realizing how the eye (with the help of aggregates) fabricates consciousness, which presumes to see things “out there.”

If one is intent on renunciation and solitude of mind, if one is intent on non-affliction and the destruction of appropriation, if one is intent on craving’s destruction and non-confusion of mind: when one sees the spheres’ arising, one’s mind is completely liberated. (AN 6.55)

The final step toward complete liberation occurs “…when one sees the [sense] spheres’ arising…,” that is, one catches the eye fabricating the world.

“Knowledge and vision of things as they are” is an attainment close to awakening. How things are, is that we presume the world “out there.” Although our concepts are designed to refer to things beyond themselves, with regard to the world “out there” they come up empty of real content. This is good to realize, because our woes are not really “out there,” they are in the world as we experience it, and we are free to experience otherwise. One is able to overcome all presumptions on the path to awakening.

5.4.4. Feelings. Feelings are the second of the five aggregates, but Ex. II is also dedicated to feelings specifically. This aggregate therefore deserves a closer look. ‘Feeling’ is vedanā in Pali. It is a hugely important factor within the scope of Dhamma, and a link in dependent co-arising, where it originates in contact and gives rise to craving.

We find that feelings are classified in two ways. First, Feelings come in flavors of pleasant or unpleasant, or of a third quality of neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant.” In all cases, however, the content of a feeling in one way or another “matters” to us or has value in an otherwise impersonal world: beautiful music, beautiful people, scrumptious food, curiosities, a job well done, kindness, potential dangers, vulture capitalism, appalling violence, excrement. Second, a feeling is either worldly or unworldly. Worldly feelings are sense-based, looking at the world “out there,” where relatively few objects are evoke feeling and the rest are ignored. On the other hand, unworldly feelings, such as rapture or jhāna, apply to no specific objects “out there,” but are confined to the subjective realm, to mind.

Feelings are ubiquitous, they arise in virtually any context, so we will not lack in opportunity to observe them. The Buddha’s special interest in feelings is probably their pivotal role in cognition. They are rich in conditionality:

All things … come together in feeling. (AN 9.14)

Feelings are natural attractors of attention; the mind wants to go there, the eyes want to look in that direction. Then once attention alights on a feeling, further analysis almost always ensues, setting cognitive wheels in motion, growing the world, but then spinning easily out of control.

With contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. With what one has mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions and notions [born of] mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, future, and present… (MN 18, i 112-3)

The mediation of attention between the initial feeling and perception is not mentioned here, but we can easily verify it in experience. Alternatively, attention can be deliberately directed to pursue something other than feelings, like the breath at the tip of the nose. But once attended to, feelings grow into so much more, enabling most of our consciousness of the world.

It is striking that, with further analysis, feelings of things “out there” for the most part seem to be subjectively conditioned, then projected onto the world “out there,” to be experienced as if they were real. We have a saying, “Beauty in the eye of the beholder” to remind ourselves of such projections. Seeing beauty as real is not the same as seeing real beauty. Similarly, we might ask, Is the pleasing taste of vanilla really a quality of the complex vanillin molecule “out there,” or does it belong to our subjective experience “in here”? After the vanillin molecule encounters the tongue, the subjective experience is certainly projected back “out there” as a quality of the vanilla yogurt. “Mmmm, that tastes good.” Consider that maybe dung tastes to a dung beetle exactly like vanilla tastes to us. The recognition that much of what is going on “out there,” such as eyesores and attractions, would not be there in our absence, reveals that the wall between subject and object is highly permeable, that much of the world “out there,” maybe all of it, is mentally constructed.¹⁵

5.5. Non-self

Non-self is one of the most profound teachings of the Buddha, and one known to leave many scratching their heads in bewilderment. It is also the primary teaching investigated in the Sutta. Let me clarify from the outset that the self is, for the Buddha, primarily something we do mentally, not something about whose existence or non-existence we need to speculate philosophically. The Buddha often spoke in terms of I-making (ahaṅkāra). I-making involves the conviction that there is a substantial self. I-making is quite deep-rooted in human consciousness. Unfortunately, I-making causes us a lot of problems of a spiritual nature. But if the self is something we do, then it should be something we can not do.

The Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta mentions neither self nor non-self directly, and so it is easy to miss the degree to which the satipaṭṭhāna is about non-self. However, the first clause of the refrain presents a structured strategy for practicing non-self in experiential terms. For instance, the body refrain begins as follows:

In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, or he abides body-contemplating in the body externally, or he abides body-contemplating in the body both internally and externally.

This involves, as before, the practice of investigating observables, but in the case of the teaching of non-self there a hitch: there are no direct observables that correspond to self, much less to non-self. Instead the best we can do is to demonstrate repeatedly that observables consistently fail to confirm the existence of the self.

Let’s divide experience into three parts: bodily experience, mental experience, and worldly experience. This gives us three places in which the self might conceivably lie. Although we never observe our body as a whole, we presume that our body is there and encompasses our bodily experiences: our breath, our posture, the visible surface of our body, our bodily activities, and so on. Although we never observe our mind as a whole, we presume that our mind is there and encompasses our mental experiences: observable thoughts, emotions, calm, our impulses, and so on. Although we never observe the world “out there” as a whole, we presume that our consciousness is there to encompass a a substantial part of it. Therefore we might infer that I am my body, I am my mind, and I am my consciousness. This gives us three facets of the self: the body/self, the mind/self and the consciousness/self, each of which is the presumed self, but manifests in a distinct set of observables.¹⁶

5.5.1. Why is the self a problem? The untutored worldling presumes that the self exists as a real, substantial and fixed thing, and makes that self a major feature of their experiential world. They think and plan in terms of that self. However, in the Buddha’s teaching the self is a presumption (maññita), a cognitive fabrication (saṅkhāra) that is taken as real. The Buddha had a low regard for presumptions:

Presumption is a disease, presumption is a tumor, presumption is a dart. By overcoming all presumptions, bhikkhu, one is called a sage at peace. And the sage at peace is not born, does not age, does not die; he is not shaken and does not yearn. For there is nothing present in him by which he might be born. (MN 140 iii 246)

There is no self present in him. For the rest of us, we do well to recognize that “to experience things as real is not to experience real things.” If what we experience as real causes us problems, then we may have the option of experiencing otherwise. This is the case with the self.

Before we go off on a campaign to eradicate the self and all other presump-tions, let us reflect that the self, like a sharp knife, is both a useful tool and a dangerous hazard, depending on when and how it is wielded. How is the self useful? The world is an overwhelmingly complex place, and the network of contingencies relevant to any of life’s decisions is impossible to trace reliably. As we try to understand what is going on in the world, there is an explosion of ways to combine the raw data to come to any reliable large-scale interpreta-tion. The usefulness of presumptions is that they abstract away large swaths of the network of contingencies into unitary objects or views, and in this way they prune back the network of contingencies, artificially, but to a traceable level.

There are many things that we presume to exist, so let’s consider a more marginal object to see the practical value in presuming: a shadow. Most would agree that a shadow is not really an object. The illusion of what we call a “shadow” originates when some physical object intercepts light before it reaches a surface which would otherwise be illuminated. Yet, presuming that the shadow exists as an object has a practical advantage: we abstract away its contingent origination, and pretend it as stable, we attribute properties to it, and we reason about it productively. We acquire, in this way, something we can refer to and say things about. This “shadow” thereby takes on length and breadth, can prevent sunburn or make a picnic more enjoyable. It can even serve as an essential component of a physical artifact: a sundial.

The presumption that the self exists has a similar practical benefit. The presumption of the self reduces a huge swath of the network of contingencies to a unitary object that possesses agency and consciousness, that has attributes, and that plays a role in human reasoning. For instance, it is easier for a unified object, rather than for a swath of contingencies, to cross the street without getting run over by a UPS truck. But notice that its effectiveness, and the effectiveness of all presumptions, is based in ignorance, that is, based on ignoring the mass of contingencies that are abstracted away by presuming a unitary object. What is ignored, nonetheless, remains at play and produces consequences. As a result, the presumption of a self quite regularly leads to faulty conclusions. By removing or de-emphasizing the role of selves from the network of contingencies, finer causal relations that are otherwise obscured come to light.

It is possible to fabricate something without being convinced of its real existence. Kids do this all the time in play. Some of us might do this with shadows. We can, if we want, abandon the presumption of the self, but re-fabricate it as needed, after we know we can remove it at will from our experience. We catch the Buddha himself repeatedly wielding the expedient of referring to him-self as “I” or as “the Tathāgata” in this way, “as if” he himself were also a unitary object. We gain the option of experiencing otherwise through satipaṭṭhāna practice: I’m a unitary self now when it is useful, and a swath of contingencies later when it is not.

The third clause of the refrain acknowledges the practical usefulness of the self alongside that of non-self. It gives us permission to use the self as a tool, much as we use the shadow, without the need to presume it as real:

Recollection that “the ◖body◗ exists” is simply established in him to the extent necessary for bare knowledge and recollection.

“The ◖body◗ exists” allows us provisionally to refer to the ◖body◗/self, as the Buddha does in the first clause.

In any case, the Buddha is most concerned with revealing the disadvantages of the self as a cause of suffering, and that will also be our focus. The presumption of the self is the source of enormous suffering. It easily leads to craving and to a widening circle of appropriation of things as “me” and “mine.” Moreover, many contingencies go unnoticed when we have a self, with important consequences.

It is sobering to realize that everything and everyone we cling to will, as a result, be lost to us one by one, until the ones that remain lose us. The precious world is slipping by like sand through our fingers. As a result, our experiential world is littered with the shards of broken promises. We have been duped, because we have presumed that an enduring substantial self exists, along with the other alluring and enduring substantial things that we cling to. And we suffer as a result, because beyond our presumptions everything is in fact highly contingent. Our presumptions, in their ignorance, simply cannot keep pace with the unfolding of a highly contingent world over time.

From the spiritual perspective, the presumption of the self is a scourge to be abandoned. Yet this presumption is deeply ingrained and therefore extremely difficult to abandon. This is one place where satipaṭṭhāna practice plays a critical role.

5.5.2. The presentation of non-self in the Sutta. The first clause of the body refrain reads, once again, as follows:

In this way he abides ◖body◗-contemplating in the ◖body◗ internally, or he abides body-contemplating in the ◖body◗ externally, or he abides ◖body◗-contemplating in the ◖body◗ both internally and externally.

The refrains for the other three satipaṭṭhānas are similar. This clause relies on a metaphor of containment, in which “the body” is the “container” within which body-contemplation occurs and within which bodily observables (breath, elements, activities, stages of decay, etc.) are found. “Body-contemplating” (kāyānupassī) is translated here from Pali literally as a noun-verb compound, which is understood as contemplating bodily observables defined in the respective signature exercise and their contingencies. “In the body” (kāye) employs a simple locative case.¹⁷ “The body” is identified with the self that is presumed to exist in its body/self facet. Similarly in the third satipaṭṭhāna, “the mind” is conceived as a container for mental observables, and identified with the self in its mind/self facet. A consciousness/self facet is that which apprehends the world “out there.”¹⁸

Based on this metaphor the remaining terms make sense. “Contemplating internally [ajjhatta]” is contemplation of a field of bodily observables and their contingencies “contained” within the body/self. “Contemplating externally [bahidhā]” brings the container, the body/self as a thing, into contemplation, presumed as a conditioned and conditioning factor, but never directly observable. “Contemplating both internally and externally” discovers the incongruity of the body/self and the bodily observables.¹⁹

Interestingly, the very first signature exercise (Ex. I.1, the breath contempla-tion), redundantly describes the same threefold mode of investigation in its own words,

Recollective, he breathes in, recollective he breathes out. Breathing in long, he discerns, “I breathe in long”; or breathing out long, he discerns, “I breathe out long.” Breathing in short, he discerns, “I breathe in short”; or breathing out short, he discerns, “I breathe out short.”

He trains thus: “I shall breathe in experiencing the whole body”; he trains thus: “I shall breathe out experiencing the whole body.”

He trains thus: “I shall breathe in tranquilizing the bodily fabrica-tion”; he trains thus: “I shall breathe out tranquilizing the bodily fabrication.”

Step (1) describes internal contemplation of the field of observables. Step (2) describes external contemplation, by bringing to mind and experiencing (paṭisaṁvedī) the “whole body” (sabbakāya), that is, the body/self. Step (3) refers to the body/self alternatively as the “bodily fabrication” (kāya-saṅkhāraṁ). Recall that the self and its facets are presumptions, and presumptions are fabrications that are taken as real. In step (3), we try to bring back to mind the finer contingencies of step (1), alongside the experience of the whole body. We are unable to reconcile the finer observables with the body/self, and so put to rest (passambhayaṁ) the body/self in favor of the swath of observable contingencies.

Let’s make a second pass through the threefold mode of investigation: “Internal contemplation” requires that we set aside “the self,” “me,” “my (whole) body,” “my mind,” “my consciousness,” and the like, as we absorb ourselves in investigating fine details in the directly observable field of contingencies. This shifts our attention from presumptions (in which the worldling tends to dwell) and onto observable details (in which the “mindful” can occasionally be spotted).

“ External contemplation” requires that we shift the attention back to the body/self, mind/self, or consciousness/self. There we imagine the self pulling the strings, doing the breathing, moving the feet, etc., making decisions, standing with a flashlight to bring what is “out there” into its consciousness, etc. The shift from a long period of internal contemplation back to external contemplation may feel something like being with a group of friends, chatting amiably and fluidly, sharing the space equally, delighting in the interplay of reflections and quips, losing themselves in favor of the group dynamics, and then being suddenly invaded by someone named “Ace,” a successful and portly life insurance salesman who dominates every conversation, consistently subverting it to be about “him” and “his.” It’s enough to set us back a jhāna or two, as we lose the tenor of the earlier conversation. Each of us suddenly remembers somewhere else they need to be.

The practice of “contemplating both internally and externally” is to try to hold onto internal and external contemplations at the same time, or rather the observables and the presumption of the body, the field and the thing. We get a sense of how coherence of the direct observables breaks down with this intrusion of the self. As a result, we tend to “tranquilize” the bodily/mental/ conscious fabrication of the self in order to return to the tranquility of the field of direct observables, bringing us comfortably back to internal contemplation, having better discerned the insubstantiality of the self.

Contemplating both internally and externally might feel like you are skydiving for the first time with a friend as instructor, suddenly surrounded by tiny water droplets so that you can barely see your friend two feet away hanging on to a fringe of your jump suit. Your friend manages to get close enough to shout, “Cloud!” You shout back, “Huh? Where?” Your concept of a cloud is simply foreign to anything you are currently experiencing.

5.5.3. Incongruity arguments. Although it should suffice to recognize intuitively the disconnect between observables and the presumption of the self, the field and the thing, the Buddha presents three kinds of rational “internal and external” arguments against the viability of the self vis-à-vis relevant observables.²⁰ Demonstrating any of the following premises are assumed to discount the viability of the self:

The self lacks managerial control over its internally observable manifestations.

All internally observable manifestations of the fixed (relatively permanent) self are impermanent.

The self is of a fabricated nature, decomposed into internally observable parts.

An example of an argument of type (1) is:

Consciousness is non-self. If consciousness were self, this conscious-ness would not lend itself to un-ease. It would be possible [to say] with regard to consciousness, “Let my consciousness be thus. Let my consciousness not be thus.” But precisely because consciousness is non-self, consciousness lends itself to un-ease. And it is not possible [to say] with regard to consciousness, “Let my consciousness be thus. Let my consciousness not be thus.” (SN 22.59)

An example of an argument of type (2) is:

A pleasant feeling is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, bound to decay, to vanish, to fade away, to cease, and so too is an unpleasant feeling and a neither pleasant not unpleasant feeling. So anyone who, on experiencing a pleasant feeling, thinks, “This is my self,” must, at the cessation of that pleasant feeling think, “My self has gone!” and the same with an unpleasant and a neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant feeling. Thus whoever thinks “Feeling is my self,” is contemplating something in this present life that is impermanent, a mixture of happiness and unhappiness, subject to arising and passing away. Therefore it is not fitting to maintain, “Feeling is my self.”
(DN 15 ii 66-7).

Another instance of type (2) concerns “the eye” as a manifestation of consciousness. The worldling presumes,

The eye is that in the world by which one is a perceiver of the world, a conceiver of the world. (SN 35.116)

However, recall that an eye is a momentary probe into the visual field. For this reason,

If anyone says, “The eye is the self,” that is not tenable. The rise and fall of the eye are discerned, and since its rise and fall are discerned, it would follow: “My self rises and falls.” That is why it is not tenable for anyone to say, “An eye is the self.” Thus the eye is not self. (SN 35.32)

Arguments of type (3) are found in exercises that decompose the self, such as the body parts and elements exercises (Exs. I.4 and I.5). But let’s take as an example the most famous incongruity argument of all: It seems that the bhikkhunī Vajirā, an early disciple of the Buddha, was sitting in meditation when she was visited by the demon Māra, whose mission in life seems to have been to disrupt the practice of Buddhists. Māra, desiring to arouse fear, trepidation, and terror in Vajirā, desiring to make her fall away from samādhi, approached her and addressed her in verse:

“By whom has this being been created?
Where is the maker of the being?
Where has the being arisen?
Where does the being cease?” (SN 5.10)

Māra was trying to confuse her with questions about the thorny issue of the self (‘this being’), but she immediately recognizes who he is, and her reply, also in verse, has had an enduring influence on Buddhist thought:

“Why now do you assume 'a being'?
Māra, is that your speculative view?
This is a heap of sheer fabrications:
Here no being is found.” (SN 5.10)

The self is fabricated, it is a speculative view, a presumption. Then she offers her famous simile:

“Just as, with an assemblage of parts,
The word ‘chariot’ is used,
So, when the aggregates exist,
There is the convention ‘a being.’

“It's only suffering that comes to be,
Suffering that stands and falls away.
Nothing but suffering comes to be,
Nothing but suffering ceases.” (SN 5.10)

Sad and disappointed, Māra disappears. Vajirā has disassembled the consciousness/self into the five aggregates, much like the body/self is disassembled through contemplation into the body parts.

5.6. Conclusions

I have proposed that the contemplative practice of satipaṭṭhāna is a process of verifying and internalizing Dhamma through investigation of experiential observables. Repeating such investigation over and over, we move beyond a mere intellectual understanding of Dhamma onto an effortless, intuitive, and automatic way of seeing (See 6.2.3, 6.4.2). The starting point for each of these exercises is thereby an initial intellectual understanding of the relevant teaching(s). I have described each of these teachings in a nuts-and-bolts way from which the relevant observables can be clearly gleaned.

I hope in this chapter to have offered the practitioner a necessary and firm basis in Dhamma for fully engaging in the practice of this brilliantly conceived and wonderfully effective Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta.

¹ Direct observations themselves may turn out to be somewhat presumptive as well, but for practical purposes we can put this finer point aside.

² I will omit an exploration of the last exercise, IV.5, the four noble truths. Often the four noble truths are taken to represent the whole of the Dhamma, and I presume that its presence here is intended as an invitation to extend the set of dhamma exercises freely.

³ My account (Cintita, 2021) of the links of dependent co-arising, for instance, provide material for many additional teachings described in nuts-and-bolts, observable terms.

⁴ Thanissaro (2012, p. 37).

⁵ See Cintita (2021, sect. A.4) for more on conditionality.

⁶ The first three satipaṭṭhānas cover the categories of body, consciousness and mind respectively. The fourth is reserved for more complex teachings, each of which might properly belong to one of the first three categories as well.

⁷ See Cintita (2025, 4.2) on these qualities of the unwholesome roots.

⁸ See Cintita (2025, 10.2) on the hindrances.

⁹ On consciousness see Cintita (2025, 11.2.1; 2021, ch. 10).

¹⁰ Ñāṇānanda (2007) is an excellent commentary on this sutta.

¹¹ See Cintita (2025, 11.3.3; 2019, ch. 4) on appropriation.

¹² This process of descent and growth as described and verified in the early texts is discussed in more detail in Cintita (2021, 3.4).

¹³ Also see other discourses of SN 35.

¹⁴ On the other hand, other instances of consciousness seem to be based on two or more channels at once.

¹⁵ The foregoing analysis of the Buddha’s consciousness teachings are based critically on Ñāṇānanda’s (1974, 2008, 2012, 2015) interpretation of the upstream links of dependent co-arising. Cintita (2021) also provides a detailed discussion of consciousness as the central theme of the first six links of the twelve links of dependent co-origination, which implicate all of aggregates, including feelings, as well as the sixfold sphere.

¹⁶ The “facets of self” (body/self, consciousness/self and mind/self) are discussed in detail in 1.6.

¹⁷ English requires a preposition here but not necessarily ‘in.’ Translating kāye as ‘in the body’ makes it consistent with the containment metaphor. For the second satipaṭṭhāna we have a plural locative, best translated as ‘feeling-contemplating among the feelings’ (vedanāsu vedanānupassī). But the plural locative in Pali also supports the meaning of containment, as in Māgadhesu viharati ‘he lives in Magadha’ (literally ‘among the Magadhans’).

¹⁸ Whereas the body/self and mind/self view the self as including body and mind within it, the consciousness/self, in truth, views the self as being in relation to what is beyond the self, that is, what is “other.”

¹⁹ The “internally/externally/both …” formula is attested in all parallel versions (two in the Chinese canon) of the Sutta and found repeated in other correlates. In most cases it is promoted to the introduction of the discourse, as Sujāto (2012, p. 205) points out.

²⁰ Collins (1990, p. 97) lists the first two and I’ve added the last.

6. The jhānas: Dhamma made easy

Many centuries ago, the question of the role of samādhi in satipaṭṭhāna opened up a contentious Dhammic rift that remains with us today. The core question is: “How can the investigation or knowledge of something as complex and wise as Dhamma be experienced in the deep stillness of jhāna?” The title of this chapter suggests that an encouraging answer to this question is forthcoming. However, the almost unanimously accepted answer to this core question among scholars today is: “Investigation of Dhamma can not occur in jhāna!”

In spite of this consensus, its adherents manage to split themselves further into two camps with regard to whether Dhamma investigation or jhāna is primary in the path to liberation. The following seems to be a rough overview of the membership of the two camps overview.¹

Contemplating Dhamma is primary. Gombrich, Conze, Rahula, Collins, Carrithers, Masefield, Lindtner, Hamilton, and also most modern Vipassanā traditions.

Typically, Samādhi is thereby regarded as a preparation for contemplation.

Jhāna is primary. Griffiths, Vetter, Wynne, Bronkhorst, Rhys Davids, Norman, Cousing, Gethin, Anālayo, Sujato, Kuan, Samuel, Brahmāli.

Often deep jhāna is regarded as the (ofttimes mystical) liberating experience itself, and Dhamma as a kind of secondary, conceptual bi-product. Sometimes contemplating Dhamma is regarded as a preparation for jhāna.

On the other hand, Shulman challenges two questionable assumptions underlying the presumed incompatibility of Dhamma investigation and jhāna. In his 2014 book Rethinking the Buddha, he argues:

that Dhamma, in the very earliest texts, is not generally abstract philosophy in need of higher reasoning processes, but rather for the most part descriptive of direct experience, and

that repeated Dhamma investigation itself induces a “restructuring” or “internalization” of content conducive to a more spontaneous means of apprehension.  

In chapter five I have taken his first point to heart in showing how each of the Dhamma teachings referred to in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta has a nuts-and-bolts interpretation in terms of direct observables. In this final chapter, I will focus on Shulman’s second point. We will learn that internalization is already intrinsic to all human skill acquisition, from learning to walk or drive a car, to weaving or to playing the accordion. In each case, it turns know-what into a progressively more spontaneous, intuitive and non-conceptual know-how, easily, with repeated practice, within the capabilities of the still mind. In fact, we will see how jhāna serves to enable the practice of investigation to reach ever greater refinement as internalization puts it out of the reach of the more deliberate reasoning processes, with remarkable results.

It should also be appreciated by the end of this chapter that if we equate satipaṭṭhāna investigation with vipassanā, and jhāna with samatha, the Buddha’s few statements about the need to balance these in practice make sense. The Buddha said,

Again, a bhikkhu develops samatha and vipassanā in conjunction. As he is developing samatha and vipassanā in conjunction, the path is generated. He pursues this path, develops it and cultivates it. As he is pursuing, developing and cultivating this path, the fetters are abandoned and the underlying dispositions are uprooted. (AN 4.170)

6.1. Acquiring the skill of Dhamma

A typical practice (Buddhist or otherwise) has two aspects:

Performance, and

Development and cultivation, aka skill acquisition.

Consider the practice of mettā. We practice mettā in everyday situations as acts of sincere kindness, with immediate benefits for self and others. This is our performance. At the same time, the more we practice, the more mettā becomes inscribed as a disposition, and eventually as an intrinsic aspect of our character. In short, we “do” and we “learn by doing.” This is the very nature of human skill acquisition. Buddhism, as a practice toward awakening, tends to put great weight on the development and cultivation of such practice skills. This is why we also develop mettā as a contemplative practice, generally on the cushion, without the immediate benefit in performing mettā for others. Satipaṭṭhāna is also such a contemplative practice, focused on acquiring the skill of apprehending the world in accordance with Dhamma.

Full skillful engagement is the key to the optimal performance of a practice task, and with enough repetition over time the optimal development of our skill in performing that task in the future. Throughout the early texts we repeatedly find the phrase ‘development and cultivation’ (bhāvanā bahulīkatā)  in association with various practices to refer to skill acquisition.  Bahulīkatā ‘cultivation’ (literally ‘done a lot’) refers to the repetition required for the cumulative development (bhāvanā) of the skill. This applies to mettā contemplation, to observation of precepts, to satipaṭṭhāna contemplation, or for that matter to bird-watching, fly-fishing, or driving a car.

6.1.1. How you acquired the skill of driving a car. Let’s consider the acquisition of skill in the domain of driving a car. I will assume that you are now a relatively expert driver, but that you were not always so. Let’s look back on your learning curve.

Stage One. At the time of your first driving lesson, your skill was largely limited to know-what, that is, it was based on conceptual instruction. You learned which is the brake and which is the gas pedal, what the effect of turning the steering wheel clockwise is, and so on. If you had gotten behind the wheel at the beginning of your training and driven in real traffic, it would have been impossible to know, all at once, when to turn, to speed up, to slow down or to stop, much less how to navigate among the swirl of cars, curbs, street signs, bikes, kites, angry drivers honking behind, and pedestrians scattering in front, while fearing for your own dear life. That would have required know-how. Luckily, at the beginning, your instructor took you to an empty parking lot where you could practice and become adept at one sub-skill at a time in preparation for entering real traffic.

Stage Two. With further practice, you might remember, there were a few months in which driving was exhilarating. You were fully engaged in both performance and acquisition of this skill, challenged but confident, exhilarated, for it seemed that every time you got behind the wheel it was with more skill than the time before.² This second stage was the most rewarding. You may recall other such elated and productive periods of full skillful engagement also in learning to play chess, the tuba or tennis; in training to be a brain surgeon or a welder; or in learning meditation. Pry children away from their passive digital distractions, and children experience this exhilaration quite readily in play. It is also what attracts adults to hobbies. This exhilaration is pīti (aka ‘rapture’) in Pali.³

Stage Three. Since reaching this stage, you drive almost effortlessly. You barely notice, and sometimes may forget altogether, that you are driving. You are so adept that the car seems to drive itself. Unchallenged, most of your attention is now free to talk on the phone, drink coffee, listen to the radio, text, honk at lesser drivers, and lean out the window to flirt with pedestrians, all while the car is conveying you to your destination. Most of the various operations that constitute successful driving, once so difficult, now happen with better results than ever, quickly, quietly, spontaneously, without effort or thought, intuitively, under the radar. The downside is that you are no longer fully engaged, nor  exhilarated. The development and cultivation of the skill of driving has reached a plateau. In fact, driving has become routine and a bit boring, which is why you seek the above-mentioned distractions.

The same learning curve is evident in the practice of fly fishing, chess, basketball, crochet, the culinary arts, everyday “mindfulness,” reading, satipaṭṭhāna, and shuffling cards.⁴

6.1.2. Internalization. What is most remarkable in this process of skill acquisition is that, even though the task to be performed remains the same, your cognitive faculties are, by the second stage, performing the task in a very efficient manner, with very little expenditure cognitive energy. The skill has become at least partially internalized, and relies primarily on a different set of cognitive faculties than it did at the beginning of the first stage. You didn’t have to think so much. By the third stage, the energy required for thought and careful deliberation, critical in the first stage, has become almost entirely reallocated to distractions. The task of driving itself seems to be handled largely unconsciously, intuitively, spontaneously. This reallocation of faculties is internalization; it makes performance easy.

Understanding internalization will provide a good basis for understanding the role of jhāna below. Cognitive scientists have modeled⁵ internalization in terms of two distinct systems that generally work cooperatively in parallel.

The explicit system is conscious, conceptually based, deliberate and effortful. It is characterized by attention, agency, choice, and reasoning, and it is very clever in thinking its way through novel problems.  The explicit system is very flexible and adaptable. However, it is an extremely limited resource, it operates very slowly, it consumes a lot of energy, it tires easily, and it is easily overwhelmed. It is a real gas-guzzler.⁶

The implicit system works virtually effortlessly under the radar of consciousness, intuitively, spontaneously and automatically. It is an essentially unlimited resource, and operates super-fast, almost tirelessly. Its great talent is in detecting, remembering and responding to complex patterns⁷ that are obscure to the conceptually based explicit system. But to do what it does so well, it must be trained over time through repeated practice.

The strength of the explicit system is in its power to reason through novel situations as they are first encountered, whereas the implicit system requires prior habituation to recurring situations. Once trained by the explicit system, the implicit system will operate in an astonishingly refined and efficient manner, and will also grow its skill beyond the conscious reach of the explicit system, fine-tuning itself as it detects ever more subtle patterns in the environment, so that it will commonly perform the task more precisely than the explicit system can even comprehend. As a result the implicit system will eventually be able to produce intuitions or hunches, that arise in the blink of an eye, and that are often far more accurate than the results of long explicit deliberation.⁸ Almost all of human cognition runs in the implicit system.

Internalization can be thought of as a process whereby explicit skill or know-how is “offloaded” onto the implicit system. It is the primary learning process in acquiring a skill. Internalization makes the difference between being a novice and being an expert. It makes the difference between knowing what the Buddha taught, and seeing the world through the eyes of the Buddha.

6.2. Mastering the skill of Dhamma

We saw above that continued skill acquisition falters at the third stage of the ubiquitous learning curve. It is there that we stopped becoming better drivers, or better singers in the shower. The skill of walking (a fruit of toddlerhood) would otherwise by now have made gymnasts, acrobats or ballet dancers of us all. We still play the ukulele about as well as we did twenty years ago, no better. Studies indicate that physicians, on average, actually become worse at performing their jobs as they gain experience beyond a certain threshold.⁹

Recall that in the first stage we are over-challenged and anxious as we attempt to acquire a new skill. In the second stage we are fully charged: Our skills are challenged ever anew, and we are delighted to see our skills develop with each performance. We have little problem with wandering attention, since rapture sustains ardency and full skillful engagement. We humans love this stage. By the third stage, the practice typically lacks challenge and seems routine. Our practice has become the victim or its own success. It has became internalized and effortless, it has released the excess energy that had been consumed by extrinsic system in the second phase, and turned it to multitasking, or to a dimwitted scattering of attention. We have become bored, disengaged, and the development and cultivation of our skill has faltered. Skill acquisition has reached a plateau.

However, the plateau in skill acquisition is not inevitable. We know that because there those among us who continue to develop and delight in a chosen skill, eventually to achieve mastery. Consider the case of our pianist who began training years ago in childhood, continues to develop her skills decades later, and is now widely admired as a virtuosa, through whose fingers the music today passes effortlessly and unimpeded to fill the concert hall. How did she do it? The Buddhist arahant has become at least equally adept in their mastery of the more fundamental skills of virtue and wisdom.

6.2.1. Remaining fully engaged. There are a number of ways to remain skillfully engaged, so as never to be mired in stage three of the learning curve. For instance, we might make the practice task ever more challenging. Teenage boys take this principle to heart in continuing to challenge and develop their driving skills beyond those of the law-abiding by exceeding posted speed limits and other legally imposed constraints, or by drag-racing on open roads. Zen practitioners, on the other hand, make even basic tasks, like walking, more challenging by imposing additional, exacting standards, making a ritual out of each detail of the task to be performed. Another option is to leave the task as it is, but to increase our challenge by handicapping ourselves. An adept chess player in the midst of mediocre players is known to play without a queen. A soldier learns to disassemble and reassemble his rifle blindfolded.

Full engagement maintains itself where the incentive is high. I imagine that a hunter or a sniper must maintain full engagement in the skill of alertness for long periods of time because their livelihoods depend on it, and then, at a brief critical moment, engage themselves fully in another skill, the skill of the shot upon spotting prey. The popularity of dangerous hobbies, like hang-gliding or rock climbing, can be explained as retaining stage-two rapture through fear of a fatal distraction. We can also incentivize full engagement by risking our social reputation in competition, as in chess matches, bake-offs, and duels.¹⁰ An additional source of incentive comes in Buddhist practice from refuge, from enormous faith or conviction in the efficacy of the practice in producing great benefit. The satipaṭṭhāna faculty of ardency (discussed in chapter 2) reflects such an incentive.

In 4.2 we learned of the Buddha’s parable about the gent who must carry a bowl of oil without spilling a drop, lest he lose his head. The long internalized skill of walking while carrying something is thereby incentivized to a higher standard of performance, once again through fear of a fatal distraction, the danger of which is bumped up in the parable by the presence of “the most beautiful girl in the land” singing and dancing. The Buddha then tells the monks that they must maintain that level of attention as they move about.

This brings us to mental discipline, the most characteristic means in Buddhist practice for foregoing stage three of the learning curve. The discipline in subduing distractions is particularly relevant here. In Buddhist practice, we are expected to be engaged in a single practice task. Distractions arise when attention overshoots the concerns of the current practice task. When attention is confined to the concerns of the practice task, it is said to be secluded. We also say the mind is one-centered (ekagga), or concentrated, or secluded from irrelevant concerns. Acquiring or maintaining this state is a fundamental skill learned in Buddhist practice. The hindrances (nīvarana) are common types of distractions that we train to work with.

Notice that the scope of concentration here must minimally encompass the concerns of the practice task, lest it squelch it all together. It cannot be one-pointed. If we want to remain fully engaged, for instance, in the non-Dhammic task of washing dishes, the scope of concern must encompass movements of the hands, the scrubbing, the sponge, the detergent, the know-how acquired through years of washing dishes, the dishes themselves, etc. One-pointedness would limit attention to, say, the fingernail of the right index finger.¹¹ One-centeredness, on the other hand, wraps snuggly around the entire scope of relevance, the theme or concern of the task.

6.2.2. Tranquility and samādhi. In this section I present the gist of my thesis.

The seven awakening factors¹² form a conditional chain that looks like this,

recollection→ investigation of dhammas → energy → rapture →
                tranquility → samādhi → equanimity.

The first three factors describe the investigation of Dhamma and its requisites, that is, it describes satipaṭṭhāna practice (see 3.1.1). Dhamma investigation focuses on one particular teaching at a time, and with regard to a particularly field of observables. These constitute its theme (nimitta) or scope of concern. When this practice is fully engaged, rapture arises. We’ve already found this in association with stage two of the learning curve described above. Rapture sidesteps distraction, because it is already having too much fun with full engagement. The mind becomes still as the loss of the familiar mix of potential distractions allows the practice to be performed at a lower energy level. This stillness is tranquility (passaddhi), and it bottoms out in one-centeredness, where the energy level of the mind is optimally adjusted to the current theme, that is, the concerns of the task at hand, which continues throughout the sequence of factors. One-centeredness also marks entrance into samādhi, within which full skillful engagement of the practice task continues.

Samādhi is one-centeredness of mind. (MN 34 i 301)

Let me pause here to address a couple of potential objections. This account may seem out of accord with some readers’ meditation experiences. Rather, this account of the awakening factors seems to suggest a natural process in which samādhi arises through a condition-driven chain that begins with a particularly high and energetic degree of skillful engagement, rather than with a complete withdrawal from any activity. Moreover, at no point do we stop to apply a special technique to induce the stillness of samādhi, such as concentrating on the breath at the nostrils, or on a kasiṇa.

Although many later traditions suggest otherwise, what I have described is exactly what the early texts tell us. First, the absence of a special mechanism in the early texts to induce samādhi has been pointed out by Vetter (1988, p. xxv), Arbel (2017, especially pp. 46, 156), and Polak (2011, p. 206). Polak (2024, ch. 5) devotes a whole chapter to this issue. He also points out (p. 260) that the Chan/Zen school has remained in accord with the early account, making no use of a special mechanism to induce samādhi.

Second, there are many instances in the early texts that follow the same pattern exhibited in the seven factors of awakening, that is, that begin with engagement in a primary practice then lead through the same chain of conditions “rapture→ tranquility→ samādhi” or (in a more detailed version) “delight → rapture → tranquility → pleasure → samādhi.” These primary practices are heavy on ethics, refuge, and include sense restraint, even Dhamma study, in addition to Dhamma investigation.¹³

Third, the Buddha explicity describes the absence of effort in the arising of samādhi,

Just as, bhikkhus, when rain pours down in thick droplets on a mountain top, the water flows down along the slope and fills the cleft, gullies, and creeks; these, being full, fill up the pools; these, being full, fill up the lakes; these, being full, fill up the streams; these, being full, fill up the rivers; and these, being full, fill up the great ocean; so too, …  with faith as proximate cause, delight; with delight as proximate cause, rapture; with rapture as proximate cause, tranquility; with tranquility as proximate cause, pleasure; with pleasure as proximate cause, samādhi; with samādhi as proximate cause, the knowledge and vision of things as they really are. (SN 12.23)

That this transition to samādhi is a natural process, suggests that it is already present in human cognition independently of Buddhism. In fact that this process continues into the jhānas will be evident in positive psychology and neuropsychology, which we will look at in 6.3.1

The process of transition to samādhi is a natural process, but it is also characteristically Buddhist. In Buddhist practice it is “developed and cultivated” (bhāvitā bahulīkatā) into a refined skill in itself,¹⁴ internalized through repetition, so that it arises spontaneously as before, but much more readily.

6.2.3. Perfection. Complete mastery of a skill is “virtuosity” (at least I will define it that way). With virtuosity one can perform even an extremely complex task with virtually no help from the explicit system. Consider, once again, the case of a virtuosa pianist, having seated herself in front of a live audience, the music seems simply to appear at her fingertips with no effort at all on her part.¹⁵ She is so competent and confident that she can entrust the performance entirely to the implicit system. As a result, she might have no sense that she is doing anything at all, or is even present. Charley Parker once said, “Don’t play the saxophone. Let it play you.”¹⁶ Remarkably, if the explicit system—with all its energetic thinking and deliberating—intrudes even for a moment, the performer is at risk of choking up, such that the performance might easily go awry.

Consider the similar case of the arahant: He has developed and cultivated in Dhamma for decades, perhaps lifetimes. He no longer has the sense of being an agent: he creates no kamma!¹⁷ He witnesses an implicit, intuitive, non-conceptual, improvisational process of appropriate conduct and perception in response to the world’s contingencies that adheres to Dhammic standards.¹⁸ He has thoroughly habituated virtuous patterns of action (precepts, generosity, kindness and compassion). He exhibits virtue but does not identify as a person of virtue (his behavior arises spontaneously).¹⁹ He has developed and cultivated the wisdom teachings, but now simply “sees with the Buddha's spectacles.”²⁰

Virtuosity can take a lifetime to attain, and in the Buddhist case we are allowed multiple lifetimes. But all of us develop, cultivate and perfect minor skills at some point in our lives, such a memorizing a poem, to the extent that the intrusion of the external system becomes an affliction to the effortless performance of the implicit system. The possibility of this level of perfection tells us the the human mind is capable of performing extremely complex skilled tasks silently, without the participation of the faculties bound to the explicit system, particularly without thought and deliberation. It therefore comes as no surprise that the attenuation of gas-guzzling explicit faculties, such as planning or pondering, under certain conditions are built into human cognition. We’ve all experienced this.

Consider an unanticipated emergency situation, like unexpectedly driving onto an oil slick at a high speed. Most readers will likely have experienced something like this: without thinking, the body simply responds, usually with surprising adeptness and successfully,²¹ before we are even fully cognizant of the danger. The mind has shut down the explicit system altogether, and given full control to the implicit system. Why? Because the explicit system is so slow that whatever danger looms will have played itself out long before the explicit system would have been able to respond. Intermittent curtailment is most easily observed at critical moments when the potentially winning throw is executed, when the hunter’s shot is fired, when the surgeon makes the critical incision, and so on. At that moment, the world seems to reduce to the basics: gun and prey, ball and basket, scalpel and brain tissue. All is silent and even the breath comes to a momentary halt. If there is an empathetic audience, even some of the viewers’ faculties come to a halt, rendering even the most loquacious of chatterboxes silent. These are spontaneous, momentary curtailments of explicit faculties.

6.3. The jhānas

We have seen that the faculty of samādhi is defined as one-centeredness (ekagga), the narrowing of the scope of attention ideally down to the concerns of a primary practice task (guarding the senses, mettā contemplation, investigation of Dhamma, recollection of the triple gem, etc.), to exclude all else. Accordingly the word samādhi is most often translated as ‘concentration.’ Samādhi in this function is critical to the efficiency of both performance and development of the skill of practice. However, this entails that concentration can rarely be “one-pointed” without forsaking the practice task. One-pointedness would serve neither the virtuosa pianist nor the surgeon well.

Moreover, beyond concentration there is a second means by which the function of samādhi is fulfilled:  through appropriate attenuation of explicit faculties. To the extent that the skill of practice has been offloaded onto the implicit system through internalization, costly explicit faculties play a diminished role in practice. Withdrawing unneeded faculties often allows a practice task to be performed in a highly efficient, intuitive and spontaneous manner. I call the process by which explicit cognitive faculties are attenuated or shut down curtailment. The second, third and fourth jhānas are products of curtailment, along with the change in active jhāna factors as we progress through the four jhānas.

6.3.1. Curtailment. Curtailment occurs in a predictable pattern, described in early Buddhism with regard to the four jhānas. The jhānas represent stages of initial concentration and progressive curtailment. Like samādhi itself, the jhānas seem to unfold naturally and effortless as needed, leading to the final awakening factor of equanimity (upekkhā), but become familiarized and highly refined in Buddhist practice. Under everyday, mundane circumstances a range of cognitive faculties is active at any one time: in support of analysis, perception,  presumption of what is not directly visible, planning, and so on. Just as samādhi is a natural process, the jhānas are expected to unfold naturally. Accordingly, we find everyday curtailment independently of Buddhist practice as a natural process, generally under conditions that require a time-critical response.

Research in neuropsychology and in positive psychology confirm the natural process of curtailment and its experiential qualities in human cognition, under conditions similar to those that give rise to samādhi in the Buddhist context. “Optimal experience” or “flow”²² is an important field of study within positive psychology that concerns experiences which are repeatedly described by subjects (unprompted) as “flow.” A composer, for instance, describes it this way:

“You yourself are in an ecstatic state to such a point that you feel as though you almost don’t exist. I’ve experienced this time and time again. My hand seems devoid of myself, and I have nothing to do with what is happening. I just sit there watching it in a state of awe and wonderment. And it just flows out by itself.”

The domains in which flow has been studied are quite diverse, included music, rock climbing, dancing, sailing, chess, basketball and so on. Flow generally involves states of elation, of intense concentration and of altered consciousness. Flow experiences almost always arise naturally under conditions of full skillful engagement in some task, particularly in which someone has attained a high level of expertise. There is no space for distraction or irrelevant thoughts; time is often distorted and self-consciousness disappears.²³ These qualities are also familiar in the deeper jhānas.

“Transient hypofrontality”²⁴ in neuropsychology refers to a mechanism for regular “down-regulation” (seemingly equivalent to “curtailment”) of cognitive faculties related to “cognitive control” (seemingly equivalent to “explicit faculties”). This mechanism is located in a particular region of the brain. The resulting curtailment leads to corresponding “altered states of consciousness,” found, for instance, within dreaming, within endurance running (“runner’s high”), within meditation, within hypnosis, and with use of certain drugs. The list of down-regulated faculties given in the cited paper are high-level functions similar to those attenuated in jhāna. Flow is recognized as an experiential correlate of “a state of optimized task-specific processing that results from domain-specific expertise paired with a reduction in cognitive control.”²⁵

In short, the mechanism of curtailment, its conditioning factors, its experiential correlates, and even the region of the brain responsible for curtailment are growing areas of scientific investigation, and seem to correspond in their relevant features to the account of samādhi and jhāna presented here. A relationship of Buddhist samādhi both to flow and to transient hypofrontality has been suggested by scholars in those fields and in Buddhist scholarship. However, as far as I know, this relationship has never been explored further. I suspect the reason is the lack of a consensus among Buddhist scholars of precisely what the experience of samādhi and jhāna is.

The early texts define the four jhānas in terms of which jhāna factors are present in each, giving us a basis for learning to navigate among the jhānas as appropriate. Abstracting away the minor jhāna factors, each of the jhānas can be quickly characterized in terms of progressive curtailment as follows:

(1st) Concentration to the degree of seclusion (vivicca) and one-centeredness (ekagga) around the theme of samādhi (samādhi-nimitta).

(2nd) Curtailment of thought and deliberation (vitakka-vicāra).

(3rd) Curtailment of rapture (pīti).

(4th) Curtailment of pain and pleasure (dukkha-sukkha).

Effectively, the jhānas make practice in accordance with Dhamma easy. The jhānas work in close collaboration with the process of internalization to facilitate the offloading of explicit functions onto the implicit system and to encourage further fine-grained processing within the implicit system. Notice that our adeptness in performing the practice task (degree to which our know-how is internalized) should in principle be appropriately matched against the level of jhāna in which we abide.²⁶ I maintain that this is what is sought in discussions vipassanā and samatha, where the practice task is satipaṭṭāna.

Let’s look at standard descriptions of the four jhānas from the early texts to see how this account works out.

6.3.2. The first jhāna. Before we enter the first jhāna, we have become skillfully engaged in some practice task (see 3.3), equivalent to the first three awakening factors (see 6.2.2). For instance, suppose we first undertake the satipaṭṭhāna theme of investigation of elements with respect to impermanence (Ex I.5 in 5.0). As a novice in this particular practice, we have been developing a conceptual understanding of the teaching supported by thinking and deliberation, while attention is centered around this concern. This theme will be retained in each jhāna, although it will be experienced differently in each. Full skillful engagement in investigating the theme has already resulted in rapture, as described in the awakening factors.

Now we enter the first jhāna:

(1st) Here, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the first jhāna, which is accompanied by thought and deliberation, with rapture and pleasure born of seclusion.

Recall that seclusion is the base level of concentration in the definition of full skillful engagement (see 6.2.1-2 above), equated with “having put away covetousness and grief for the world.” “Born of seclusion” indicates that this level of concentration precedes entry into the first jhāna. What is not mentioned here, and mentioned rarely in similar texts, is the slightly deeper level of one-centeredness definitive of samādhi.²⁷ “Thought and deliberation” (vitakka-vicāra) is a discursive cognitive faculty (or rather two) that is capable of complex reasoning, of presuming what is not directly observable, of spinning narratives and so on.²⁸ It is already present in most of everyday life, but is certainly active if we are first grappling conceptually as a novice, for instance, with regard to our particular satipaṭṭhāna exercise.

The jhānas will get progressively deeper in large increments. The first jhāna is relatively shallow: with no faculties yet curtailed, it places no limits on our ability to conceptualize and reason explicitly about even the most complex Dhamma teaching. Given the factor of seclusion, and without the rambling generally associated with everyday thought and deliberation, the first jhāna is nonetheless experienced as a composed meditative state, distinct from normal human consciousness.²⁹

6.3.3. The second jhāna. When we have practiced the theme long and well in the first jhāna, such that practice is no longer a challenge, our degree of internalization suffices to curtail the dominant explicit faculty of the preceding jhāna, which is thought and deliberation.

(2nd) With the stilling of thought and deliberation, he enters upon and abides in the second jhāna, which has tranquility and equipoise of mind without thought and deliberation, with rapture and pleasure born of samādhi.

“Born of samādhi” tells us that samādhi (and therefore one-centeredness) is present prior to the onset of the second jhāna. “Tranquility,” like rapture, is an awakening factor antecedent to samādhi (see 3.1, 6.2.2). “Equapoise” (ekodibhāva) is commonly regarded as synonym for one-centeredness (ekaggatā), which is already implied by samādhi.³⁰

“The stilling of thought and deliberation” is the curtailment that distinguishes the second jhāna. The state of consciousness is altered as presumptions and abstractions (otherwise sustained through thought and deliberation) disappear in favor of simple, direct, and very vivid perception of what can be directly observed. We get the sense that we are just sitting with the various details of the ongoing theme. If the theme seems to elude us,³¹ it is appropriate to return to the first jhāna. Otherwise, further investigation has significantly, but not entirely, been entrusted to the implicit system, which works silently; we are not totally aware of exactly what it is doing. The Buddha accordingly calls this stage of curtailment “noble silence” (ariya tuṇhī-bhāva),³² which will continue into the two deeper jhānas. It is the explicit system that has become still, just in time, for its excess energy might otherwise have turned to distraction and multitasking. We are still fully engaged in the practice task, but at a lower energy level.

6.3.4. The third jhāna. When we have practiced under the current theme repeatedly and thoroughly in the second jhāna, our degree of internalization suffices to justify dropping rapture, which has been energizing the remaining explicit faculties.

(3rd) With the fading away as well of rapture, he abides in equanimity, recollective and discerning, still feeling pleasure with the body, he enters upon and abides in the third jhāna, on account of which noble ones announce: “One has a pleasant abiding, who is equanimous and recollective.”

Rapture had been exciting and had energized the mind in many subtle ways. The curtailment of rapture in the third jhāna eliminates the excitement of rapture, and of whatever other minor cognitive faculties are conditioned by rapture. Very little explicit cognition remains, the mind becomes “equani-mous,” the potential for distraction is greatly diminished, and attention is thereby stabilized so that it remains effortlessly centered and is unlikely to revert haphazardly to a previous jhāna, much less be diverted from the theme. “He has a pleasant abiding” suggests that this is the most delightful of the
jhānas.  

“Recollection-discernment” is a term that refers to the core process of skillful engagement itself (see 2.2.4, 3.4.3, 6.4.3), which was already a prerequisite for entry into the first jhāna. So why is it mentioned here? To have reached the third jhāna we must already have largely internalized the skill of the current practice, so investigation of the theme has largely disappeared into the implicit system. It is under the radar of consciousness. Mentioning full skillful engagement here is certainly a reassurance that investigation continues undeterred, although unheard, even at this very deep level of jhāna.³³

6.3.5. The fourth jhāna. In the third jhāna, explicit engagement is at most a mere whisper. Pleasure remains, which means that what we do experience matters to us. In the fourth jhāna we drop even this.

(4th) With the abandoning of pleasure and pain, and with the previous disappearance of joy and grief, he enters and abides in the fourth jhāna, which has neither-pain-nor-pleasure and purity of recollection due to equanimity. (MN 141 iii 252)

“The abandoning of pleasure and pain” curtails the faculty of feelings, upon which virtually every explicit cognitive faculty is dependent (see 5.4.4). Even perceptions are almost completely curtailed as a result.³⁴ “Joy and grief” are mental correlates of pleasure and pain, but the disappearance of joy and grief had not been mentioned with respect to a previous jhāna; we might presume their disappearance had occurred along with the curtailment of rapture in the third jhāna. “Purity of recollection due to equanimity” refers to purity specifically of the skill applied in investigating the theme. This reassures us once again that skill is still developing under the radar. The text here makes no reference to discernment, as in the third jhāna; perhaps skill is developed in the absence of performance, into a particularly pristine or finely tuned form within the implicit system. The fourth jhāna is experienced subjectively as an almost trance-like (void of anything that could be construed as “thinking”) state along with some vague stirring of activity seeming to emanate from below consciousness.

6.4. Realizing the fruits of samādhi

We’ve developed enough understanding of the mechanics of samādhi (including the jhānas) to advance an explanation how it achieves the functions attributed to it. In the Samādhi Sutta, the Buddha lays out the fruits of samādhi, repeated here:

Bhikkhus, there are these four developments in samādhi. What four?

There is a development in samādhi that, developed and cultivated, is conducive to dwelling happily in this very life.

There is a development in samādhi that, developed and cultivated, is conducive to obtaining knowledge and vision.

There is a development in samādhi that, developed and cultivated, is conducive to recollection-discernment.

There is a development in samādhi that, developed and cultivated, is conducive to the destruction of the corruptions. (AN 4.41)

We have seen that samādhi is a faculty, an auxiliary practice (see 2.3, 2.4.1) in support of a skillfully engaged primary practice. Primary practices include exercises within the four satipaṭṭhānas, mettā practice, recollection of the triple gem, or acts of generosity. I have accordingly translated the compound samādhi-bhāvanā as ‘a development in samādhi’ (rather than ‘… of …’), since the primary practice is what is developed here, although (as we will see) samādhi itself plays a vital causal role in enabling these fruits. Let’s explore why practice in samādhi should enable these four fruits.³⁵

6.4.1. Dwelling happily in this very life. Before his awakening, the Buddha-to-be recognized that there are pleasures that transcend mundane sensual pleasures when he recollected an experience that arose spontaneously in his childhood:

I considered: “I recall that when my father the Sakyan was occupied, while I was sitting in the cool shade of a rose-apple tree, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, I entered upon and abided in the first jhāna, which is accompanied by thought and deliberation, with rapture and pleasure born of seclusion. Could that be the path to awakening?” Then, following on that memory, came the realization: “That is indeed the path to awakening.” I thought: “Why am I afraid of that pleasure that has nothing to do with sensual pleasures and unwholesome states?” I thought: “I am not afraid of that pleasure since it has nothing to do with sensual pleasures and unwholesome states.” (MN 36 i 246-7).

We are not told what theme the Buddha-to-be found so engaging to center his attention upon, and to think and deliberate about, only that he put aside worldly concerns and that supramundane pleasure and rapture arose. Mundane pleasures, based in sensuality (food, sex, money in the bank, adventure movies, playing pranks on the elderly, booze and so on) tend to be short-lived, problematic, fraught and unsatisfying because they are fleeting and get entwined with craving and appropriation (upādāna) as “me” and “mine.” Spiritual, supramundane (lokuttara), or non-carnal (nirāmisa) pleasure arises spontaneously in wholesome Buddhist practice. Let’s consider how such non-sensual pleasures might arise.

(1) We’ve already seen that rapture (pīti) and pleasure (sukkha) arise from full skillful engagement as antecedent states prior to the arising of samādhi, rapture as one of the seven awakening factors (see 6.2.2 above). We love full skillful engagement, and the Buddha-to-be must have discovered something he was thrilled to be engaged in as he sat under the rose-apple tree. We’ve seen that such positive affects continue in samādhi and well into the jhānas. Because the jhānas sustain engagement and avoid a plateau in full engagement, if his discovery were to become a long-term hobby, samādhi would secure for him much additional rapture and pleasure in the years to come. This is a development in samādhi that is conducive to dwelling happily in this very life.

(2) As a whole, Dhamma practice discourages, over the long term, what is unwholesome, in particular craving and appropriation (upādāna) as “me” and “mine,” which would otherwise lead toward suffering. Many other non-Buddhist domains of full skillful engagement (like golf or driving) have their own criteria for what is skillful or unskillful, and many are quite unwholesome by Dhammic standards (such as marketing useless or harmful merchandise that customers cannot afford). Although temporary seclusion from unwholesome states is, in principle, possible also in unwholesome practices (even for a sniper), long-term, unfortunate kammic effects (regret and unwholesome dispositions) are expected outcomes. The early texts often speak of the goal of Dhamma practice as a whole in terms of the eradication of such suffering, and experience shows that a common consequence within this very life is a sense of meaning and purpose. This is also a development in samādhi that is conducive to dwelling happily in this very life.

(3) Although rapture ceases in the third jhāna and pleasure in the fourth, paradoxically the absence of pain or pleasure is often regarded as a kind pleasure found in these deepest jhānas. For instance, with reference to the absence of feeling (vedanā, of which rapture and pleasure are instances) in nibbāna, the following exchange is recorded,

… Venerable Udāyī said to the Venerable Sāriputta, “But friend, what happiness could there be here when there is no feeling here?”

“Just this, friend, is happiness here, that no feeling is felt here.”
(AN 9.34)

In the same way, this is also a development in samādhi that is conducive to dwelling happily in this very life.

6.4.2. Knowledge and vision. Knowledge and vision are factors of wisdom attributed to samādhi repeatedly in the early texts, where they represent a stage close to final liberation, at which it might be said that we see what the Buddha saw.³⁶

When right samādhi does not exist, for one failing right samādhi, the proximate cause is destroyed for knowledge and vision of things as they really are. (AN 10.3)

Jhāna, in particular, is discussed in the early texts consistently in association with attainments that approach awakening,³⁷

There is no jhāna for one with no wisdom, no wisdom for one without jhāna. But one with both jhāna and wisdom, he's on the verge of nibbāna. (Dhp 372)

“Knowledge and vision of things as they are” (yathā-bhūta-ñāṇa-dassana) begins to develop in the explicit system, in learning to distinguish right view from wrong view. Wrong views are presumptions of the explicit system, for instance self-view, the bifurcation of the world into subject and object, and the conviction that behaviors and observances (sīlabbata) have special efficacy. These wrong views are comparatively easy to correct intellectually at the very adaptable explicit level. However, the behavioral patterns or dispositions associated with them are amenable only to slow development and cultivation in the stubborn implicit system. As a result, even as we abandon self-view explicity, self-centered behaviors and conceit may long linger,

Ven. Khemaka: “I do not regard anything among these five aggregates of appropriation as self or as of self, yet I am not an arahant without corruptions. For with regard to the five grasping aggregates I’m not rid of the conceit ‘I am.’ But I don’t regard anything as ‘I am this.’”
(SN 22.89)

Attaining knowledge and vision of things as they are is effectively seeing directly through the eyes of the Buddha, immediately and spontaneously as a result of deep internalization of Dhamma through repeated skillful engage-ment, for which the exercises of satipaṭṭhāna practice are particularly well chosen. This process commonly proceeds through a series of “insights,” or “seeing otherwise,” beyond normal experience, indicative of internalization. We discover, in the mechanics of the jhānas, several points at which such insights are plausibly inspired:

(1) Many of our conceptualizations and narratives, including our worst presumptions (such as of the existence of a substantial self) seem not to be sustained after thought and deliberation have been curtailed in the second jhāna. For instance, the second jhāna and beyond are empty of subject and object.³⁸ In general, discursive thought tends toward the most pernicious forms of overthinking, and with its abandonment we, at least temporarily, experience a world devoid of such embellishment. With repetition we begin to internalize this way of “seeing otherwise.” This is a development in samādhi that is conducive to obtaining knowledge and vision.

(2) As the progressive curtailments found in the silent jhānas clear away complex conceptualizations, perception acquires crystal clarity,³⁹

Just as if there were a pool of water in a mountain glen—clear, limpid, and unsullied—where a man with good eyesight standing on the bank could see shells, gravel, and pebbles, and also shoals of fish swimming about and resting, … In the same way—with his mind thus composed [in samādhi], purified, and bright, unblemished, free from defects, pliant, malleable, steady, and attained to imperturbability—the monk directs and inclines it to the knowledge of the ending of the mental corruptions. (MN 39 i 279)

This lucidity plausibly reflects a partial reallocation to the faculty of percep-tion of explicit energy otherwise unused after the curtailment of other faculties. This is another development in samādhi that is conducive to obtaining knowledge and vision.

(3) Each point of curtailment entails a shift in what we experience as “reality,” and produces an “altered state of consciousness.” This in itself is a direct demonstration of an important component of things as they are, namely the across-the-board presumptiveness (see 5.1) of what we take to be real and substantial. Such shifts present various ways in which we might experience the world otherwise, and more beneficially. This is yet another development in samādhi that is conducive to obtaining knowledge and vision.

(4) The deeper jhānas, in particular, seem to encourage those mysterious flashes of insight that also in everyday life appear out of nowhere, often inducing one to utter “Aha!” and are accordingly called “aha-experiences.”⁴⁰ An aha-experience typically has its roots in earlier thought and deliberation about a challenging problem, which had reached an impasse and was put aside. This is followed by an “incubation period,” during which the problem is largely forgotten, at least explicitly. However, the resolution suddenly erupts into consciousness, typically at the most unlikely time (for instance, in a dream, or while taking a shower), from somewhere in the implicit system.⁴¹ This is itself indicative of the tendency of the implicit system to retain a theme and pursue it relentlessly, albeit unconsciously. I propose that the deeper jhānas provide a particularly effective context for incubation.⁴² Recall that recollection-discernment continues in the deep jhānas (see 6.3.4-5 above), virtually undetected. This is another development in samādhi that is conducive to obtaining knowledge and vision.

(5) As know-how is internalized, it is thoroughly integrated with many other domains of knowledge through the unique capacity of the implicit system to recognize complex patterns and associations that encompass diverse factors, weaving a kind of fabric of connections. For instance, the practices of kindness and generosity will support and be supported by the satipaṭṭhāna contempla-tion of non-self. This is a final development in samādhi that is conducive to obtaining knowledge and vision.

6.4.3. Recollection-discernment. Recall that this compound is closely identified with full skillful engagement in the primary task. What is recollected (and kept in mind to guide the practice) is Dhammic know-how; at the core of engagement is discernment, the executive control of performance. Full skillful engagement gives rise to samādhi, and samādhi in turn improves efficacy in performance and development of the primary task in these ways:

(1) Samādhi establishes one-centeredness around the theme of the primary task. This manages concentration to keep us on task. This is a development in samādhi that is conducive to recollection-discernment.

(2) Recall that internalization of skill or know-how eventually reaches, under normal circumstances, the third stage of the learning curve, at which a practice task is relatively effortless and without challenge, such that boredom might easily ensue and the energy otherwise dedicated to the task at hand might become dispersed or easily distracted. At this point further development toward expertise or toward awakening would reach a plateau. However, through concentration and curtailment of the most energetic faculties, samādhi induces the explicit system to operate at a lower energy level, leaving no excess energy for distractions, thus keeping the mind fruitfully engaged in the practice task.⁴³ This is a development in samādhi that is conducive to recollection-discernment.

(3) Bringing practice into the silent jhānas facilitates internalization, to reduce reliance on the clumsy and costly explicit system and to extend reliance on the quick and effortless implicit system. This hastens the offloading of skill from the explicit to the implicit system. This is a development in samādhi that is conducive to recollection-discernment.

(4) The implicit system takes on an active role in its own in development and performance as it discovers subtle patterns and associations in experience, weaving the internalized content of know-how into broader areas of knowledge, and into the very structure of perception.⁴⁴ Samādhi thereby makes Dhamma transformative.⁴⁵ This is a development in samādhi that is conducive to recollection-discernment.

6.4.4. Destruction of the corruptions. Knowledge and vision, encouraged by development and cultivation through full skillful engagement, bring us close to the destruction of the corruptions (āsavakkhāya), a common means of referring to final liberation. The corruptions (āsava) are sensuality (kāma), becoming (bhava) and ignorance (avijjā), the fundamental misguided tendencies of the mind with which the worldling is afflicted, whose complete removal marks the Buddhist virtuoso. The aforementioned developments are developments in samādhi that are conducive to the destruction of the corruptions. There is a development in samādhi that is conducive to the destruction of the corruptions.⁴⁶

6.5. Conclusions

For casual readers who have managed to reach this point in the text, I assure you: you don’t need to know all of the details of this exposition to benefit in your practice. My intentions are scholarly: I want to make a strong case for the feasibility of this interpretation of what the jhānas are, of their operation and of their function in comparison to alternatives that have been proposed, or that have become orthodox parts of accepted doctrine.

My case is based on a close reading of the early texts, but at the same time on its consistency with what we know about human cognition. Together, these two perspectives provide a natural explanation not only of what function jhāna serves, but of how it serves that function. Jhāna is a natural process; its mechanisms are already present and documented in general cognition. However, in Buddhism they are explicitly cultivated and refined, much as wolfing down food is refined in many cultural contexts into haute cuisine and table manners.

The central factor to understanding in this explanation is the role of internalization in the learning curve any skill, whereby know-how evolves from the slow conceptual deliberation of the novice to the spontaneous intuitions of the expert. Jhāna is ideally suited to working with the expert’s end of this curve, so that Dhammic mastery can advance to Dhammic virtuosity. In the case of satipaṭṭhāna practice, its contribution is vital to the attainment of knowledge and vision.

¹ Shulman (2014, pp. 7-12).

² Full skillful engagement is defined in 2.1.2 and developed throughout chapter 2. There it is identified with the satipaṭṭhāna faculties, listed at the beginning of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta: “… ardent, discerning, and recollective, having put away covetousness and grief for the world …”

³ Pīti is the fourth awaking factor, following the three factors of recollection, dhamma-investigation, and energy, which describe full skillful engagement in satipaṭṭhāna practice, and followed by tranquility, samādhi and equanimity (see 1.5.2).

⁴ The three phases of being over-challenged, comfortably challenged, and under-challenged are described in psychology by Csikszentmihali (1997, pp. 30-32), who associates the first with anxiety, the third with boredom, and only the second with producing conditions conducive to “flow,” which we will introduce momentarily.

⁵ This model is called dual-process theory. See Kahneman (2011), Gladwell (2005), Bronkhorst (2023), T.D. Wilson (2002), McMahan (2023, p. 73), etc.

⁶ The sluggishness of the explicit system is reflected in the fact that it actually consumes glucose in the brain at a very high rate, whose supply is easily exhausted, a condition suggestively called “ego-depletion” in neuroscience.

⁷ T.D. Wilson (2002, pp. 49, 66).

⁸ This is the theme of Gladwell’s (2005) popular book.

⁹ Ericsson & Pool (2016, p. 133).

¹⁰ Such competition is generally avoided in Buddhist practice, because it is a ready source of craving.

¹¹ For the across-the-board justification for translating ekagga as ‘one-centeredness’ see 3.2.

¹² See 1.5.2, 5.3.3.

¹³ See 3.1.1 for more on this.

¹⁴ Arbel (2017, p. 39).

¹⁵ Ericsson & Pool (2016, p. 81).

¹⁶ Slingerland (2014, p. 1).

¹⁷ SN 35.145, AN 4.235.

¹⁸ Garfield (2021, p. 24).

¹⁹ He is sīlavā, but not sīla-maya. MN 78 ii 27.

²⁰ Gombrich (1997, p. 36). Shulman (2014, p. 111) refers to “a method by which philosophy [i.e., Dharma] is turned into an active way of seeing,” and Kuan (2015, pp. 58-9) to directing perception to conform to Dhamma such that wisdom results.

²¹ Kahneman (2011, p. 55).

²² Csikszentmihalyi (1990) is the most accessible introduction to flow theory, by its leading proponent. There is also a substantial academic literature. Csikszentmihalyi recognizes (pp. 103-6) a possible link between flow experience and samādhi (albeit samādhi as defined in later Yoga traditions). Bronkhorst (2023), a scholar of Buddhism, also recognizes the relationship of flow to samādhi.

²³ Csikszentmihalyi (1997, p. 31).

²⁴ Dietrich (2003).

²⁵ The Buddhist scholar Bronkhorst (2023) briefly suggests the relationship of this work to the jhānas, particularly with regard to altered states of consciousness.

²⁶ For instance in AN 4.94.

²⁷ This seems to be a point of equivocation here in the early texts: do we enter the first jhāna with seclusion alone, or also with one-pointedness? The texts suggest the former, but then samādhi, by definition, arises with the latter.

²⁸“Thought and deliberation are the verbal fabrication, one breaks into speech.”
 (MN 44 i 301)

²⁹ As we go along, I will include some qualities of the meditator’s subjective experi-ence.

³⁰ Kumāra (2022, pp. 49-52) makes the case etymologically for the translation ‘equipoise.’ I will provide a potential alternative interpretation in a footnote at the end of this section.

³¹ Samatha has gotten ahead of vipassanā, in the case of Dhamma investigation.

³² E.g., SN 21.1 ii 273.

³³ For evidence that skilled engagement continues unheard, see 6.3.2-5).

³⁴ See 5.4.5 on these qualities of feelings.

³⁵ The following section is a more detailed version of 3.5.

³⁶ See Cintita (2025, 10.5) on knowledge and vision.

³⁷ Arbel (2017, p. 4).

³⁸ Arbel (2017, p. 91).

³⁹ Shulman (2014, p. 36).

⁴⁰ Slingerland (2014, p. 147). Zander & Öllinger (2016) observe additionally that this kind of insight is immediately accepted as self-evident and felt as a strong emotional experience.  

⁴¹ T.D. Wilson (2002, pp. 171-2) points out that gaining insight in this way can be deliberately induced to good advantage (independently of jhāna): gather relevant information on the problem, but instead of analyzing it, entrust it to the implicit system for a more accurate result. A day or so later, maybe while tying your shoes, “Aha!” (I discovered and made use of this technique myself when I was in graduate school.)

⁴² Emanating from the implicit system, such insights often defy conceptual explanation. A famous sayadaw recounts that when he was a young meditator, he unconvincingly described such an experience to his fellow practitioners as, “You can smell only with the nose.” His teacher admonished him, “If you have an insight, don’t tell anyone about it; they will think you are crazy.”

⁴³ This might feasibly be subject to verification in terms of glucose consumption in relevant parts of the brain.

⁴⁴ As Shulman (2014, pp. 106-7) puts it.

⁴⁵ Shulman (2014, p. 50).

⁴⁶ On corruptions, see Cintita (2025, 11.1).

MN 10: Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta

Recollection-Attentiveness Discourse

[Opening.] Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was living in the Kuru country where there was a town of the Kurus named Kammāsa-dhamma.

There he addressed the bhikkhus, “Bhikkhus.”

“Venerable sir,” they replied.

The Blessed One said this:

This is the one way, bhikkhus, a path for the purification of beings [i 56], for the surmounting of sorrow and lamentation, for the disappearance of pain and grief, for the attainment of the true way, for the realization of nibbāna, namely, the four satipaṭṭhānas.

What are the four? Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body, ardent, discerning, and recollective, having put away covetousness and grief for the world. He abides feeling-contemplating among the feelings, ardent, discerning, and recollective, having put away covetousness and grief for the world. He abides mind-contemplating in the mind, ardent, discerning, and recollective, having put away covetousness and grief for the world. He abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas, ardent, discerning, and recollective, having put away covetousness and grief for the world.

[First satipaṭṭhāna, contemplation of body.] And how, bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu abide body-contemplating in the body?

[I.1 Breath exercise.] Here a bhikkhu, gone to the forest or to the root of a tree or to an empty hut, sits down; having folded his legs crosswise, sets his body erect, recollectively attending to what is in front. Recollective, he breathes in, recollective he breathes out. Breathing in long, he discerns, “I breathe in long”; or breathing out long, he discerns, “I breathe out long.” Breathing in short, he discerns, “I breathe in short”; or breathing out short, he discerns, “I breathe out short.” He trains thus: “I shall breathe in experiencing the whole body”; he trains thus: “I shall breathe out experiencing the whole body.” He trains thus: “I shall breathe in tranquilizing the bodily fabrication”; he trains thus: “I shall breathe out tranquilizing the bodily fabrication.”

Just as a skilled lathe-operator or his apprentice, when making a long turn, discerns, “I make a long turn”; or, when making a short turn, discerns, “I make a short turn”; so too, breathing in long, a bhikkhu discerns, “I breathe in long” … he trains thus: “I shall breathe out tranquilizing the bodily fabrication.”

[Refrain.] In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, or he abides body-contemplating in the body externally, or he abides body-contemplating in the body both internally and externally.

He abides contemplating in the body the nature of origination, or he abides contemplating in the body the nature of vanishing, or he abides contemplating in the body the nature of both origination and vanishing.

Recollection that “the body exists” is simply established in him to the extent necessary for bare knowledge and recollection.

He abides independent. He doesn’t cling to anything in the world. That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

[I.2 Postures exercise.] Again, bhikkhus, when walking, a bhikkhu discerns, “I am walking.” When standing, he discerns, “I am standing.” When sitting, [i 57] he discerns, “I am sitting.” When lying down, he discerns, “I am lying down.” Or he discerns accordingly however his body is disposed.

[Refrain.] In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

[I.3 Activities exercise.] Again, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu is one who acts with discernment when going forward and returning, who acts with discernment when looking ahead and looking away, who acts with discernment when flexing and extending his limbs, who acts with discernment when wearing his robes and carrying his outer robe and bowl, who acts with discernment when eating, drinking, consuming food, and tasting; who acts with discernment when defecating and urinating; who acts with discernment when walking, standing, sitting, falling asleep, waking up, talking, and keeping silent.

[Refrain.] In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

[I.4 Body parts exercise.] Again, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu reviews this same body up from the soles of the feet and down from the top of the hair, bounded by skin, as full of many kinds of impurity thus: “In this body there are head-hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, bone-marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, diaphragm, spleen, lungs, intestines, mesentery, contents of the stomach, feces, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, grease, saliva, snot, oil of the joints, and urine.”

Just as though there were a bag with an opening at both ends full of many sorts of grain, such as hill rice, red rice, beans, peas, millet, and white rice, and a man with good eyes were to open it and review it thus: “This is hill rice, this is red rice, these are beans, these are peas, this is millet, this is white rice”; so too, a bhikkhu reviews this same body… as full of many kinds of impurity thus: “In this body there are head-hairs … and urine.”

[Refrain.] In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

[I.5 Elements exercise.] Again, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu reviews this same body, however it is placed, however disposed, by way of elements thus: “In this body there are the earth element, the water element, the fire element, and the air element.” [i 58]

Just as though a skilled butcher or his apprentice had killed a cow and was seated at the crossroads with it cut up into pieces; so too, a bhikkhu reviews this same body, however it is placed, however disposed, by way of elements thus: “In this body there are the earth element, the water element, the fire element, and the air element.”

[Refrain.] In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

[I.6 Corpse exercise.] Again, bhikkhus, as though he were to see a corpse thrown aside in a charnel ground, one, two, or three days dead, bloated, livid, and oozing matter, a bhikkhu compares this same body with it thus: “This body too is of the same nature, it will be like that, it is not exempt from that fate.”

[Refrain.] In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

[I.7 Corpse exercise.] Again, as though he were to see a corpse thrown aside in a charnel ground, being devoured by crows, hawks, vultures, dogs, jackals, or various kinds of worms, a bhikkhu compares this same body with it thus: “This body too is of the same nature, it will be like that, it is not exempt from that fate.”

[Refrain.] In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

[I.8 Corpse exercise.] Again, as though he were to see a corpse thrown aside in a charnel ground, a skeleton with flesh and blood, held together with sinews, a bhikkhu compares this same body with it thus: “This body too is of the same nature, it will be like that, it is not exempt from that fate.”

[Refrain.] In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

[I.9 Corpse exercise.] Again, as though he were to see a corpse thrown aside in a charnel ground, a fleshless skeleton smeared with blood, held together with sinews, a bhikkhu compares this same body with it thus: “This body too is of the same nature, it will be like that, it is not exempt from that fate.”

[Refrain.] In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

[I.10 Corpse exercise.] Again, as though he were to see a corpse thrown aside in a charnel ground, a skeleton without flesh and blood, held together with sinews, a bhikkhu compares this same body with it thus: “This body too is of the same nature, it will be like that, it is not exempt from that fate.”

[Refrain.] In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

[I.11 Corpse exercise.] Again, as though he were to see a corpse thrown aside in a charnel ground, disconnected bones scattered in all directions—here a hand-bone, there a foot-bone, here a shin-bone, there a thigh-bone, here a hip-bone, there a back-bone, here a rib-bone, there a breast-bone, here an arm-bone, there a shoulder-bone, here a neck-bone, there a jaw-bone, here a tooth, there the skull—a bhikkhu compares this same body with it thus: “This body too is of the same nature, it will be like that, it is not exempt from that fate.”

[Refrain.] In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

[I.12 Corpse exercise.] Again, as though he were to see a corpse thrown aside in a charnel ground, bones bleached white, the color of shells, a bhikkhu compares this same body with it thus: “This body too is of the same nature, it will be like that, it is not exempt from that fate.”

[Refrain.] In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

[I.13 Corpse exercise.] Again, as though he were to see a corpse thrown aside in a charnel ground, bones heaped up, more than a year old [i 59], a bhikkhu compares this same body with it thus: “This body too is of the same nature, it will be like that, it is not exempt from that fate.”

[Refrain.] In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

[I.14 Corpse exercise.] Again, as though he were to see a corpse thrown aside in a charnel ground, rotted and crumbled to dust, a bhikkhu compares this same body with it thus: “This body too is of the same nature, it will be like that, it is not exempt from that fate.”

[Refrain.] In this way he abides body-contemplating in the body internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides body-contemplating in the body.

[Second satipaṭṭhāna, contemplation of feelings.] And how, bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu abide feeling-contemplating among the feelings?

[II. Feelings exercise.] Here, when experiencing a pleasant feeling, a bhikkhu discerns, “I experience a pleasant feeling”; when experiencing a painful feeling, he discerns, “I experience a painful feeling”; when experiencing a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he discerns, “I experience a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.”

When experiencing a worldly pleasant feeling, he discerns, “I experience a worldly pleasant feeling”; when experiencing an unworldly pleasant feeling, he discerns, “I experience an unworldly pleasant feeling.”

When experiencing a worldly painful feeling, he discerns, “I experience a worldly painful feeling”; when experiencing an unworldly painful feeling, he discerns, “I experience an unworldly painful feeling.”

When experiencing a worldly neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he discerns, “I experience a worldly neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling”; when experiencing an unworldly neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he discerns, “I experience an unworldly neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.”

[Refrain.] In this way he abides feeling-contemplating among the feelings internally, or he abides feeling-contemplating among the feelings externally, or he abides feeling-contemplating among the feelings both internally and externally.

He abides contemplating among the feelings the nature of origination, or he abides contemplating among the feelings the nature of vanishing, or he abides contemplating among the feelings the nature of both origination and vanishing.

Recollection that “the feelings exist” is simply established in him to the extent necessary for bare knowledge and recollection.

He abides independent. He doesn’t cling to anything in the world. That is how a bhikkhu abides feeling-contemplating among the feelings.

[Third satipaṭṭhāna, contemplation of mind.] And how, bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu abide mind-contemplating in the mind?

[III. Mind exercise.] Here a bhikkhu discerns mind affected by lust as mind affected by lust, and mind unaffected by lust as mind unaffected by lust. He discerns mind affected by hate as mind affected by hate, and mind unaffected by hate as mind unaffected by hate. He discerns mind affected by delusion as mind affected by delusion, and mind unaffected by delusion as mind unaffected by delusion. He discerns attentive mind as attentive mind, and scattered mind as scattered mind. He discerns distinguished mind as distinguished mind, and undistinguished mind as undistinguished mind. He discerns superior mind as superior mind, and unsurpassed mind as unsurpassed mind. He discerns composed mind [mind in samādhi] as composed mind, and uncomposed mind as uncomposed mind. He discerns liberated mind as liberated mind, and unliberated mind as unliberated mind.

[Refrain.] In this way he abides mind-contemplating in the mind internally, or he abides mind-contemplating in the mind externally, or he abides mind-contemplating in the mind both internally and externally.

He abides contemplating in the mind the nature of origination, or he abides contemplating in the mind the nature of vanishing, or he abides contemplating in the mind the nature of both origination and vanishing.

Recollection that “the mind exists” is simply established in him to the extent necessary for bare knowledge and recollection.

He abides independent. He doesn’t cling to anything in the world. That is how a bhikkhu abides mind-contemplating in the mind.

[Fourth satipaṭṭhāna, contemplation of dhammas.] And how, bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu abide dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas?

[IV.1 Hindrances exercise.] Here a bhikkhu abides dhamma-contemplating among dhammas in terms of the five hindrances. And how does a bhikkhu abide dhamma-contemplating among dhammas in terms of the five hindrances?

Here, there being sensual desire in him, a bhikkhu discerns, “There is sensual desire in me”; or there being no sensual desire in him, he comprehends, “There is no sensual desire in me”; and he also discerns how there comes to be the origination of unoriginated sensual desire, and how there comes to be the abandoning of originated sensual desire, and how there comes to be the future nonorigination of abandoned sensual desire.”

There being ill will in him…

There being sloth and torpor in him…

There being restlessness and remorse in him…

There being doubt in him, a bhikkhu discerns, “There is doubt in me”; or there being no doubt in him, he discerns, “There is no doubt in me”; and he discerns how there comes to be the origination of unoriginated doubt, and how there comes to be the abandoning of originated doubt, and how there comes to be the future non-origination of abandoned doubt.

[Refrain.] In this way he abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas internally, or he abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas externally, or he abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas both internally and externally.

He abides contemplating among the dhammas the nature of origination, or he abides contemplating among the dhammas the nature of vanishing, or he abides contemplating among the dhammas the nature of both origination and vanishing.

The recollection that “there are the dhammas” is simply established in him to the extent necessary for bare knowledge and recollection.

 He abides independent. He doesn’t cling to anything in the world. That is how a bhikkhu abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas in terms of the five hindrances.

[IV.2 Aggregates exercise.] Again, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas [i 61] in terms of the five appropriation-aggregates. And how does a bhikkhu abide dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas in terms of five appropriation-aggregates? Here a bhikkhu discerns, “Such is form, such form’s origination, such form’s disappearance. Such is feeling, such feeling’s origination, such feeling’s disappearance.  Such is perception, such perception’s origination, such perception’s disappearance. Such are fabrications, such fabrications’ origination, such fabrications’ disappearance. Such is consciousness, such consciousness’s origination, such consciousness’s disappearance.”

[Refrain.] In this way he abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas in terms of the five appropriation-aggregates.

[IV.3 Sense-spheres exercise.] Again, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas in terms of the six internal and exterior spheres. And how does a bhikkhu abide dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas in terms of the six internal and exterior spheres?

Here a bhikkhu discerns the eye, he discerns forms, and he discerns the fetter that originates dependent on both; and he also discerns how there comes to be the origination of the unoriginated fetter, and how there comes to be the abandoning of the originated fetter, and how there comes to be the future non-origination of the abandoned fetter.

He discerns the ear, he discerns sounds…

He discerns the nose, he discerns odors…

He discerns the tongue, he discerns flavors…

He discerns body, he discerns tangibles…

He discerns mind, he discerns dhammas, and he discerns the fetter that originates dependent on both; and he also discerns how there comes to be the origination of the unoriginated fetter, and how there comes to be the abandoning of the originated fetter, and how there comes to be the future non-origination of the abandoned fetter.

[Refrain.] In this way he abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas in terms of the six internal and exterior spheres.

[IV.4 Awakening factors exercise.] Again, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas in terms of the seven awakening factors. And how does a bhikkhu abide dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas in terms of the seven awakening factors?

Here, there being the recollection awakening factor in him, a bhikkhu compre-hends: “There is the recollection awakening factor in me”; or there being no recollection awakening factor in him, he discerns: [i 62] “There is no recollection awakening factor in me”; and he also discerns how there comes to be the origination of the unoriginated recollection awakening factor, and how the originated recollection awakening factor comes to fulfillment by development.

There being the dhamma-investigation awakening factor in him, …

There being the energy awakening factor in him, …

There being the rapture awakening factor in him, …

There being the tranquility awakening factor in him, …

There being the samādhi awakening factor in him, …

There being the equanimity awakening factor in him, … comes to fulfillment by development.

[Refrain.] In this way he abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas in terms of the seven awakening factors.

[IV.5 Noble truths exercise.] Again, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas in terms of the Four Noble Truths. And how does a bhikkhu abide dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas in terms of the Four Noble Truths?

Here a bhikkhu discerns as it actually is: “This is suffering”; he discerns as it actually is: “This is the origin of suffering”; he discerns as it actually is: “This is the cessation of suffering”; he discerns as it actually is: “This is the way leading to the cessation of suffering.”

[Refrain.] In this way he abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas internally, … That is how a bhikkhu abides dhamma-contemplating among the dhammas in terms of the Four Noble Truths.

[Conclusion.] Bhikkhus, if anyone should develop these four satipaṭṭhānas in such a way for seven years, one of two fruits could be expected for him: either final knowledge here and now, or if there is a trace of clinging left, non-return. Let alone seven years, bhikkhus. [i 63] If anyone should develop these four satipaṭṭhānas in such a way for six years … for five years … for four years … for three years … for two years … for one year, one of two fruits could be expected for him: either final knowledge here and now, or if there is a trace of clinging left, non-return. Let alone one year, bhikkhus. If anyone should develop these four satipaṭṭhānas in such a way for seven months … for six months … for five months … for four months … for three months … for two months … for one month … for half a month, one of two fruits could be expected for him: either final knowledge here and now, or if there is a trace of clinging left, non-return. Let alone half a month, bhikkhus. If anyone should develop these four satipaṭṭhānas in such a way for seven days, one of two fruits could be expected for him: either final knowledge here and now, or if there is a trace of clinging left, non-return.

So it was with reference to this that it was said: “Bhikkhus, this is the direct path for the purification of beings, for the surmounting of sorrow and lamentation, for the disappearance of pain and grief, for the attainment of the true way, for the realization of Nibbāna, namely, the four satipaṭṭhānas.”

That is what the Blessed One said. The bhikkhus were satisfied and delighted in the Blessed One”s words.

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Glossary

Included are novel technical terms and non-standard or potentially confusing translations of Pali terms. References into the chapters of the book provide additional explanation of how these terms are to be understood here.

ajjhatta - ‘internal.’

anupassanā - ‘contemplation,’ ‘investigation.’

appropriation - upādāna.

āsava - ‘corruption.’

attentive recollection - upaṭṭhita sati.

attentiveness - upaṭṭhāna.

attitude - saṅkappa, commonly ‘thought,’ ‘intention.’

auxiliary practice - practice that serves a primary practice, notably the faculties of right effort, right recollection and right samādhi. See 2.3, 2.4.1.

bahiddhā - ‘external.’

bāhira - ‘exterior.’

bahulīkata - ‘cultivated.’

bhāvanā – ‘development.’

body/self - see under ‘facet.’

centered - ekagga, see under ‘one-centered.’

composed - samāhita.

composure - samādhi.

concentration - narrowing scope of attention to single theme, ‘one-centeredness.’ See 3.2, 6.2.2. Contrast with ‘curtailment.’

consciousness/self - see ‘facet.’

contemplation - anupassanā.

corruption - āsava.

curtailment - deactivation of specific cognitive faculty, aspect of samādhi. See 3.3, 6.3.1.

development - bhāvana.

development and cultivation - bhavanā-bahulīkata.

dhamma (lower case) - ‘Dhamma teaching,’ sometimes ‘factor of experience,’ or ‘observable.’

discerning - sampajāna.

discernment - sampajāñña.

discursive thought - vitakka-vicāra, = ‘thought and deliberation.’

dual-process model - distinguishes explicit and implicit cognition and their functions. See 6.1.2.

ekagga - ‘(one-)centered.’

ekodibhāva - ‘equipoise.’

equipoise - ekodhibhāva.

explicit (cognition, system) - deliberate, conscious, see ‘dual-process model.’

fabrication - saṅkhāra.

facet (of self) - body/self, consciousness/self or mind/self, presumption of self on basis of distinct realm of observables. See 1.6.

faculty – a factor that promotes the efficacy of some practice. See chapter 2.

faculty group - the path factors of right effort, right recollection and right samādhi.

feeling - vedanā, commonly ‘impression,’ ‘sensation,’ ‘hedonic tone.’

flow - state of altered consciousness studied in positive psychology. See 6.3.1.

implicit (cognition, system) - (nearly) unconscious, effortless intuitive, see ‘dual-process model.’

internalization - offloading from explicit to implicit cognition, natural result of development and cultivation. See 6.1.2.

jhāna - untranslated.

know-how - (partially) internalized skill.

maññati - ‘presume.’ See 5.5.1.

maññita - ‘presumption.’ See 5.5.1.

mind - citta.

mind/self - see ‘facet.’

nimitta - ‘theme.’

observable - factor arising in (direct) experience. See 5.1.

one-centered - ekagga, also ‘centered,’ concentrated around theme of current practice task. See 3.2.

origination - samudaya.

pīti - ‘rapture.’

presume - maññati.

presumption - maññita, fabrication with conviction of validity. See 1.6, 5.1, 5.5.1.

primary practice - task served by an auxiliary practice, notably right view, right attitude, right speech, right action and right livelihood. See 2.3, 2.4.1.

rapture - pīti.

recollection - sati. See 2.2.1.

recollection-attentiveness - literal meaning of satipaṭṭhāna, but only preserved in cognate forms, such as upaṭṭhitā sati ‘attentive recollection.’ See 2.2.2.

recollection-discernment - sati-sampajāñña, also roughly ‘full skillful engagement.’

recollective - satimā.

right recollection - sammāsati. See 2.4.

rūpa - ‘form,’ raw sense data (not ‘body’).

samādhi - untranslated, also ‘composure.’

samādhi-nimitta - ‘theme of samādhi.’

samāhita - ‘composed,’ ‘in samādhi.’

sammā sati - ‘right recollection.’

sampajāna - ‘discerning.’

sampajāñña - ‘discernment.’

samudaya - ‘origination,’ basis of contingency.

saṅkhāra - ‘fabrication.’

sati - ‘recollection’ (of know-how or practical skill), commonly ‘mindfulness’ (but see chapter 4).

satimā - ‘recollective.’

satipaṭṭhāna - untranslated, sati + upaṭṭhāna, literally ‘recollection-attentiveness.’ See 2.2.2.

sati-sampajāñña - ‘recollection-discernment,’ ‘full skillful engagement.’ See 2.2.4.

satipaṭṭhāna faculties - “ardent, discerning, proficient, secluded.” See 2.1.2.

secluded (mind) - vivicca, with hindrances at bay.

seclusion - viveka, absence of worldly distractions, hindrances at bay.

signature exercise - exercise within Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta independent of accompanying refrain.

full skillful engagement - practice in accordance with satipaṭṭhāna faculties. Recollection-discernment and recollection-attentiveness are (near) synonyms. See 2.1.2, 6.1.1.

synthetic technique (meditation) - specialized technique to induce deliberately a meditative state. See 3.1.0, 3.2.2.

teaching (of Dhamma) - dhamma (lower case).

theme - nimitta, factors relevant for performance of current practice task, particularly dhammas and observables. See 1.5.1, 3.2, 6.2.2.

theme of samādhi - samādhi-nimitta. See 1.5.1, 3.2, 6.2.2.

thought and deliberation, - vitakka-vicāra, also ‘discursive thinking.’

three signs - tilakkhaṇa.

tilakkhaṇa - ‘three signs.’

upādāna - ‘appropriation,’ commonly ‘attachment,’ ‘clinging.’

upaṭṭhāna - ‘attentiveness.’

upaṭṭhita sati - ‘attentive recollection.’

vedanā - ‘feeling,’ commonly ‘feeling,’ ‘sensation.’

vipassanā - active, conceptual investigation of Dhamma.

vitakka-vicāra, - ‘thought and deliberation.’

viveka - ‘seclusion.’

vivicca - ‘secluded.’

Series: Early Buddhism for Modern Buddhists

 by Bhikkhu Cintita

Buddhist Life/Buddhist Path: the foundations of Buddhism based on earliest sources, third edition. (2025)

Mindfulness, where Dharma meets practice: an introduction to Early Buddhism, second edition (2025)

Dependent Coarising: meaning construction in the twelve links. (2021)

Satipaṭṭhāna Rethought: a meditation manual based on earliest Buddhist texts. (2024)

To order or download any of these books go to:

                https://cintita.org/books/

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